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I.—ON DELBRÜCK'S VEDIC SYNTAX.¹

Ever since the publication of this work, now four years ago, I have been desiring and planning to pass it in review, but have been unable hitherto to carry out my intention. Since, however (so far as has come to my knowledge), no detailed or penetrating criticism of it has yet appeared, the present attempt at one will not, I presume, be thought belated.

That the volume is an extremely valuable contribution to Vedic science, being unusually able, careful and accurate, full of sound knowledge conscientiously worked out and lucidly presented, does not require to be stated; the author's reputation, founded on earnest and successful labors, is a sufficient warrant of that. It is one which every student of the Vedic writings, especially of the Brāhmaṇa division of them, should have always at hand for consultation.

I speak of the work as a "Vedic" syntax, although the author calls it "Alt-Indisch"; we have no current English term corresponding to the latter; and, moreover, the author might himself perhaps have done as well to use the word "Vedisch." Though we speak in a looser and more popular way of Veda and Brāhmaṇa as opposed to one another, there is no doubt that "Veda" belongs just as much to the Brāhmaṇas as to the hymn- and *yajus*-collections to which we try to limit it. Properly, it is all Veda, with the subdivisions *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa* (and *sūtra*, which is not included in the plan of this work); and M for *mantra* and B for *brāhmaṇa* would have been in many respects preferable to

¹Altindische Syntax, von B. Delbrück (Syntactische Forschungen, V). Halle, 1888. Roy. 8vo, pp. xxi, 634.

our author's adopted signs of V for Veda and P for "prose" (I as if there were not plenty of prose that is *mantra*, and so not included in "P"). Professor Delbrück speaks of *my* using the name "Alt-Indisch," in the title of my grammar, in a somewhat different sense, curiously overlooking the fact that it was not I, but the German translator, who employed it. If one is so fortunate as to have his translation made by a scholar of independent and high standing and repute, one willingly accepts the latter's decision on various points, whether one approves it or not.¹

To the method of transliteration employed (p. viii), agreeing with that in the earlier parts of the series of Syntactische Forschungen, no one can take serious exception. It might be wished that for the vowel *r* we had *ṛ* instead of the gratuitously distorting *ṛi*; but there seems to exist hardly any traceable tendency among Sanskrit scholars to come to an agreement upon this point, or upon any other in the whole system; new elements of confusion are added by new scholars from time to time; and even such an utterly perverse feature as Aufrecht's later introduction of *ṣ* for the palatal sibilant finds imitators among those from whom better things were to be expected.

Beside the conveniently brief designations (AB., TB., etc.) for the other Brāhmaṇas, "Tāṇḍ.-Br." for that to the Sāma-Veda seems awkward; why is not PB. (for the equally correct title Pañcaviṅṣa-Brahmaṇa), or TMB. (for Tāṇḍya-Mahā-Brahmaṇa, as the edition calls it), altogether acceptable? This is another subject upon which agreement among Sanskrit scholars is more to be wished than hoped for; the example of RV., AV., SV., etc. (these being already nearly universal), might with great advantage be carried by common consent at least through all the limited records of the Vedic literature.

To the author's strictures (p. ix) on my preference of the *ṛ*-form of a root (*kṛ* instead of *kar*, etc.) I have replied elsewhere (JAOS., vol. XIV, p. cxlviii, Proceedings for October, 1889). He was unfortunate in resting his objection to it on untenable ground; if he had had occasion to make a grammatical statement of the phonetic changes in inflection and derivation, he would certainly have found the *ṛ*-form the truly "practical" one. The difference is happily of minor consequence.

¹ It is only in regard to the unwieldy and grammatically incorrect rendering of "descriptive," as applied to compounds, by *appositionell-bestimmt* that there was any serious question between us.

Considering that the work is not one to be read through and then laid upon the shelf, but rather to be turned to for frequent help, it is to be regretted that the author has shown himself so little thoughtful for the convenience of his public. The volume is most unreasonably difficult to find anything in—difficult to a degree that must interfere not a little with its usefulness. One is astonished—it is hardly too much to say, incensed—at discovering no running titles to the pages to facilitate one's search. There are, indeed, headings to paragraphs; but, besides that it is a vexatious waste of time to have to look into the body of the page for information as to what is under discussion, many of the paragraphs cover several successive pages, even up to twenty-six. Such omission, far too common in German books, ought to be made a hanging offense. Indexes, also, though not altogether wanting, are (ten pages in large type) quite insufficient. The author of a book so fitted out cannot complain if his views on points of detail pass unnoticed. The list of passages from the *Brāhmaṇas* translated or referred to is all that could be desired, and will prove of high value to students of that class of works; but we are disappointed at not being furnished with such a list for *Rig-Veda* and *Atharva-Veda* as well. It seems to be the author's modesty that deprives us of this; he does not claim to be in any such sense an authority in the exegesis of the *Veda* as of the *Brāhmaṇa*; but his self-depreciation will be generally pronounced misplaced; his moderation, sound judgment, and critical faculty make his understanding of a difficult Vedic passage well worth consulting by any Vedic scholar, be he who he may.

A laudable manifestation of the author's good sense is seen in his occasional abnegation of all attempt to use a Vedic passage as being too obscure or difficult to suit his purpose. He wastes his space on no long-drawn discussions of insoluble puzzles; coolness, directness, and absence of display are characteristics of his work from one end to the other.

One is a little surprised at the first sentence of the work proper (p. 3^b),¹ declaring that "there are interjections that form a sentence"; in accordance with which we are later (33^b) told of vocatives that constitute a sentence. This seems to imply a peculiar and indefensible conception of what a sentence is. Surely, speak-

¹ For convenience of reference, I designate by a superior *a*, *b*, and *c* respectively the upper, middle, and lower parts of a page, as roughly estimated with the eye.

ing grammatically, it is a combination of a subject with a predicate to make an assertion, a union of parts of speech into a significant whole; or, when incomplete, it is the suggestion of such a combination, susceptible of and calling for a filling out to normal form. Is that true, in any proper sense, of an interjection or a vocative? I think decidedly not; these are words that stand outside the structure of the sentences with which they are (often) associated, not as being other sentences, but because they are essentially non-sentence-making utterances.

A much more important offense against true grammatical theory is the author's classification and treatment of infinitives and participles as verb-forms. "*Verbum infinitivum*" is the heading under which (367) he places them, and the name by which (49^a) he first mentions them; and his whole discussion of them is in accordance with this title, as if what required to be specially accounted for in regard to them was the qualities of noun and adjective which they in part display! We do not find anywhere an intimation that an infinitive, for example, is not just as good a "verb" as the 3d singular present indicative. This takes us back to the pre-Boppian period of grammatical science, when it was as yet undemonstrated that an infinitive is merely an oblique case of a verbal noun. Perhaps the false classification is at bottom only a concession to the force of classical habit in Germany, where, as elsewhere, the writers of text-books appear to be unable to give up the old modes of statement, however antiquated they may have grown. But, if so, the surrender is a complete one; not a hint is dropped that there is a truer and better way of looking at the facts involved. And a Vedic syntax is precisely the place where the right view should be not only set forth but insisted on. The grammatical distinction of noun and verb is the most ancient and fundamental in Indo-European language-history. The cleft between them goes to the very bottom, and is insuperable, like the cleft between subject and predicate—which, in fact, it primarily represents. Excepting the verb, all the other parts of speech have grown out of the noun; and a noun can still be a pronoun, an adjective, an adverb, a preposition, or a conjunction; but it cannot be a verb, nor can a verb be aught but a verb. That certain kinds of nouns and adjectives should attach themselves to the fortunes of verbs, sharing their range of meaning, their combinations with prefixes, even their constructions with dependent cases (in regard to which there is, as between verb and noun, no ultimate difference of

principle, but only a developed difference of linguistic habit)—all this is natural enough, and gives good reason for the names "verbal noun" and "verbal adjective," designating various degrees of closeness of verbal connection; but it does not justify our calling a noun or adjective by the name "verb." A certain group of verbal adjectives, the so-called "participles," have pretty clearly had that character ever since the period of Indo-European unity, and in most Indo-European languages they are held distinctly apart, in meaning and construction, from the general mass of adjectives; but in Sanskrit, which certainly in this respect represents an older condition of things, the line between ordinary adjective and participle is but uncertainly drawn, and transfers across it take place before our eyes during the historic period of the language. As for the infinitive, I think it extremely questionable whether any such outside appendage to the verb-system is of pro-ethnic age; the category is too obviously in the full career of development in earliest Sanskrit to allow the assumption. And here, even more strikingly than in the case of the participles, there is no distinct line to be drawn between infinitive and ordinary noun. The Vedic infinitive has nearly all the oblique case-forms of a noun, each used in its proper case-constructions; it includes a considerable variety of verbal derivatives, and a number of other derivatives approach it nearly in construction; certain others (as the formations in *-ana*, in *-in*, and in *-tar*) follow hardly less closely the verbal senses, and take as freely the verbal prefixes; and the list of nouns that admit an accusative object overruns considerably the borders of the so-called infinitive class. It seems to me utterly inadmissible to apply the title "verb" to words that have cases and genders and that do not predicate. What is a verb, then? One can but wonder what definition the author of this work would give. I have long been accustomed to maintain that any one who does not see that a noun is a word that designates and a verb a word that asserts, and who is not able to hold on to this distinction as an absolute and universal one (within the limits of our family of languages), has no real bottom to his grammatical science. And I have seldom been more surprised than to find Delbrück accepting and perpetuating the exploded category of the "*verbum infinitivum*." It is worth noting, however, that he does not commit the crowning absurdity, as seen from the point of view of sound grammatical theory, of calling the infinitive a "mode" of the verb.

Though treating them under the same general head with the rest, the author almost allows (396) that the gerundives (or future passive participles) are nothing but verbal adjectives—one quite fails to see why, if the other participles are anything else, since they too possess the general characteristics of participles. But it is, in my view, a serious omission on his part not to point out their altogether modern formation, as not primary but secondary derivatives (perfectly obvious in the case of those in *-tva*, *-tavya*, and *-aniya*, wholly probable for the others); for this helps to the proper estimate of their syntactical character. It is yet harder to understand why he apologizes (382ⁿ) for reckoning “the adjective in *-ta*” (what we call the past passive participle) to the participles, since it differs in no important respect from the others;¹ it does not, to be sure, take an object-noun as complement; but that is nothing essential. He defines (ib.) its character thus: “it is associated with a noun in order to indicate that on it [the noun] the action of the verb is exhibited.” This is one of those explanations that do not explain of which the work offers here and there a not inconsiderable number of instances. So the present participle exhibits the action of the verb *in* a noun; and the distinction between *in* and *on* is just that between active and passive; so that the definition means merely that the “adjective in *-ta*” is a passive and not an active participle.

It does not seem in accordance with the usual sober good sense of the author that (4ⁿ), while acknowledging impersonal verbs to be in part the result of an indefinitizing and obliteration of the subject-element in personal ones, he yet maintains that others are original—that, beside the 3d personal form for use with subjects, there was one, identical with it, for expression of subjectless action. If it is easy to win subjectless expression from that with subjects, every language having its own examples and in part its own peculiar methods of arriving at them, why should not all have been won in that way? Because *it* in *it rains* designates nothing definable, we do not infer that there was an original *it* expressing indefinite non-subjectivity beside the same pronoun in its ordinary neuter sense. If the Indo-European tongue had impersonal expressions, they were doubtless of the same secondary origin with those of later date. Inflective speech does not begin with the incorporation of grammatical indefinitenesses.

It would at sundry points have helped noticeably the clearness

¹ At 77^o it is even referred to as the participle *par excellence*.

of presentation if the category of the objective predicate, the adjective or noun made through a verb predicative to its direct object, had been recognized. That there is anything adverbial (79^a), either in the Sanskrit or in its translation, about an adjective qualifying the object of *kr* 'make'—"he makes them *faithful* to him"—is not to be conceded; nor do such cases as those treated in §122 (178-9) come for the most part properly under the head of a verb governing two accusatives.

The term "indirect question," as applied to an object-clause of a certain character ('I know not *whither I shall go*' is the author's example), is a common one in grammars, growing out of our conversion of an interrogative word to relative use; but it is always incorrect and objectionable, since, when once the word has been made relative, it no longer asks a question. But in Sanskrit, where the relative is not of interrogative origin, the term is peculiarly misapplied, and its introduction into Sanskrit syntax (as at 569^b) is altogether to be deprecated.

All these are matters which do not directly concern the specific subject of the work, but rather the grammatical theories of its author; yet they have a good right to be noticed, because theoretical error is always more or less detrimental to the best practical presentation of grammatical phenomena. We may go on now to take up certain points of general interest, in the order in which they occur.

Under the head of "accentuation of the members of a sentence," when treating of the vocative, the author makes the statement (34^a) that we find in the interior of the sentence (or verse) such accent as *viçve devāḥ*, not *viçve devāḥ*, if there is a noun with a preceding adjective. He gives no references, and no such rule is laid down by Haskell (to whom he refers for the general discussion of the subject: JAOS. XI 57 ff.); nor has it ever suggested itself to me. No instance of *viçve devāḥ*, except at the beginning of a sentence, is to be found in either RV. or AV. (on the other hand, the latter has, at VI 114. 3, *viçve vo devāḥ*), nor have I noted one elsewhere. The alleged rule must be, I think, either an out-and-out mistake, or founded insufficiently on one or two anomalous examples, of doubtful correctness.

Further on, after statement (35 ff.) of the facts touching the accent of the Sanskrit verb, the author takes up (50) for explanation the remarkable rule that in an independent clause the verb, unless standing at the head of the clause, is regularly accentless,

while the verb of a dependent clause is always accented. Already more than twenty years ago (1871), in the first part of his Syntactische Forschungen (pp. 96-8), the author treated of this rule, setting up in respect to it a theory which I was never able to find in any measure acceptable. It ran, briefly, thus: the dependent clause in Sanskrit is oftenest one of necessary condition, and oftenest precedes the clause on which it depends. In such a case, the practice of our own language shows that the verb of the dependent clause has the superior emphasis. This is to be inferred from such examples as the following: *was man nicht NÜTZT, IST eine schwere Last*, 'what one *uses* not *is* a heavy *burden*'—where *IST* (*is*) is unemphatic as compared with *NÜTZT* (*uses*). Now here, it is plain, the author deceives himself by failing to observe that his dependent verb is one which, owing to the content of the word, and not at all to the form of the sentence, is the emphatic predicated element, while his independent verb is the mere copula, unemphatic for that reason and for no other. If his line had read instead thus: *was uns nicht nützlich IST, BELASTET uns*, 'what *is* useless to us *burdens* us,' the relation of the two verbs in respect to emphasis would be seen to be reversed; the independent one would be obviously the one better entitled to the accent. And so, for aught I can see, in every other like case; the emphasis of the verb depends on the relation of its significant content to the sum of significance of the sentence, and not in the least on its occurrence in a clause of the one kind or of the other. The author goes on to maintain that, on the basis of such sentences as the one instanced, the Hindu learned men set up a rule that the verb of the dependent clause was to be accented, and, by contrast to it, the verb of the independent clause left accentless, and then proceeded to extend the rule rigorously to all cases, whether it applied or not. Now, altogether apart from the imaginary character of the foundation claimed for the rule, it seems to me that scholars in general will decline to admit that the phenomena of verbal accentuation as we read them in the manuscripts are the product of theories which ancient Hindu savants framed and carried out, "regardless," instead of being the (on the whole) faithful record, as they observed and understood it, of their actual utterance. To admit this would certainly be to take away most of the interest now belonging to the investigation of Sanskrit accent; and I can see no good reason for the admission, but abundance of reason against it. The whole aspect of the phe-

nomena is to me that of a historic verity, which those who have handed it down to us did not themselves understand, or, for the most part, even try to understand—much less try to regulate on such shadowy principles as our author thinks to recognize.

In his later work, which we are now criticizing, he neither repeats nor explicitly rejects his former explanation, but gives, rather, one new and essentially different, though not less unsatisfactory than its predecessor. He takes up the subject this time from the other end, dealing first with the unaccented verb of the independent clause. Its accentlessness, he says (50*), is "merely the external sign of the fact that the verb appears as a relatively dependent member of the sentence, attaching itself to a noun, a pronoun, a preposition, in such a way as to limit these ideas." I cannot refrain from pronouncing this statement little short of absurd, and maintaining that no theory built up on such a foundation can possibly be anything but a failure. The sentence consists of subject and predicate, and each one of these is just as primary and just as secondary as the other. A subject, noun or pronoun, is even more meaningless without a verb to tell what it is there for than is a verb without a subject, since a subject can be on the whole much more easily inferred for a verb from the circumstances than the contrary. But not only a preceding subject, even a preceding object, or adverb, or prefix, takes away the accent from the verb in the Sanskrit sentence; and that a verb is a "relatively dependent" word as compared with these its own modifiers, that it is "attached to a preposition" in order to limit the meaning of the preposition, is a doctrine which, in my opinion, no reasonable person can be expected to accept on our author's authority. He adds that "the verb has only in exceptional cases a primary value for the sentence," and that then it is moved back, toward or to the head of the sentence. That is hardly an acceptable account of the difference between *āsīd rājā* 'fuit rex' and *rājā* "sīt 'rex fuit.' A certain order of the clause having been established as normal, any deviation from it becomes a means of the different distribution of emphasis, to the members moved either backward or forward. But the Sanskrit verb, however it may change position, gets no accent unless it be placed first of all; nor do the other members, even though moved to the very end, lose their accent. That the sentence is naturally a *diminuendo*, beginning strong, to attract the attention of the listener, and then toning gradually down to the end, as our author

goes on to claim, might at best be allowed a certain questionable measure of truth in a first direct address, but seems wholly out of place as applied to continuous discourse—as, for instance, a hymn, or a piece of exposition.

As regards the accented verb of the dependent clause, a double explanation, viewed as a single one in two parts, is offered. First, if the dependent clause precede the other, the *diminuendo* of the whole sentence has not become complete when the dependent verb is reached, and hence that verb has not become entirely toneless. And then this partial non-tonelessness, originally a result only of the position of the clause, becomes historically generalized into a means of distinction of all dependent clauses, which express an incomplete sense or involve a suspension of sense as compared with the main clause. Thus, we see, a verb in general is not accented because it is a dependent member of its clause; but, if this clause becomes a dependent member of another clause, the verb in it attains independency and gets an accent. A result, too, quite the reverse of that in German, where the dependent verb, instead of being made emphatic, takes its position at the very end, which signifies tonelessness!

The whole explanation, both in its earlier form and in its later, appears to me not so much ingenious as artificial and forced, and altogether wanting in plausibility. As its author abandoned the 1871 form, so we may feel sure that he will hereafter abandon this of 1888. It is better to acknowledge that the law of verbal accentuation in Sanskrit is thus far an unexplained puzzle than to try to content our minds with any such unsatisfactory solutions as are offered us in these volumes.

When discussing (37-44) the accented verb in quasi-dependent or antithetical clauses, the author shows much ingenuity in accounting on internal grounds for the discordances between different texts or between different passages from the same text; but here also it appears to me that the explanations are in no small measure forced. The accentual usage itself seems to have been a progressive and in part a wavering one. As the accent of the verb in this class of cases is especially a rule of the Brāhmaṇas (there are numerous instances in both Rīg- and Atharva-Vedas where the verb, now accentless, would certainly have gotten an accent in any Brāhmaṇa text), so the line of division is somewhat variously drawn in different parts of the mass of Brahmanic material; and in the case of some treatises (particularly the

Māitrāyaṇīya) defects of the accentual tradition count for a good deal.

One is a little surprised to find the formation and value of compound words among the matters discussed at some length (55-59, 62-69, 72-75) in this work on syntax; the subject is not ordinarily classed as syntactical. There is, indeed, something to be said for the inclusion, since, but for their composition, the compounded words would have to be put together into syntactical phrases, equivalent and yet not precisely equivalent. But then, upon similar grounds, the subject of derivation ought not to be omitted; a derivative also, especially a secondary one, is a sort of abbreviated phrase, the equivalent of two or more words having syntactical relations. The author (perhaps as feeling that he is off his proper ground) does not allow himself to go far enough into the investigation of compounds to bring to light anything that is particularly new, not already to be read in the grammars. The repetition of things familiar, expanded with more illustration than their importance calls for, is a little tedious. Copulative or *dvandva* composition (55) of course commences with pairs of persons or things familiarly and closely associated; but, like the other varieties of composition, it at once begins to be extended to even casual combinations; it involves *or*- as well as *and*-relations, and draws in more than two members. That the possessive or *bahuvrihi* compounds stand on the border-line between noun and adjective (61^a) is hardly to be admitted; their possessive character, the 'having' which they all imply, makes them distinctly adjectives and nothing else. One does not see what is gained by such an elaborately obscure definition of a simple thing as is given us (62^b) of a possessive with passive participle as prior member (like *hatadbhrātar* 'having a slain brother'). Such, we are told, "usually signify that the noun to which they belong is found, so far as concerns the idea which constitutes the last part of the *bahuvrihi*, in a lasting condition which results from the past occurrence of the action expressed in the participle." It might be of more legitimately syntactical interest to point out how such a compound is made the equivalent of a dependent clause, 'whose brother is slain,' with a passive verb-form taking the place of the participle. We are reminded (62^a) that the possessive compounds have been repeatedly explained as by origin appositive nouns that have later taken on an adjectival character. This can hardly be questioned; and in the same way, as I presume, came into being in our family

of languages the whole category of adjectives as distinguished from substantives. But both these are pre-historic questions, altogether antedating the whole period of Sanskrit syntax proper. What stands decidedly nearer to the latter is the question how these adjectivized substantives came to be so almost exclusively possessive in character; and then, what traces there are left in the language of a character other than possessive as belonging to them. These are the points which seem to me both the most interesting and the most important to discuss in the theory of Sanskrit *bahuvrīhi* ('much-rice') compounds (they are briefly treated of in my grammar, §1294); and I confess myself to have been a good deal disappointed at reading on in our author's pages about compounds and finding that he not only failed to cast upon them any new light, but even did not acknowledge their existence. There is an inviting opportunity still for some one to write an instructive paper on that queer fabrication of the Hindu grammarians, the *dvigu* class of compounds: *dvi-gu* 'two-cow,' not as 'having two cows,' like an ordinary "possessive," but as 'equal to, or worth, or bought for, two cows.' It ought to be possible to extract from the native grammars and the native commentaries on them something more than the scanty array of material, gathered out of the literature of the language, with which I had to content myself in my grammar (2d ed. §1294 b).

Under the next head, of dependent compounds, we are told (62°) that "in composition the second idea is determined by the first in such a way that a new idea is the issue"; and we have given us as an example *ācārya-jāyā* 'teacher's wife' (literally, 'teacher-wife'), which is declared to signify, not the wife of this or that teacher, but a member of a certain class of wives; so that, when a particular person is intended, a *svā* 'his own' has to be added, just as it might be to *mātar* 'mother' or the like; and thus the consciousness of two individual ideas is lost. As for the *svā*, it might also be omitted equally well with *ācāryasya jāyā* 'the wife of the teacher,' the connection in all the three cases alike pointing out who is meant. But how, in a compound like that instanced, which, in common with a great proportion of the Sanskrit compounds, is made only once, the two ideas are integrated into one so as to lose their separate identity, is altogether unintelligible. Such integration might at the utmost be claimed for a current and familiar compound like our *housewife*, in which, moreover, the received sense is very different from the literal one;

or like *alewife*, where the application is fantastic and obscure. Is the individuality of *Lehrer* any less present to the mind in *die Lehrersfrau* than it is in *des Lehrers Frau*? A compound is essentially an abbreviated designation, and by its aid a slightly different shade of expression is won, as in *goat-milk* (*aja-kṣīra*, 63^b), compared with *goats' milk*, *a goat's milk*, *the milk of goats*, and so on; but *goat* and *milk* are present alike in them all, and cannot be ignored—and the three pages of examples which the author proceeds to give might well be spared, as well as sundry pages of like material which follow later. The author unconsciously exaggerates and distorts a little the peculiarities of composition in order to justify his expenditure of space upon the subject.

It is doubtless by an oversight that (70^a) *asuraghñī* 'demon-slaying,' etc., have slipped in among the descriptive compounds.

I can see no more reason for distinguishing (99) an anaphoric dual than an anaphoric plural. If "Agni and Vishnu" are an example of the one, so are "Tom, Dick, and Harry" an equally important example of the other. In the setting up of the classification seems to be involved the doctrine that the dual number was created for natural pairs of things, like one's two eyes, two hands, etc.; and this I think just as much a mistake as that the plural was created for natural trios and quaternions, etc. The distinction of numbers had to stop somewhere, and it was not carried beyond three.

Under the head of noun-cases (103 ff.) is especially noteworthy how generally unwilling the author is to commit himself in regard to their original and fundamental meanings. Even the ablative he cannot bring himself frankly to define as the *from*-case, but takes respecting it this curiously uncertain position (106^c): "It is now generally assumed, in accordance with Indian [that is, doubtless, Hindu native] grammar, that into the ablative enters that idea of the noun forth from which the action of the verb follows." So also, under locative, we find (115^b) only the admission that so-and-so may be right in defining it as denoting "the space within which"; though the author himself adds that we have to render it sometimes by 'at' and 'on' and 'by.' The quoted definition evidently tries to put too fine a point upon it; "place where" is quite exact enough, whether of the kind expressed by 'in' or by 'on' or by 'at.' But it is very remarkable that, when he comes (121) to the second grand division of the use of the locative in Sanskrit, that of denoting place whither, he does not spend a word

upon its relation to the other division, although this relation has been the subject of considerable dispute and misapprehension. Considering that the two uses pass into one another by so many avenues, it being not infrequently difficult to classify a particular case as belonging under the one head or the other, and that the transition is so easy that in English *there* has crowded *thither* entirely out of familiar use, we should have expected some recognition and illustration of it, with an acknowledgment that the two values are originally one, and not independent senses forced together under one form.

Of the instrumental, we find (122°) an explicit statement of the author's opinion that it is the *with*-case. But the paragraph in which he treats of its various shades of meaning and application is to me quite obscure. It seems as if he were claiming the uses of the case to be but one, their apparent variety depending only on the substantial sense of the noun itself and of the verb on which it depends. Why is this any more true of the instrumental than of the other cases? There are certain well-marked differences in its value, the others naturally derived from the sociative sense, but by no means identical with it; and not the brute sense of noun and verb alone, but the general circumstances, the requirement of the connection, determine which. So, in *atrim muñcātho gaṇena* (123°), *gaṇena* might mean '[him] together with his troop' or '[you] by means of your troop'; it requires the help of the subject of the verb as well, of the situation depicted, to settle the question. And there are instrumental uses so special that it is not altogether easy to connect them with the fundamental sociative sense. One wishes that the author had given us his view as to how the instrumental of extent of space or time originated. To me it seems probable that it started from the road or track: 'by means of such a track; by way of the desert, of the river, of the air,' or the like; and hence 'through the air,' from one end or side to the other of the tract or medium traversed. *Nayathā . . . rjunā pathā* (129°) is not strictly 'lead *upon* a straight path,' as rendered, but 'cause to go *by* a straight path'; our preposition *by* incorporates and illustrates the transition. Further, the account (132°) of the instrumental of separation seems unsatisfactory. I should think rather of the prior, or the desired, association of the things now parted; "let me not be separated from (parted with) him" is properly "let me with him (= me and him) not be separated or parted." The rare instances of the instrumental with a compara-

tive (137-38) are probably of kindred character: "taken (or compared) with him, I am the better."

As for the more difficult dative, the author has at present no confident opinion, but is inclined (140^a) to follow another authority in regarding it as "grammatical," as never having had any local character at all. Here is, I believe, the sole appearance in this work of the category of grammatical cases, which we might otherwise hope to have been abandoned by the author. To pronounce a case originally grammatical is simply equivalent to saying that its ultimate character lies beyond our discovery; and the statement might much better be made in the latter form. For to postulate such a value at the very beginning is to deny the whole known history of language, which shows that all forms begin with something material, apprehensible by the senses, palpable (*handgreiflich*). If the intellectual values of terms are anterior to the physical; if the tense- and mode-uses of *have* and *will* and *would* and their like are the original ones; if *be* began with being an expression of the copula; if the *-dom* of *wisdom* and the *-wise* of *likewise* and the *-head* of *godhead* were derivative suffixes before they were independent nouns—then, and not otherwise, was a case originally grammatical. Such an explanation simply betrays a false philosophy of language. There was a time when our author (in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, XVIII, 81 ff.) favored the view that the dative first indicated "a physical inclination toward something"; that is a genuine attempt at an explanation; none better, so far as I know, has been suggested; and it is perhaps even to be accepted as satisfactory. The chief objection is that a *to*-case (the accusative) and a *toward*-case might seem too nearly akin, making a virtual repetition; but, after all, this is hardly to be accounted more strange than the presence among the prepositional prefixes of so many words as we find all signifying 'to' with different shades of application: thus, in Sanskrit, *ā*, *abhi*, *upa*, *api*, *acha*—even *prati*.

Again, no attempt whatever is made (151) to give any account of the genitive. Even its general character as adjectival or adnominal is not alluded to—not so much as to be mentioned as a view widely held and regarded as satisfactory. This is so strange as to seem well-nigh unaccountable.

It is less to be wondered at that the author takes no notice of the fact that the accusative has been explained as the *to*-case, since this is a view which has a much less general acceptance. The

accusative is treated last of the series of cases, and is defined (164) as signifying those case-relations which are not signified by the rest of them. The same method, it is obvious, might have been applied to the definition of any other case; each takes those relations which the others do not take. It is, then, altogether to be disapproved—unless it may be held to involve the theory (nowhere distinctly stated) that the accusative was the original “grammatical” case of limitation of a verb, and that, when the rest had arisen and trenched here and there upon its sphere of use, it was finally left with a remainder, which is therefore composed of applications having no genetic relations with each other. That would be, of course, a theory having a right to present itself as such; but it would involve the (above rejected) theory of a “grammatical” case, and would make the accusative quite different in its origin from the other cases—both of them very objectionable implications. There is surely no difficulty in deducing all the accusative uses from the *to*-relation, the most variable of all those of local origin. Especially, when the natural step from *to*-relation to direct-object-relation is taken, the way is prepared for a great and various array of secondary applications to follow.

In the scheme of uses given on p. 165, it may be remarked, the accusative of extent of space ought plainly to precede that of extent of time.

The suggestion (182^o) that the (quasi-primary, but really secondary) derivative adjectives in *-in* are allowed sometimes to govern an accusative “because the slight future meaning which they contain places them in a nearer relation to the verb” seems to me quite fantastic. Is a future sense more characteristic of a verb than a past, or than a present? Moreover, the future sense in these derivatives, at the best, is so slight and rare as to count for nothing, and in the instances quoted by the author is derived rather from the accompanying verb *bhavati* ‘comes to be.’ And the nouns in *-tar* in the Veda govern an accusative freely with their present signification, before they change it to a future and form a periphrastic future tense.

We have reason to be much surprised that the author turns entirely aside from his proper subject to treat, at the length of several pages (188 ff.), of the different methods in which adjectives are compared. What under the head of comparison belongs to a Syntax is obviously the sense attaching to those derivative adjectives which we call the comparative and superlative, and their

constructions (by the way, no reason is given us why the ablative is the case that usually follows a comparative). That there are two different sets of suffixes of comparison, applied (with minor irregularities) to different classes of primitives, is a matter that no more concerns syntax, so long as the value of the two formations is the same in practical use, than the different modes of forming the genitive case, or the 2d singular imperative, or the aorist. If, indeed, there were something strikingly new in his view of the subject, if the relation of the two formations (that in *-iyas* and *iṣṭha*, and that in *-lara* and *-lama*) had been hitherto misunderstood and needed to be set in its true light, there would be more excuse for the author's thus dragging a matter of pure inflection or derivation into the midst of his syntactical discussions; but so far is this from being the case that the whole passage might be taken for an extract from my Sanskrit grammar, so close is the agreement in regard both to the views held and to the manner of combining and putting them forward. I do not in the least accuse Delbrück of having borrowed from me without acknowledgment; such a charge would be absurd; he has doubtless by his own study arrived at conclusions according with mine (which are of very old standing; the substance of them may be found communicated to the Oriental Society away back in 1855: JAOS. V 210-11); and I take satisfaction in the accordance. But I cannot help thinking it in a high degree strange that he should have felt himself called upon to treat the subject at all, and should then have overlooked the already long-published views of others upon it (he is in general extremely conscientious about making acknowledgments), thus giving himself the aspect of one who brings out something quite new.

In speaking of denominatives and causatives (222-23), the author, when he mentions that some *-aya*-stems fluctuate between causative and denominative accent (*-āya-* and *-aya-*), strangely forgets to add that many obviously denominative verbs take in use only the causative accent—as some of his own examples plainly show. He declines (223^b) to express any opinion as to the development of causative meaning, because that is a subject involving an investigation in comparative philology, although not a few of the opinions and explanations given elsewhere rest, and can rest, upon no other foundation. Certainly, the evidence of Vedic language is wholly in favor of the view that the causative is by origin a denominative.

Among the tense-stems of the causative, the author (223^o) forgets to mention the half-dozen *iṣ*-aorists that occur in the older language (V. B.).

Under the desiderative (227-28), I miss the statement and illustration of the fact that desiderative and future show a natural relationship by shading into one another, even to the extent of occasionally seeming to change places.

As regards the formation (273) of only a part of the tenses of a given meaning from one root, and the quasi-association of different roots to form one verb-system, I cannot see any degree of probability in the theory (lightly hinted at here, more distinctly stated in Synt. Forsch. IV, p. 80 ff.) that it is because of an inherent non-adaptedness of a certain root to certain varieties of the expression of time. It is, I think, simply and purely one of the accidental results of the vagaries of linguistic usage—as destitute of deeper significance as is our combination of *go* and *went*, or *be* and *am* and *was*, or the French *vais* and *allai* and *irai*.

The subject of variety of present stem-forms (274 ff.) appears still to call for a considerably more careful and penetrating examination than is given here by our author, or elsewhere by his predecessors. But it is, in my opinion, a very important omission that he makes no mention, in connection with this subject, of the intensive and desiderative, as being also properly present systems, although, after their establishment with well-marked specialties of meaning, occasionally and tentatively extended into other tense-systems. He does not, to be sure, even refer to the passive stem here, and the way in which he speaks of it further back (268^a: "das Passivum liegt nur im Praesensstamme vor") gives rather the impression (which, however, must surely be a false one) that he regards it as a once more general formation, now reduced to such modest dimensions. With the prevailingly intransitive *ya*-stem, the passive *yá*-stem, and the intensive and desiderative stems, we have the basis of a more systematic and fruitful discussion of the subject than is here furnished us. Such forms as *gamati* and *karati*, it may be further remarked, if mentioned, ought to be noted as purely sporadic. We miss sundry familiar stems from the list given: for example *tyate*, which it is simply absurd to regard as intensive, and *pávate*, an expression of the author's view of which would have been welcome, and so on. The relation of *tirati* to *tarati* is rather like that of a causative to a simple verb, and is therefore extremely curious; *tarati* is not excluded from figurative uses.

It does not seem to help our comprehension of the imperfect much to be told (279^e) that "it is the tense of narration, by means of which the hearer is summoned to transfer himself with his fancy into the past"; precisely the same is true of any other past tense, and something very like it of the future. That the imperfect denotes simply past action, without implication of anything else, is, in my opinion, both a truer and a more enlightening definition.

Few things in the theory of tenses are more difficult to define satisfactorily than the difference between preterit and perfect, between *I did* and *I have done*. The ordinary description of the latter, as signifying "completed" action, is of no value whatever, and the word "completed" ought to be banished out of the grammars; all past action is completed action, or it would not be past. But in English (as in German, French, and so on) we are guided to a better account of the perfect by the etymology of the form itself; *I have done* means literally 'I possess at present the result of a past doing,' and so contains a peculiar mixture of past and present time; it designates a state of things as now existing which involves as a condition the previous doing or occurrence of something. Then this expression of the present consequence of past action assumes more or less the character of an expression for the past action itself, and so enters into a rivalry with the other preterit tenses; and they compromise on a division of the territory among them. The division is not always made on a systematic and consistent plan, and the line is differently drawn in different languages: for example, as between English and French and German there are marked, though minor, discordances, the perfect of the one being by no means always correctly rendered by the perfect of another, as the adult learner of any of them knows to his cost. In some South-German dialects the perfect has mainly driven out the preterit as general expression of past action; the Swabian peasant does not say *i' that*, but *i' hob g'tha*ⁿ. The one office of the perfect in regard to which there is something nearest to an agreement among the several languages is that of designating the proximate past, of defining the action as having happened or been done within the limits of the still current, the present, space of time—though even here there remains plenty of room for minor variations.

Now this composite perfect-sense, as has become generally known since our author himself brought it clearly to light in the second part of these *Syntactische Forschungen* (1876), is repre-

sented in the Vedic Sanskrit, of both *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa*, by the tense which is called the aorist. It is not too much to say that the rendering 'I have done,' etc., fits the Vedic aorist closely throughout; the perfect tenses of English, French, and German do not agree in value any more closely with one another than this Sanskrit tense with them all. The constraint of meter, and the pervading obscurities of meaning and construction, in the hymns make its distinctive character in part less obvious and undeniable in *mantra* than in *brāhmaṇa*; and there are even good Vedic scholars who (much to the detriment of their versions) are careless of the distinction, or even seem to make it a principle not to acknowledge the special aorist signification.¹ But there is no real difference between the aorist of *mantra* and that of *brāhmaṇa*; and the distinction laid down by our author in his former work, and here (280^a) reported rather than repeated—namely, that in the former the aorist denotes what has just taken place, while in the latter it is the tense of personal experience—seems to me of no account; it is a difference in the circumstances of use, and not in the value of the tense itself. Especially does this appear when there is taken into account what the author in his comparative examination of the tenses has failed to notice (see the Am. Or. Soc.'s Proceedings for May, 1891: Journal, vol. XV, p. lxxxv ff.; also Trans. Am. Philol. Assoc'n for 1892): that the imperfect is the tense of personal narration in *brāhmaṇa* not less than the aorist, the two being in such use related to one another as are our preterit and perfect.

The author notes that there are exceptional cases, in both divisions of the Vedic literature, which do not fall strictly under the definitions given (certainly they are not more frequent than is the case with our modern perfects with *have*); and he asks after a wider definition, which shall include all. This seems to me a mistaken quest, like that which should seek a formula inclusive of all the various uses of the accusative case, and which could issue only in some such worthless bit of indefiniteness as that the accusative is "a complement or nearer definition of the verbal idea." So here, in like manner, we get as result the following (280^b): "the aorist informs us that an action has made its appearance" (dass ein Vorgang [or eine Handlung] in die Erscheinung getreten ist). This is valuable solely and alone in virtue of the

¹A curious recent example is Hillebrandt, in his *Vedische Mythologie*, I, 1891.

verb-tense, *has made*, which is used in it: and just so an imperfect informs us that an action *made* its appearance, and a future that it *will make* its appearance. The "making its appearance" of an action (like the "coming in" or *Eintreten* of an action, the phrase which, after the example of others, he conjures with in Synt. Forsch. IV, p. 101 ff.) is really nothing more than an awkward and pretentious equivalent for simple predication, and something positive has to be added in order to make it descriptive of a tense. The author expresses, with good reason, his dissatisfaction with the phrase, nor does he attempt to lay it at the basis of the illustration that follows. A tense needs to be defined and illustrated according to its leading and prevalent sense, and not according to its rarer and exceptional applications—unless, indeed, some one of these can be shown to have been historically older, and the others derived from it; and the "making appearance" or "coming in" of the action can certainly never have that value. The 'coming in' element is twice made use of later in defining aoristic forms, and plainly without any advantage whatever as regards our comprehension of their value. If (590^b), in *yadā . . . āsahiṣṭa* 'when he has overpowered,' *yadā* has the virtual meaning 'as soon as,' it is simply because the verb-form indicates proximate action: 'when he has just overpowered' is the same with 'as soon as he has overpowered.' And if (what is extremely questionable) *bhīyānā* (381^b) signifies 'having been frightened,' as distinguished from *bhāyamāna* 'being in a state of fear,' it is because the participle is associated with a tense which means 'I have come to feel fear'; the "in-coming action" has nothing to do with it. Again, the aorist sense is once (279^o) referred to as "constatirend," 'recording a fact'; and this is obviously one of the secondary applications of the *have*-perfect in every language that possesses such a tense, and calls for no resort to any peculiar mode of explanation.

While the Vedic aorist is thus in the sum of its uses equivalent to our auxiliary perfect with *have*, it must, of course, have had a quite different history of development of meaning, since it is the combination of present auxiliary with past participle that gives our tense its distinctive union of present and past time. And I see nothing in the way of our assuming that the proper "perfect" sense came in Sanskrit out of that of proximate past, as in our modern formations the latter out of the former: the two are so related that either passes naturally into the other. As for the prior probable transition from simple indefinite past action (such

as belongs to the Greek aorist) to proximate past, that is not at all, it appears to me, out of reach of the differentiating and adaptive action of a language that has a certain redundancy of expression for past time (impf., pf., and aor. tenses). Perhaps the Greek imperfect of continuous action got its characteristic quality in no other way. Or, if continuousness be proved to be the original character of the proper imperfect, then its loss in the Sanskrit imperfect (which certainly, from its earliest period, shows not a trace of it), and the shift of the former indefinite past or aorist to the designation of proximate past action, may have been two parts of the same adaptive process.

As regards the Sanskrit reduplicated perfect, I may refer again to the paper quoted above (on p. 290), in which I have discussed in considerable detail the use of this tense in the Brāhmaṇas. Of its three *mantra*-senses—1. that of our auxiliary perfect (= the Vedic aorist); 2. that of an indefinite past (= imperfect); and 3. that of a present—it has (except in the participle: see below) quite lost the first; for the signs of this which our author thinks to find (§170, pp. 298–300) in Brahmanic use seem to me not to require to be interpreted as such, but rather to be examples of the narrative use; even the last passage quoted (TS. VII 3. 1³), though most nearly approaching the true “perfect” meaning, is best to be judged in accordance with the rest. Both the other senses are retained, and, in part of the texts, in proportions not far from equal: in PB., for example, there are even twice as many occurrences of the present sense as of the preterit; in MS., an equal number; in TS., hardly fewer; but, apparently by a later and rapidly growing usage, the perfect as simple preterit wins the upper hand, and comes to be employed on a very large scale, partly in whole narratives in place of the imperfect, partly mixed with the latter as a co-ordinate tense. And at the same time the imperfect exhibits a tendency to be used in personal narrative, or by one speaking in his own name, to the exclusion of the perfect; so that the later Hindu grammar clearly lays down that distinction between them. It is a curious and interesting piece of syntactical growth thus laid before us in the existing records of the language.

The story is not complete, however, without bringing in also the fate of the perfect participle. In his treatment of this form as it appears in the Brāhmaṇas (377–81), the author appears to me to overlook the fact that it has not simply a past or “preterital” sense, but that variety of past sense which belongs to the aorist

as a tense: namely, present result of past action; it has become, in short, the corresponding participle to the aorist. It will be seen on examination that he is obliged to use the auxiliary *have* in translating every one of his "preterital" examples with one exception (ÇB. IX ii 3. 30: 378^a); and in that the meaning is the same as in the rest; and in one example (AB. V 34. 1: 378^b) the participle is actually co-ordinated with a series of aorist tenses. As for his exceptional or non-preterital cases, they all either admit of or require a different explanation. The unduplicated *vidvāṅs* is of course no proper exception; it goes with its tense, which, through the whole history of the language, is present and only present. Of the two instances of *suṣupvāṅs*, the one from TS. (VI 1. 4¹: 377^b) is certainly misunderstood: *dikṣitāt suṣupvāṅs* does not mean "from him who lies asleep as one consecrated," but 'from him who has slept during his consecration'; the analogy of various parallel passages (e. g. TS. V 6. 3⁴; VI 6. 7³) clearly shows this. And the other instance may be taken in the same way, and must be, because otherwise it would be a single unsupported case: not "the eyes are moist of one who sleeps," but 'of one who has been sleeping,' i. e. 'has just waked up,' and who therefore does not at once 'see clearly' (*vi-ikṣ*). Even at RV. I 161. 13 (375^a) the true meaning is evidently the same; it is people who 'have been sleeping' (*suṣupvāṅsas*) that ask "who has waked us up?" Under the head of the middle participle, *anūcāna* is the only exception recognized by our author; and that too is plainly no real exception: *brāhmaṇāḥ ṣuṣruvāṅso 'nūcānā vidvāṅsaḥ* (quoted 379^a from ÇB.; like combinations are found repeatedly elsewhere) means literally 'Brahmans who have heard, who have repeated, who know,' i. e. who have been under the instruction of a teacher, who have learned to reproduce the sacred texts, and who consequently possess the true knowledge. That both *ṣuṣruvāṅs* and *anūcāna* then come to be used substantively (especially the latter, which becomes a kind of synonym for 'learned') is only what is liable to happen to any adjective frequently employed in a technical sense. So far as I have observed (and my attention has been particularly directed to the subject), the perfect participle, whether active or middle, is always used in *brāhmaṇa* in a sense corresponding to that of the aorist in the same texts.

When giving an account of the future in RV. (290^a), the author might well, I think, have noticed its remarkable rarity in that text

(personal forms from only nine roots), and its rapid increase in frequency later, as the subjunctive goes out of use; and a similar statement is true, and equally called for, in regard to the optative (302).

Coming next to the modes, the author repeats (302 ff.) the doctrine taught by him in the first part of the *Syntactische Forschungen* (1871), and hence widely known to students of syntax: namely, that the fundamental distinction between subjunctive and optative is the expression by the former of an action *willed*, by the latter of an action *wished*. To this doctrine I have never been able to give my assent, especially for these reasons:

1. I do not find a sufficiently well-marked difference of sense of the kind asserted between the two modes, but only such a preponderance, on the whole, of the sense of wishing on the side of the optative as might easily come about by gradual differentiation of usage between two originally equivalent formations;
2. because there is yet another mode, the imperative, to which, if to anything, the expression of an action *willed* properly belongs;
3. because the proposed explanation takes no heed of one marked formal distinction between the two modes—namely, that the subjunctive has primary personal endings, but the optative secondary; and no explanation that does not account for this feature along with the rest can have any right to be regarded as more than conjectural and provisional; while it looks very far from probable that such a difference has anything to do with a distinction between willing and wishing.

Delbrück denies (353^e) to the 2d pl. and the 2d and 3d du. of the imperative any true imperative character, because they agree in form with the augmentless imperfect persons, or the "injunctive," as he joins with Brugman in calling them. The unmistakable occurrence of a 2d and 3d sing. and a 3d pl. of real imperative formation, and the occurrence in the other allied languages of a 2d pl. to match the 2d sing., seem to me sufficient to make overwhelmingly probable that the accordance in form between imperative and "injunctive" in the persons in question (at least in the plural, for we may leave out of consideration the dual, as of minor consequence) is simply accidental, a result of the leveling forces of linguistic change. If we had only the evidence of English to infer from, we might think that the preterit and participle of our New conjugation (as *loved* and *loved*, *sent* and *sent*, and so on), or our possessives singular and plural (*horse's* and *horses'* and the

like), were identical; but the belief, even in the absence of proof to the contrary, would be a crude and hasty one, to be rejected by all prudent scholars.

Of the present participle we find (368*) another of those curiously unedifying definitions already instanced above: it "is associated with a noun in the sentence in order to express that the noun occurs in an action (action taken in the widest sense) which falls into the action of the sentence." Students of a Vedic syntax perhaps hardly require to have a participle defined for them; but no one who did not know beforehand what it was would be likely to recognize it from this description—which, moreover, for aught that can be seen, applies to any kind of a verbal adjective (e. g. to *active* as well as *acting*), and not to that kind alone which we call participle.

In treating the absolute constructions (386 ff.), it would seem to be the more instructive method to put first the transition-cases, those which admit of being understood as either the ordinary case-construction or the absolute, in order to illustrate the way in which the latter originated. That transition-examples for the genitive absolute as well as for the locative are to be found in the *brāhmaṇa* is so much a matter of course that our author hardly needs to fortify himself (389*) with another's opinion to that effect; the only question is whether there is not to be found an example that oversteps the line, and requires to be viewed as a real absolute construction; and such seems to occur at AB. VII 27. 4: *teṣāṃ ho 'tliṣṭhatām* 'as they rose up.' It is strange that Saussure, in his discussion of the genitive absolute, wholly ignores this item, the most interesting of all from the point of view of comparative syntax—its origination out of an ordinary possessive genitive. One wonders whether the beginnings of an instrumental absolute may not also be found in the earlier language, as they are in the later (cf. Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax*, p. 290)—beginnings which, having never been developed by usage into a customary construction, are of as little account in Sanskrit as in English (e. g. "we should be much better off *with him gone*"). A noun and agreeing participle can hardly be put together in any way without creating the possibility, if not making the suggestion, of a dependent clause or quasi-clause.

I have elsewhere in this Journal ("On Böhlingk's Upanishads," vol. XI, p. 411) remarked upon the curious obstinacy of the Jena Sanskrit scholars in adhering to the accentuation *-tāvya* (instead

of *-lavya*) for the gerundives quoted from ÇB. The author explains his action in the note to p. 398: "In this work, in passages from ÇB., I have retained the accent *-lavya*, chosen by Weber, because the [native] grammarians also authorize it." This is trifling with the subject. As between two admissible interpretations of the same accent-marks of the MSS., Weber, in the first published Brāhmaṇa text, did indeed "choose" the wrong one; but, when all the other accented texts had given their testimony against it, he long ago saw his (wholly natural and excusable) error, and had even retracted it publicly in 1886, in the second volume (p. 70) of his Catalogue of the Berlin manuscripts; so that Delbrück's vain attempt to save the credit of the Hindu native grammar rests solely upon his own authority.

In treating (401 ff.) of the gerunds (or absolutives, as he prefers to call them), the author unaccountably fails to point out that the one in *-am* is nothing but the adverbially used accusative of a derivative verbal noun in *-a*; and he laboriously avoids the use of the name "adverb" in explaining its value and use. The "verbum infinitum" in Sanskrit really includes adverbs as well as nouns and adjectives. Nor does he take any notice of the current and acceptable explanation of those in *-tvā* and *-ya* (earlier *-yā*) as also case-forms of nouns; and he impliedly denies them that origin by including in his definition of their fundamental character the designation of past action. Now it may be true, as he claims (405^o), that the gerund always admits of being rendered as past; but certainly in nearly all cases it also admits of being rendered as present. Its past value is, in my opinion, akin with that of the passive participle in *-ta* (of which his definition, quoted above, p. 276, says nothing of past action); it is not inherent, but, though predominant, only given by the circumstances of each case.

Under the infinitives (410 ff.), it would have been interesting to know what the author's present opinion is in regard to the quasi-modal uses of those in *-dhyāi* and *-sani*. They are very peculiar conversions of the constructions properly belonging to such case-forms, but doubtless only that; that they show any pro-ethnic connection between infinitive and imperative is not to be credited.

I fail entirely to see why the perfectly natural construction of an ablative infinitive with *purā* tends (418^b) to support the assumption of an ablative rather than a genitive with *madhyā*.

The chapter on the prepositional prefixes (432 ff.) is very good and instructive, and the determination of their grades of nearness

to the verb has much that is new and worthy of attention. Under the head of two or more prefixes with the same verb would have been welcome a plainer distinction between those cases in which the prefixes are added to the verb as it were on equal terms, and those in which there has been an integration of the verb with the nearer prefix, and another is then added somewhat as it might have been added to a simple verb. Thus (to take an extreme instance), *upa-viç* having won the special meaning 'sit down,' it becomes possible even to add the same prefix a second time in more casual connection, and we find (in the later language) *upa-upa-viç* 'sit down beside.' So, in Vedic use, *abhi-sam bhū* is not at all made by adding *abhi* and *sam* to *bhū*; but, *sam-bhū* having obtained in familiar use the sense 'come into being,' the addition of *abhi* gives it power to take an accusative object of the condition or the form of being 'into' which anything comes: e. g. *janitvam abhisambabhūtha* 'thou hast entered into wifehood,' i. e. hast become wife. The variations in character of combination even of a single prefix with a verb are very considerable, according as it purely modifies the verbal sense or makes a connection between this and adjuncts—in other words, according as it is more adverbial or more prepositional in value; and this is especially true of a second prefix.

To note a few details: Under *adhi* with the sense of 'plus' (441^b), the curious example at ÇB. X iv 3. 8 might well have been quoted; and, further down, *ah* might have been added to *brū* and *vac* as used with *adhi*; the explanation of how these compounds arrive at the sense 'bless' (so rendered 559^b) is not at all satisfactory. The pregnant sense in which *anu* is used in *brāhmaṇa*, as 'along with and in consequence of,' is (445^b) quite insufficiently recognized. Under *apa* (446-47), *apa umbh* would have been worth notice; it is rendered at 370° simply 'bind,' which is obviously inexact. The close analogy of *api* (447) as prefix with Gr. *ἐνί* might well have been pointed out. *Hinzu*, 'unto or on to,' would, I think, have better represented its sense than *herzu* or *hinein*; nor is it from the sense of 'on,' but rather from that of 'to,' that the adverbial value as 'too, also, even' appears to be developed (as in the case of our own *too*). It is a curious question whether any remnant of the apparently original sense of *ἄμφι* or *umbe* belonging to *abhi* is to be traced in its derivative *abhitas* 'roundabout,' or whether this value comes purely from the Sanskrit value of *abhi*, in which, certainly, no shade of 'about' is

discoverable. I see no difficulty about *ava-tar* "overpower" (450^a); it is *ava-tirati*, and means properly 'drag down.' Osthoff's suggestion (453^a) that the preposition *ā* is a mere strengthener of the proper meaning of the case with which it is used seems to me hardly worthy of the respect with which it is here mentioned. That *ud-gā* (453^b) means "begin singing" cannot, I think, be shown; *ud* denotes conclusion rather than commencement. For *ud-man* (453^b) read *ud-mad* 'go crazy.' *Upa-vad* (455^b) perhaps rather 'impute (something) in words'; and *upa-stor* 'spread under' as something to be lain upon, in accordance with the proper meaning of *upa*. *Ni-pad* has also the special sense 'lie with.' A peculiar use of *vi* with *hū* or *hvā* and two or three other roots, as meaning 'severally, on the one side and the other,' is omitted in the account of this preposition (464-67), though observed by the author in translating—not, however, at 568^b, where *vi-ṣap* evidently has the sense of 'swear severally,' and is mistranslated as "quarrel." Omitted, too, is *sam-viṣ* 'turn in, lie down.'

Respecting the particles (471 ff.) one is tempted to make the general criticism that many of them are treated at rather excessive length in comparison with their importance and with the results attained. The author also almost seems to have laid it down as a principle that he will neither mention nor have any regard to the etymologies of the words, even to the make-up of the compound ones: thus, in briefly noticing *tvāi*, *tvāvā*, etc. (491^b), he does not say that they are contracted combinations of *tū vai*, etc., and so might naturally have the united value of their two constituents; and neither under *id* nor under *ned*, *svid*, *kuvid* is any reference made to their relationship, although, by an exception, *ced* is fully explained (596^a) as *ca + id*; that *ed* (184) belongs to the same group, notwithstanding the author's exclusion of it, I think I have satisfactorily shown in the Proc. Am. Or. Soc. for October, 1888 (Journ., vol. XIV, p. xi); further, it is hardly made to appear (514 ff.) that *nu* in its ordinary use is nothing more than a weakened 'now.' The special use of *iti* in PB., as pointing forward instead of back, might well have been pointed out on p. 533: examples are found at IV 6. 17; VI 3. 11; 5. 16, 21, etc. (always *yat tv ity āhuḥ ṣaḍbhir ito māsāir . . . iti*, and the like).

I do not see that the accentuation of a verb after *kuvid*, any more than after *hanta*, marks the clause as dependent (551^a).

It is unnecessary to say that the versions given by the author

of the illustrative passages which he quotes in abundance on every page are extremely good, especially those from the Brāhmaṇas. In dealing with the latter, no one has shown in the same measure as he the ability to combine accuracy and readableness. He sometimes renders the same word or phrase, now and then even in the same passage, differently in different parts of the volume—instances are *svad*, "fruchtbar machen" 30^a, "schmackhaft machen" 286^a, "angenehm machen" 523^a; *upa-jñā*, "Sorge tragen" 329^b, "nachdenken" 349^b; *sarvam ājīm i*, "das ganze Spiel ausspielen" 385^c, "jede Anstrengung bestehen" 537^b; and so on—but in general the variation only represents fairly the uncertainty that clings to much of the language of these works; "Lied," however, for *sūnṛtā* at 371^a, while it is rendered "Freundlichkeit" at 375^a, is more serious, the former translation being a false one, taken from the native commentators. Also, such loosenesses as "Zeit" for *saṁvatsara* (13^b), "beissen" for *han* (182^a), "essen" for *pratigrāhi bhū* (182^b), "Zahlwort" for *vāc* (320^a), "verlieren" for *rudh* (343^a), "Weg" for *kṣetra* (383^a), "Loch" for *prāṇa* (71^a), are of little account, being mainly adaptations to the circumstances of each case. A real oversight is a rare and accidental occurrence. There is one at 498^a (from MS. III 2. 5), where the second *iti*-clause is wrongly connected with what precedes instead of with what follows: the sentence means '... he should take [the grain] from its direction, saying "I have taken from them food and refreshment."' So also (253^a: like Müller before him and Böhtlingk after him), in a Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka passage (ÇB. XIV iv 2. 18), he connects the first *evam* incorrectly with the succeeding clause, instead of taking it as by itself the whole apodosis. This value of *evam* is noticed by him at 534^b, and is not rare; his explanation of it does not satisfy one; the particle represents simply an abbreviated clause, and has no special analogy with the use of *iti*. Another decided oversight is found at 370^a, where *kaṇiṣṭham pra jāyate* 'has least progeny' is translated as if it were *kaṇiṣṭho jāyate* 'is born the smallest'; the former may be true of the ass among domestic animals, but certainly the latter is not. One more example (29^b), of another kind, from the Rīg-Veda, may be noticed, because our author repeats in regard to it an error which is committed by a whole series of translators and dictionary- and chrestomathy-makers (though the minor Pet. lex. has corrected it). It is the word *ayoddhār*, occurring in vs. 6 of the spirited Indra-hymn I 32, and rendered "coward," as if literally 'non-

fighter.' But this interpretation, according to ordinary rule, would imply the accent *áyoddhar*, while *ayoddhár* is the accentuation belonging to a possessive compound, and the word should mean rather 'not having a fighter': that is (compare *indraçatru*, etc.), 'not finding any one to fight him,' or 'unmatched.' The accent, to be sure, could not be absolutely relied on to settle the matter, if the connection also did not plainly demand the normal sense. To call *Vṛtra* a coward because he dared to challenge Indra to combat is evidently the height of injustice; the act exhibits rather a foolhardy courage—which is precisely what the epithet (*durmada*) in the verse attributes to him.

That in *praçnam i* (167°, 441°) the *praçnam* is to be understood as infinitive I have pointed out in the article last quoted (JAOS., vol. XIV, p. x); and also (ib.) that *prāiṣam ich* (237°, 403°) means 'send out and seek, seek earnestly.' In connection with this last passage (403-4) it should be mentioned that the author appears to misunderstand the sense of *prāiṣāis* and *paryāyāis* in AB. III 9. 1 and IV 5. 3; they signify 'by means of the *prāiṣas*' and 'by means of the *paryāyas*': i. e. of the sacred utterances called by these names; then, in each case, there is a word-play made by putting alongside them the gerunds *prāiṣam* and *paryāyam*. At 483° he renders *vralā* by 'Beschäftigung'; this looks rather as if he agreed with me in deriving the word from the root *vṛt* (Proc. Am. Or. Soc. for Oct. 1884; Journ., vol. XI, p. ccxxix); I am very confident that this is its true etymology; the various derivations from *vṛ* are not more discordant with one another than they are together forced and unsatisfactory.

We may now look through the text in order, raising here and there a question, or offering a suggestion, on matters of translation of greater or less consequence, for the possible benefit of a second edition of the work. *Çriyāi sthā* (7°, 143°), rather 'support the majesty' than "be under the command." "Spirit" (*Geist*) is a new sense for *çarīra* 'body' (16°). *Kam* (32°) is not "why" (*was*); but this is perhaps meant only as a conveniently (but unnecessarily) loose translation. "Protect against" seems further from the natural meaning of *uruṣya* (110°) than is called for. Why should the locative *daçame māsi* (117°: of the birth of a foetus) mean "after the tenth month" rather than 'in' it? The explanation given (143°) of *ā vrçya-* seems far from satisfactory, especially as the verb takes also, and oftener, a locative case; and at 248° it is rendered quite otherwise; the original sense of the phrase is to

me very obscure. *Bhandiṣṭha* (189^b) is, I think, clearly the superlative corresponding to *bhadra* 'excellent'; I see in it no meaning of noisy exultation. *Vi-bhaj* in the middle voice (201^c) signifies 'share among themselves' rather than "cut to pieces." *Bhū* with *kva* (255^b et al.) has the sense 'what has become of?' as the author himself translates *as* with *kva* at 337^c. *Vi-sṛj* (256^b) is perhaps rather 'let go, release.' I find it very difficult to admit the rendering "überlassen" (256^c) for *pra-su*, which regularly means something very different; nor is *parā-as* 'throw away' well represented (260^c) by "shove aside." "Devise" (*erfinden*) for *vidām kṛ* (299^a et al.) seems to connect the form with the root 2 *vid* 'find.' At 316^a and some other places, it would be better to bring out the more original sense of *satya* as 'real, actual'; *tāt satyām it tāva* (RV. VIII 93. 5 and I 1. 6: 579^c) means doubtless 'that on thy part actually takes place'; it 'comes true,' rather than 'is true.' *Pra-mī* (334^c) hardly means "liegen bleiben," nor *pari-ā-dā* (343^c) "abwendig machen." *Bhūta*, as contrasted with *bhavya*, *bhaviṣyat*, etc. (345^b et al.), means, I think, 'the present' ('what has come to be') rather than "the past": cf. QB. II iii 1. 24, where the two are co-ordinated with 'what is born' (*jātā*) and 'what shall be born' (*janīṣyāmāṇa*), with the 'arrived' (*āgata*) and the 'expected' (*āçā*), with 'to-day' (*adyā*) and 'to-morrow' (*çvās*). *Adadivāṇs* (352^c) has not the general sense of "stingy," but is specifically 'he who has not given.' *Añçu* "drop" (371^a) looks like an oversight. The radical sense in *jaritar*, *gṛṇīmasi*, etc. (374^a, 414^a, et al.), cannot be "implore." Nor is *abhitaḥ pari sthā* (383^a) "zur Seite treten," nor *pracyutaḥ parastāt* (394^c) "verschwunden," nor *tanaya* (395^c) "Heerden." I should regard *asmiṇ jāyamāne* at 387^b as the normal rather than the absolute construction of the locative. Why should the sense of *paçyan manye* 'I think to see' (395^c) be doubtful? I do not apprehend (ib.) any peculiar construction of the participle with *akāniṣam*. *Gūdhvī* (misprinted *yūdhvī*: 405^c) is certainly not "having driven away"; nor can I find "lie" in *abhi-druh* (476^a), nor "seize" in *ni-yam* (478^b). For *iti vāi vayām vidma* (481^a), 'this is what we know' seems to fit both the expression and the connection decidedly better than "so können wir es." In the translation of QB. I ix 1. 19 (495^b) the words *weniger* and *mehr* have been transposed by an oversight. *Arātīy* (ib.) has a more positive meaning than "grudge," I think. At 536^a we have *ullara* rendered as "high," as "higher," and as "highest," without any sufficient reason. "Rever-

ence" for *sac* (557^b) is too far from the proper meaning; and in *tap* (563^a) it is, as usual, rather the heat than the radiance that is intended. Why should not 'Parjanya' (*parjanyaḥ*) as well as "the cloud" bring water (573^b)? At 582^a, *āminās* is translated as if it had no accent; the apodosis does not properly come until the following line. *Ā-kṣi* (584^a) must mean 'dwell upon,' not "rule over." "Church" (*Kirche*) for the Brahman caste (585^a) seems quite too modern and Occidental. How is the accent of *ānṛta-deva* (586^a) to be explained if the word is made to mean "one who plays falsely"? 'one who has false gods' is surely the better rendering.

There are a few cases where it appears to me better to question the reading and suggest an emendation than to try to deal with the text as it stands. The most noteworthy, perhaps, is at ÇB. XI v 1. 1, where, for the only time in the language, so far as my knowledge goes, we have the prohibitive *mā* with a subjunctive, and where we also much need a *mā* pronoun; I can hardly think it doubtful that we are to change *akāmāṁ sma mā nī padyāsāi* to *akāmāṁ sma mā nā nī padyāsāi* 'thou shalt not lie with me against my will' (33^a, 316^b). Since *bhāvānt* 'your worship' is construed in all ages of the language, as its sense demands, only with a verb in the 3d person, we doubtless have, at ÇB. XIV ix 1. 5 (83^a, 204^b), to emend *avocas* to *avocat*. In ÇB. III ii 3. 1 (30^a) *īyus* should evidently be *īyus*, optative (so also ÇB. I vii 4. 12). At ÇB. XI vi 1. 3 (404^b), *vibhājamanāu* must be, I presume, a bad reading for *vibhajyāmānau*. At 448^b we are hardly called upon to admit such a compound as *paścātprāñcas*; *paścātprāñcas* would be not even an alteration of the reading, but only of the transcription. In AV. XII 4. 3 (269^b) *diyate* as passive of *dā* 'divide' is extremely unsatisfactory; I should prefer to understand *ā diyate* (*kāṇāyā* "diyate") 'is taken away.' On the other hand, the author's alteration (269^a) of the *pada*-reading in AV. XII 5. 25, *api-nahyāmāne*, to *-nā* seems quite uncalled-for; *mūkhe* 'pinahyāmāne' is locative absolute.

A few more minor matters of a general character may be noticed before bringing this criticism to a close. To lay it down as a principle (17^a) that the predicate noun comes first in a sentence and the subject later is, in my opinion, to put the case too strongly; numerous and important errors have followed from its adoption by some translators. *Are* (35^a), it seems clear, is by origin vocative of *ari* 'enemy,' which has become weakened into a word

of chiding or of *de haut en bas* address. The expression (49^a) "less often *apagaté*" (instead of *ápagate*) does not do justice to the rare and exceptional character of this accentuation of the passive participle with prefix. On p. 50, third and second line from below, *Hauptsatzes* is an erratum for *Nebensatzes* (the work is, on the whole, so carefully and correctly printed that errata, though not entirely absent, are very uncommon and almost always of insignificant importance). A more philosophical account of the agreement (83^a) of a verb in the 1st person with combined pronouns of 1st and 2d or 3d, and in the 2d person with those of 2d and 3d, would be that 'I and you' or 'I and they,' etc., are equivalent to 'we,' while 'you and they,' etc., are summed up in 'you,' and that they take their verbs accordingly. Among words of two genders (94^b) *div* chances to be overlooked; also (95^a) the curious masc. accus. *mātīn*. Would it not be more proper to say of *ni-i* (110^a) that it had become mixed up with *nil-i* for *nir-i*? One does not quite see why the cases of two ablatives with a verb (111^b) are not put under the head of attraction (89). *Ciré* (117^b) belongs rather to the adverbial locatives (122^a); and in like manner *kṣamā* is rather adverb (129^a) than requiring to be treated as a normal instrumental case. Why should we have *Vāyus niyutvān* (145^a) instead of *Vāyu niyutvant*? and why, yet worse, *dyāus asura* (522^a)? This latter has won a degree of currency which is to me, at least, altogether unaccountable and very offensive. Why *Dyāus* any more than *Indras*, *Agnis*, *Vishnus*, and so on? And by adding to it *asura* we obtain not only a discordance with all other names, but even, into the bargain, an inconsistency with itself, since we ought at least to say *Dyāus asuras* if we do not say *Dyu asura*. No one, I am sure, can give any good reason for using the (highly irregular) nominative form of this particular word, instead of the stem-form as everywhere else, and the senseless practice ought to be frowned summarily out of existence. The genitives with *pra-han* and *ni-han* (161^a) seem to me to call more distinctly for the subaudition of a governing noun than other cases in which the author is ready to assume such; but *rakṣāsas* with *prati-han* is undoubtedly accus. pl; the RV. reads *prāti dāha* instead of *prāti jahi*. To 163^b the author is obliged to add in a note (600) a genitive dependent on *ihā*; I long ago pointed out in this Journal (III 405) like constructions with *yātra* (see now my Skt. Gr.², §299 b). The reason given (183^b) for such a construction as *agreṇa ṣālām* does not seem to

me of any value whatever. In the explanation of the adverbial suffix *-vat* (186°), the author overlooks the fact that in the Veda *-vant* is a suffix also of resemblance: *manuvāt* is like the accus. *indravdt* 'what is like Indra.' Such adverbs as *yathākāmam* (188°), or rather the adjectives of which they are originally the adverbially used accusatives (though the adverbial use has come to be far more common than the adjectival), are, it appears to me, modeled on such as *tathākratu*, *tathāvidha*, etc., which do not violate the rules of ordinary Sanskrit composition. The analogy between *tathā* and *yathā* as part of speech is stronger than their discordance as demonstrative and relative. *Praçām* (197°) was hardly worth mentioning so briefly and slightly; it is the sole quotable example of a whole type of declension as stated by the Hindu grammarians, and is a puzzle as regards both form and value. That such words as *çirçatās* should be called (199°) "nouns in *-tas*" seems rather queer. As regards the curious addition of a pronoun repeating a noun (subject or other: 215°), it is doubtless to be regarded simply as a pronominal redundancy, such as is not uncommon in our modern languages (e. g. 'this man, he said'), and is especially frequent in French, even in standing constructions ('the man, is he here?' etc.). A further striking example is seen at ÇB. I vi 3. 16: *tād v evā khālu hatō vṛtrāḥ sá . . . çigye* 'so forsooth Vṛtra, being slain, he lay,' etc. And at XIV iv 4. 1-3 there is even a double repetition: *tēsām nāmnām vāg ity etād eṣām ukthām* 'of these names speech, so called—it was their hymn' (and so in two following sentences). That the idiom is not entirely restricted to ÇB. is shown by the occurrence of a similar case in Ch. U. V 1. 12: *atha ha prāṇa uccikramiṣant sa yathā suhayaḥ . . . sam akhidat* 'so then the breath, being on the point of going out, it . . . tore up,' etc. At 309°, *achānta* should be written *achāntta*, and, at 315°, *āyudhvī* in like manner *āyuddhvī*, according to their etymological value; what the manuscripts, even if unanimous, may write in such cases is not of the slightest consequence; to the grammarians and the scribes, *ntt* and *nt*, and *dhv* and *ddhv*, and the like, are equivalent combinations, interchangeable under all circumstances (see my Skt. Gr., §232); editors of texts merely waste their time and space by noting differences of reading in regard to such points. At 315°, the "verse" which the author rightly surmises is RV. X 38. 5, with some differences of reading. I do not see on what ground forms like *yeṣam* (see my Skt. Gr.², §894 c) are simply reckoned (356°)

as "injunctive"; something in real explanation of them would be very welcome. I have not struck out *vakṣi* from the list of imperatively used 2d persons, and see no good reason for doing so (365^a). In AV. XII 4. 42 (553^a), the second *pluta*-sign is not wanting in the *pada*-text: see AV. Prāt. I 97 and note. I do not understand why the proper aorist meaning is assumed to be normal for *bhūt* (576^b); an augmentless form has no tense-character.

Here and there the author raises a question or suggests a correction concerning statements made in my Sanskrit grammar, and of these I take notice in conclusion. *Gāutamabruvāṇā* (76^c) I find myself unable to support by a reference, and I presume that, as he surmises, it comes from a mistaken apprehension of the vocative *gāūtama bruvāṇa* in ÇB. *Paristubdhā* (201^c) was an error, and, as such, already struck out in my second edition. *Avāci* (267^a) occurs twice in KB. XIV 3 (also repeatedly in Sūtras, as ÇÇS. VII 9. 6). *Vibhajyāmāna* in the AV. Index Verborum is an erratum for *-bhāj-*, as found in the text. As regards the Brāhmaṇa usage of active and middle verb-forms, the few discordances between his observations and mine (§§147-52, p. 229 ff.) come in part from the differences between his classification of 'V' and 'P' and mine of 'V' and 'B'; my 'V' includes only RV., AV., and SV., and my 'B' does not exclude *mantra*-material occurring in the other earliest texts. *Sac* as active, then, is found in VS. XXXVIII 20 and elsewhere; *svad* as active in VS. and TB. (see the Pet. lex.); and *asṛpta* at AB. VII 3. 4. Of *ikṣ* as active, *abhivyāikṣat* occurs in AA. II 4. 3. 10; the text there gives *-āikhyat*, but this must be a false reading for *-āikṣat*, which the Upanishad has in the corresponding passage, III 13. For *jṛmbh* the one active form from AB. is all that I have also; but it is sufficient. *Plu* is active at ÇB. V 12; see the Pet. lex. *Akṣ* is middle in MS. IV (p. 32. 8). From *an*, *prāṇeta* as 3d sing. occurs more than once in JB. II 57. *Kūj*, active, is found in VS. (XXII 7) and elsewhere; *bhū*, middle, in TA.; *vidmahe* in MS. II (p. 119. 7); *grāyantas* in RV. From *ās* we find the active participle *āsiṣyānt* in TS. VII 1. 19³. Middle forms of *mā* are not attributed by me to the Brāhmaṇa. I have a middle person of *sā* credited to TB., but I am unable to find the reference, and suspect that it is an error. My ascription of active to *edh* was made solely upon the basis of a bad reading in TA. (VI 7. 2), which I regarded as meant for *edhyāsam*; but this was insufficient, and the item

should be struck out. From *bhr* and *yudh* I have no middle forms from Brāhmaṇa noted, but, as these are found both earlier and later, I assumed their occurrence there also; in such specialties of Brāhmaṇa usage, the author's observations are more to be trusted than mine.

I should add that I was unfortunately unable to make any use of this work in correcting my grammar for its second edition, as it did not come to my hands until the printing of that edition was completed, and I was preparing its index.

W. D. WHITNEY.

II.—THE SONG OF SONGS.

The following observations are the outcome of a recent study of the Song of Songs, in which the writer seemed to himself to gain a clear view of some passages which have formed a stumbling-block to many interpreters. He therefore wishes to lay his conclusions before critics and seeks their judgment. It must, however, be remembered that an article like this is not exhaustive of the subject. When the translation and notes are published in full, they will give the key to anything which is left obscure here; while the author gladly seizes the opportunity of an article in this learned periodical, to explain the reasons for some dealings with the text that require justification and yet could not be suitably inserted in the notes of a book intended for general use. It will be seen in the following pages that the author does not hold a brief for the exact transmitted text, masora and all, but detects the same sort of corruptions as are found in all books that have been transmitted from a great antiquity by handwriting; of which the varying readings of the Greek and other ancient versions afford sufficient proofs. In not a few manifestly corrupt passages it appears possible to recover the original text by conjecture, involving the alteration of only a few letters, yet substituting good sense for manifest nonsense.

We have here a conversation between several persons, carried on through the whole piece. The constant occurrence of the first and second person pronoun and verb proves this: i. 3, 4 "girls love *thee*. Take *us*, *we* will run after *thee*"; i. 5 "Black am *I*." The use of the first person pronoun in the plural (as in the above passages) shows that besides the individuals there is also a chorus of several persons; and we know what they are, for they are addressed as "ladies of Jerusalem" (i. 5, etc.). The individuals who are discovered at once are two: 1) the girl, called in vii. 1 [Eng. vi. 13] a Shulammitte, or inhabitant of Sholam or Shulam, and probably in the original text at vi. 12, vii. 2 [1] daughter of Amminadab. She is generally present and speaking; she tries to interest the chorus in her fate: i. 5, 6, 12, 14, ii. 3-9, v. 2-8, 10-16, vi. 2, viii. 4, and speaks amorously of the charms of her

lover, both to the chorus in the above passages and in dialogue with him: i. 7, 16-ii. 1, 15-17, iv. 16ef, vii. 12 [11]-viii. 2, 6-12. (2) her lover, who speaks in dialogue with her: i. 8-11, 15, ii. 2, 10-14, iv. 7-16d, v. 1a-d, vi. 4-7, vii. 7-10 (6-9), viii. 5c-e, and to himself: vi. 8-9, vii. 1cd. No name is given to him in the text; we only gather that he is a shepherd i. 7, and that he has a garden full of spice-bearing shrubs and vines, iv. 4, v. 1, vi. 2, 11. The chorus is almost if not quite constantly present; it speaks and is addressed in the plural, and is feminine, being always described as "ladies (literally *daughters*) of Jerusalem" i. 2-4 (emended), v. 9, vi. 1, vii. 1ab [vi. 13ab], vii. 2-6 [1-5]. The only other speakers who seem to be required are some persons who may be conjecturally designated citizens of Jerusalem, who observe Solomon's palanquin approaching, and describe it in iii. 6-11, and those who speak vi. 10abc and viii. 5ab, who seem to be the lover's friends.

Of the various kinds of poetry consisting of dialogue—reported dialogue or narrative (epic), direct dialogue (dramatic)—or the very limited dialogue between two persons (bucolic), it is not difficult to see that this poem belongs to the second. The speech is not reported by a third person, but direct. The change of speaker in i. 8 is not introduced by "And the shepherd answered and said," nor in i. 12 have we "And the Shulammite turned to the ladies of Jerusalem and said." In only one place are such words inserted, in ii. 10 "My beloved answered and said to me"; and here there seem to be sufficient reasons for regarding them as spurious.¹ Besides this, there are manifest changes of scene. The earlier part, as the appellation "ladies of Jerusalem" sufficiently shows, and the mention of the city police in v. 7 more strongly proves, has its seat in the capital; but a removal into the country is announced in vii. 12-14 [11-13] and accomplished at viii. 5.

It will perhaps conduce best to a clear understanding of the plot of this little drama and the problems in it that await solution, if it is here described in as few words as possible, with the divisions of scenes and names of speakers attached according to the judgment of the present writer.

Scene I, i. 2-ii. 7: at the king's residence in Jerusalem. Ladies of his harem call to him as he passes to cheer them with amorous

¹ If genuine context we should have not ענה but ויען, and not ואמר but ויאמר.

caresses, i. 2-4. The text of these verses exhibits manifold corruption, which may have been introduced through the unwillingness of scribes to allow a chorus of ladies (plural) to claim such intimate relations with the king. I adopt most of the emendations of Rabbi Kohler, of Chicago,¹ with one or two of my own, which together make the speech read thus:

Kiss us from the kisses of thy mouth!
 for thy caresses are better than wine,
 and the fragrance of thy mouth (?) than all balsams.
 Like oil of myrrh are thy kisses;
 therefore girls love thee.

Take us, we will run after thee;
 bring us, king, into thy chambers,
 we will exult and rejoice in thee;
 We will make merry with thy caresses more than with wine,
 with thy love more than with strong drink.

There is nothing here to identify this king. But it appears from iii. 11 that Solomon is meant. He passes out, and the Shulammitic girl comes in, and addresses the ladies in i. 5, 6, her very first words being skilfully chosen by the writer to exhibit her as a rustic maiden inured to the labors of the fields under a hot sun, contrasting with the luxurious habits of the fine court ladies whom she addresses. The shepherd enters here, and the Shulammitic addresses to him i. 27—a verse which exhibits the modesty of her character, while the shepherd's reply shows his confidence in her: no harm can come to one so pure and discreet while seeking him among the shepherds. The lover addresses to her i. 8-11, verses full of affection, to which she responds by speaking to the ladies of his charms in i. 12-14. Then follows an amatory dialogue, the lover speaking i. 15, the girl i. 16, 17, ii. 1, and the lover ii. 2. The Shulammitic's words,

“Our couch is green,
 the walls of our houses are cedars,
 our beams cypresses,
 and I am a crocus of Sharon,
 a lily of the valleys,”

seem to indicate that they live largely in the open air, with trees for their walls and roof; and that she is a lovely flower from the

¹ In his German edition published at New York in 1878; it is full of very ingenious corrections of the text and transpositions, most of which, however, appear to me too wild guess-work to be adopted by a sober critic.

valley (or low land) of Sharon, on the sea-coast between Joppa and Caesarea. The shepherd is elsewhere assigned to En-gedi. Both therefore belong rather to the south than the north of the land. Verses ii. 3-7 are of a very different character; they are spoken to the ladies, and show that the Shulammite is now exhausted with the excitement produced by the interview with her lover, and desires refreshment and repose. This forms a natural end to the scene; as similar words do also in viii. 4.

The second scene is ii. 8-17. It commences with a speech of the Shulammite, who has recovered from her fatigue, and now sees her lover running to the house where she is staying. At *v.* 10 he exhorts her to come with him into the country and see the beauties of the spring, the flowers, the birds, etc., thus making it certain that she is not already in the country, and but rarely at Jerusalem as in the previous scene. This speech is introduced by the words "My beloved answered and said to me," which, if the poem is dramatic, cannot possibly be used to indicate a change of speaker; and the absence of any similar expression in other places where a change of person is proved (even by change of gender) as between i. 15 and 16, makes it certain that they are spurious.¹ The lover ends his speech by praising the charm of her voice and asking her to sing him a song (*v.* 14). This she does in *v.* 15; the difference in the subject and rhythm show these lines to be a song; after which she assures him of her affection, but refuses his other request to go away with him, and tells him to go back to his hills before it is too dark (*vv.* 16, 17). The reason for the refusal is not distinctly given, but it may surely be nothing more recondite than the time-honored principle in fiction that the maiden ought not to yield too soon to the entreaties of a lover, but should try him well first. Let it be noted that this scene gives absolutely no countenance to the theory invented by commentators, that the Shulammite was picked up for her beauty in the country by some of Solomon's people, brought up to Jerusalem and lodged as a prisoner in his harem. For here in Jerusalem her lover gains free access to her, asks her to come (not to *fly*) with him, and she does not reply that she is a prisoner and cannot move. The king is not exhibited as a lover at all; the few verses (i. 9-11, 15, ii. 2)

¹Grammatically they are hardly justifiable. We desire a particle of connexion (אֲנִי or אֲנִי); and אֲנִי for אֲנִי is scarcely ever found in Biblical Hebrew, except in the very peculiar language of the book Ecclesiastes, and never in this poem.

sometimes assigned to him form quite naturally a part of her lover's discourse with her.¹

We now reach the little scene iii. 1-5, which is full of difficulties. The Shulammite tells how she sought her lover in her bed at night, and not finding him, went out into the streets in search of him, and was met by the watchmen, but afterwards found him and would not let him go till she had brought him to her mother's house (far away in the country, vii. 12-14). As she says "I seized him (past tense), and now will not let him go (future tense)," we expect to find him constantly with her; yet in v. 2 she is alone in bed and he trying in vain to be admitted. This leads to the discovery that the scene commencing at v. 2 is closely similar to this, in fact a kind of duplicate of it. Both scenes occur at bedtime; here she is thinking of her lover, there he is calling and asking to be admitted. In both she rises and goes out to find him and meets the watchmen, who in v. 7 beat her. This is the end of the story in ch. v.; whereas here it is added that afterwards she did find him. Thus the story is identical, and so are several of the lines: iii. 1c = v. 6d, iii. 3a = v. 7a, and v. 6e = iii. 1d + 2f in LXX (omitted in the Hebrew). But the scene in ch. iii. begins with the verse which all the commentators wish away and none can justify, in which she says that she used to seek her lover *on her bed in the nights* (plural, and therefore not once only but in many nights). This is incredible of a girl who is shown to be perfectly virtuous and modest: see i. 7, iv. 12, and especially viii. 1, 2, where she wishes he were her brother, as then she could kiss him without impropriety; which she must not now, as they are only lovers; and she cannot in any case be so immodest as to tell such a story of herself. The duplication of the scene of itself raises the suspicion that one of the versions is a spurious repetition; and the other difficulties make the suspicion almost a certainty. Comparing the scenes together, we find that the offensive words in iii. 1a "Upon my bed in the nights" are absent from v. 2a, and that those in iii. 1c "I used to seek him but found him not"

¹ The line i. 9a seems to have occasioned this misunderstanding, being interpreted "To my mare in Pharaoh's chariots"—absurdly, since one mare cannot pull many chariots. מִרְכָּבָה must be collective "horses" (Vulg. equitatus). מִרְכָּבָה is a peculiar form of stat. const. (Ewald, §211, b. 1) used before a preposition, so that the sense is "To the horses in Pharaoh's chariots," words which need not be attributed to the king, but may be spoken by any one.

are in another place in v. 6d, where they are unobjectionable, being said not of seeking of him in the bed, but of looking for him in the city; and that even in ch. iii. they occur again, naturally, in v. 2e. The reason for her going to seek him in the city is credibly given in ch. v.: he had come in the night and asked to be admitted; she refused and he went away; then she was sorry and went out to bring him back, and met the watchmen, who took her for a vagrant and illtreated her. This is clearly the true version of the story. An interpolator has made iii. 1-5 out of it and spoiled it. For the first line "While I was sleeping, though my mind was awake" he has substituted "Upon my bed in the nights," apparently without perceiving the scandal these words would raise in connexion with the next lines "I used to seek him whom my soul loves; I sought him, but found him not." He omits the lines at the beginning which account for her conduct v. 2-6c, and yet carelessly allows iii. 1 to stand. He mentions her question to the watchmen, but omits to say that they beat her (v. 7cde), probably deeming it either unlikely or unnecessary to the story. Here the original story ends; but the interpolator, thinking that it wants a dénouement, adds the remark that afterwards she found him, and that she seized him and will not let him go till she has brought him to her mother's house. Surely it was not for her to insist on bringing him there, but for him to go and demand her in marriage. Thus all the contents of this little scene are impossible, either as being a repetition of what is better given in ch. v., or as involving statements inconsistent with her character or with the plan of the piece. The final verse (iii. 5), a duplicate of the last of the first, is adopted by the interpolator simply to terminate the scene. There is, therefore, every reason to condemn this scene as a spurious interpolation.

The third scene, iii. 6-11, presents a new picture, also in Jerusalem, though probably not in the royal residence. A procession is seen coming up to the city from the desert of Judah, the central part of which is Solomon's chair or palanquin, in which he himself is sitting. It is described by onlookers, whose names are not given, but who may be taken to be citizens of Jerusalem, the first speaking iii. 6, the second vv. 7, 8, the third vv. 9, 10, and the fourth v. 11. The ladies of Jerusalem (also called ladies of Zion, and probably from this double designation intended to be ordinary female inhabitants, not the ladies of the king's harem) are exhorted to come out and see King Solomon and his wonderful pageant.

The connexion of this scene with the plot of the piece is not immediately obvious. But on reflection it becomes evident that it is intended to present a moral lesson, by showing us Solomon as a luxurious coward, who requires sixty armed men to attend his litter to preserve him from fancied dangers; in contrast to the brave Shulammite girl keeping watch alone in the vineyards (i. 7), and going alone at night through the streets of the city (v. 6, 7), and to her lover ready to scale the highest mountains and incur risks from wild beasts (iv. 8, 9). This is the only scene without any of the usual speakers. It must be located on the walls of Jerusalem, whence a view is obtained of the surrounding lower land. No interval need be assumed between this scene and the preceding; indeed it might very naturally be placed on the evening of the same day. In one passage only is the text faulty in two or three letters, but the emendation of these (which belongs mainly to Graetz) restores this excellent sense:

- iv. 10. its (the palanquin's) pillars he made of silver,
 its floor of gold,
 its seat of purple,
 its interior tessellated with ebony.
 11. Daughters of Jerusalem, come out,
 and look, daughters of Zion, etc.¹

We now reach the verses iv. 1-6, which are entirely occupied with words of admiration addressed by the lover to the Shulammite. But scarcely a word of them is original. "Thou art fair, my friend, thou art fair, thine eyes doves" iv. 1ab = i. 15. "Thy hair is like the herd of goats that are smooth, from the mount of Gilead," iv. 1de = vi. 5cd. "Thy teeth like the flock of shorn ones that have come up from the washing, all bearing twins, without a barren one among them," iv. 2 = vi. 6. "Like the cutting of a pomegranate thy brow behind thy ribbon," iv. 3cd = vi. 7. "Like David's tower thy neck," iv. 4a, resembles "thy neck like an ivory tower," vii. 5 [4] a. "Thy breasts like two fawns, twins of a gazelle," iv. 5ab = vii. 4 [3]. "That pasture in the lilies," iv. 5c = ii. 16b. Now we cannot indeed decide from our superior and colder wisdom how many of these extravagant expressions a lover might be allowed to employ; but from a poet we have a

¹ For רצוף הכנים: בנות יר' read רצוף אהבה מבנות יר' Mem had become prefixed to בנות instead of being the last letter of the previous word, and hence all the misunderstanding.

right to expect no stale repetition of fantastic phrases, one utterance of which is as much as an audience could tolerate. If one of the passages be spurious, undoubtedly it is iv. 1-6; because in those verses are brought together phrases culled from many passages where each is appropriate, and there are also several words of doubtful correctness. The action is of course better without this scene. And if *vv.* 1-5 are cast out, verse 6 must go with them, as no reason appears why the lover, after coming in to eulogize his lady through five verses, should suddenly say that it is getting so late that he really must go.

Scene four is iv. 7-16, consisting of an amatory address of the lover to the Shulammitte, *vv.* 7-15, and a song in which he sings 16a-d, and she responds in 16ef. If we were right in the excisions, this immediately follows scene 3, in which neither of the present speakers were present, and they were last seen in scene 2 (ii. 8-17), where the Shulammitte parted from the lover in the evening and he went home. Here therefore we have probably the morning of the next day, and he comes again to talk to her of his love, with the courage and brightness that come naturally with the morning. There is, however, an important change in the mutual relations of the lovers. In scenes 1 and 2 she addressed him as "my beloved," i. 16, ii. 16, 17, and "thou whom my soul loveth" i. 7, and he her as "my friend" i. 9, 15, ii. 2, 10, 13, "thou fairest among women" i. 8, "my fair one," ii. 10, 13.¹ In this scene he begins with the accustomed epithet "my friend" iv. 7, but immediately exchanges this for the new one "bride" iv. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, which is generally preceded by "my sister" iv. 9, 10, 12. We may with probability conjecture that they have in the interval been formally betrothed, which seems to be promised by the words in her last speech, "My beloved is mine and I his," uttered in answer to his request in ii. 14. Some slight corrections of the text are necessary in this scene, but none very serious. In *v.* 16 the lover sings a song of four short lines about his garden (for we know from *v.* 1 that he had a garden), and the Shulammitte answers in two, that she hopes he will go to his garden and enjoy its fruits.

The fifth scene contains the one verse *v.* 1, before which a considerable interval must have occurred; for in the preceding verse the lover was exhorted to go to his garden; and here that is

¹ In Hebrew respectively יָפְתִי, הַיָּפָה בְּנָשִׁים, רַעֲיָתִי, שְׁאֵהָבָה נַפְשִׁי, דֹּרִי

² בְּלָהָה

already past: "I *did go* into my garden"; hence this verse must commence a new scene. But it stands alone, for the next verse commences a very different scene, beginning with a long story told by the Shulammitte about her lover, who therefore cannot be present. Yet this verse v. 1, though isolated, stands in the only possible place. We have seen that it cannot be placed earlier, since an interval is required before it. It cannot stand later, for at vi. 1 the ladies ask the Shulammitte where her lover went, and she answers: To his garden. She must have known this from his declaration in this verse, wherefore v. 1 must stand before vi. 1. But there is no gap or pause from v. 2 to vi. 1 in which it could possibly be inserted. One unsatisfactory point still remains, and would remain whatever transposition of verses we might make. If here at v. 1 the lover comes to his lady and tells her that he has been to his garden, he is no longer there, and she ought not at vi. 2 to say that he was gone there. We can apparently explain it only by supposing that the Shulammitte meant that the last she had heard of her lover was that he had gone to his garden. It is a weakness inherent in the text, which cannot be removed by any shifting of verses.

I have now to speak of the three verses vi. 10-12, which seem to have had a curious fate. Verses 11 and 12 manifestly cannot belong to the lover's speech in vi. 4-9; and for verse 10 a much more suitable place can be found. None of these three verses have any connexion with each other, yet they can all be restored to the places from which they have evidently been torn. Here we are concerned only with v. 11ab, which may follow v. 1a, to which it forms a suitable parallel, and gives with the rest of v. 1, two equal three-line verses, thus:

- v. 1a. I did enter into my garden, my sister, bride,
- vi. 11a. to the walnut-garden I went down,
- b. to look at the fruits of the valley;
- v. 1b. I plucked my myrrh with my balsam,
- c. I ate my honey-drippings with my honey,
- d. I drank my wine with my milk.

The two lines vi. 11cd occur almost identically, and in better context in vii. 13 [12] bd, and may therefore be cancelled here as useless duplicates. The words which follow next—"Eat, friends, drink and get drunk, fellows"—can be spoken only by the same person (the lover) who in the preceding lines addressed the

Shulammite; his friends are mentioned also in viii. 13, and they very probably speak vi. 10 and viii. 5, and may be the shepherds who are called the lover's companions in i. 7. These words surprise us as being addressed to persons of whose presence there has been no intimation. We must take them as showing that the lover is here attended by his comrades, and that while the refined and ethereal pleasures provided by his garden satisfy his tastes, their grosser natures enjoy coarser delights of the table, even taken in excess. These lines are among the most important in the Song as giving a motive, or pointing a moral, derived from the contrast between the elevation of spirit produced by pure love, and the low tastes of those who have no such sentiments.

After this minute but important scene, we find that another, the sixth, commences at v. 2. Here the Shulammite narrates her experiences, not to her lover, who is not present, but to the chorus of ladies. It continues without break to vi. 3. She tells what happened to her when she was in bed, "While I was sleeping, though my mind was awake." This curious expression may well describe a dream, in which the mind is active (awake) in sleep. If this be so, then what follows is the dream—that the lover comes in the night, knocks, and asks to be admitted, as he is all wet with dew, v. 2b-4. However this be, it was not at the time understood by the Shulammite to be a dream; for she says that she rose to open to her lover, found that he was gone, and then actually went out to look for him in the city, was arrested by the police and beaten by them. All this hangs very well together; the only doubtful point being whether v. 2b-7 is meant to be all real, or the first part is a dream. For the former speaks the difficulty of believing that a dream is not on waking recognized to be such, an argument which loses much of its force from the fact that the whole thing is fiction and may admit improbabilities; for the latter, the interpretation of the first line, v. 2a. She then in v. 8 expresses the hope that the ladies whom she is addressing may succeed in finding the truant lover. This leads the ladies, who have not spoken a word since the beginning (i. 2-4), to show interest in the Shulammite's troubles and ask what her lover is like, v. 9. This leads her to give an enthusiastic description of him, v. 10-16; and this works so powerfully upon the ladies that in vi. 1 they offer to help her to look for him, and ask where he is gone; which she answers by saying (as we have seen before) that he went to his garden, vi. 2. The next verse, vi. 3, is almost identical with

ii. 16. There it is suitable: here, where she has only to give a direct answer to a question of fact in vi. 1, it is not wanted, and may be declared spurious.

The seventh scene consists of the few verses vi. 4-9, all spoken by the lover, *vv.* 4-7 to the Shulammite, and *vv.* 8, 9 to himself. After the love-sick maiden's praise of her lover, it is suitable that we should hear her charms described by him. It seems to be implied that the Shulammite and the ladies had been successful in the search for him; for which an interval must be allowed between the two scenes. In iv. 1-3 we had verses identical with vi. 4-7, and found those to be spurious and these genuine. But two lines iv. 3ab, which do not occur here, seem essential; for when the hair, teeth and brow are mentioned, why not the mouth, which is much more expressive? We will therefore insert them (with Graetz) after vi. 6, and thus gain three equal verses of three lines each: (1) vi. 4, 5; (2) vi. 6; (3) iv. 3ab, vi. 7. In vi. 8, 9 the lover no longer addresses the Shulammite, but speaks in praise of her in the third person, showing her as immeasurably superior to the degraded women of the court, who, nevertheless, cannot but admire her. These words must be spoken by the lover to himself, as they have quite the tone of a soliloquy, and the only other persons shown to be present are the chorus of court-ladies, the very class with which he contrasts his own lady. The climax of the encomium is formed by v. 9, which must be the end of the scene, as *vv.* 10-12 cannot belong to it, and vii. 1 (vi. 13) commences a new and very different one. Verse 10,

"Who is this (*fem.*) that is looking out like the dawn,
fair as the moon,
pure as the sun,"

might indeed appear to be the words of praise implied in v. 9 "Daughters saw her . . . and praised her"—in the words "Who is this," etc. But in this case the words of praise would be quoted by the lover from what he had heard these ladies say among themselves—a very strained position, which we are fortunately not obliged to adopt, as vi. 10 finds a suitable place before viii. 5, where it is parallel to another "Who is this." Verse vi. 11 has been already placed elsewhere; v. 12 clearly cannot belong to this context; and we shall find a very suitable one after vii. 9.

The eighth scene comprises vii. 1-10 [vi. 13-vii. 9] and vi. 12, 4c, 5ab. The Shulammite enters in dancing costume (shoes and

splendid drawers, vii. 2 [1], whereas she ordinarily goes bare-foot, v. 3), and dances before the chorus, who call her back, vii. 1 [vi. 13], and admire her figure and features, vii. 2-6 [1-5];¹ but their speech is very prettily interrupted by her lover, who expostulates with them for treating his lady as if she were a common ballet-girl (vii. 1 [vi. 13] cd). As she is dancing, the spectators look first at her feet and then survey her from below upwards, which is the order observed in the ladies' description here. The reason for this dance by a virtuous girl, who must not be looked on as a hired ballet-dancer, is not distinctly given. We must assume that it formed part of the ceremonies of the betrothal, which had taken place between the third and the fourth scene, as is proved by the epithet "bride" first bestowed on her by her lover in iv. 8. She and her companions formed a double company for the dance, as appears in vii. 1 [vi. 13] cd. The occasion also accounts for the splendor of her attire in vii. 2 [1]. Verses 5 and 6 require a slight transposition. I read:

- vii. 5 [4] a. Thy neck like an ivory tower;
 6 [5] a. thy head over it like Carmel;
 b. and the ringlets of thy head like the purple robe of a king,
 c. tied up in folds;
 5 [4] b. thy eyes, pools in Heshbon, etc.

We thus obtain two verses of four lines each, instead of one of five and one of three; and by correction of one letter get "over it," i. e. over thy neck instead of the senseless "over thee," and have

¹ The purity of the Shulammitte being attested by all the rest of the poem, the license used in these verses is striking and difficult of explanation. If Solomon were really one of the persons in this drama, he might utter words possible only to a voluptuary; but his presence would spoil all the plot. Besides, it is the ladies of the court who have already encored the performance of the Shulammitte in vii. 1 [vi. 13], and it is clearly their part to continue their outburst of admiration for the dancer which we find in vii. 2-6 [1-5]. They are themselves voluptuaries at a polygamous court, and the language assigned to them here and at the beginning (i. 2-4) is no worse than we ought to expect. And the words are not nearly so objectionable as some critics have made them. In vii. 2 (1) the parallel to shoes on the feet is "the encirclements of thy thighs in the dances, the handwork of an artist"—by which (*ambitus*, what goes round) some sort of gorgeous drawers must be meant. The navel is compared to "a round cup in which mixed wine will not be wanting," i. e. a cup such as was used for wine and water. The word denotes navel alone, as is proved by its use in Ezek. xvi. 4, and not *pudendum mulieris*.

neck and head named first, and followed by the parts of the head—hair, eyes and nose. After these verses we come to a very different speech, which must be assigned to the lover, as the Shulammitte is addressed as "beloved one" in *v.* 7 [6] and the speaker speaks of himself in the first person singular; it consists of *vii.* 7-10 [6-9], *vi.* 12, 4c, 5ab. Verses 7 [6] and 8 [7] which describe her stature and breasts, are quite simple. The rest of the scene I take thus:

- vii.* 9 [8] e. and the scent of thy nose is like apples,
- 10 [9] a. and thy mouth like the best wine.
- 9 [8] a. I thought I would mount up into the palm,
- b. that I might seize upon its branches.
- vi.* 12a. But I knew not my own self;
- b. thou didst make me timid,
- c. thou daughter of Amminadab,
- 4c. terrible as towers!
- 5a. Turn thy eyes away from me,
- b. for it is they that have driven me wild.

The encomium of the nose and mouth can only accompany that of the other parts of the body; hence the last line of *v.* 9 [8] must precede *v.* 10 [9]. Of the second and third lines of *v.* 10 [9] no sense has been made in accordance with grammar ever since the Seventy tried their hands at them; they must therefore be given up as hopelessly corrupt. Next come the first four lines of *v.* 9 [8], which introduce a new subject, quite unexpected and somewhat revolting, yet essential and leading to a dénouement of the highest beauty and importance. Having compared the Shulammitte's stature to that of a palm-tree, the lover now resumes the figure and confesses that he felt a desire to "mount up into the palm and seize its branches." In other words, he contemplated doing some violence to her; and how was this averted? She looked at him with a reproachful gaze, which proved her purity and her power: "but I knew not what I was doing; thou didst frighten me off from it, daughter of Amminadab." Here the second half of *v.* 9 [8] must be declared spurious, being a repetition of *v.* 8 [7] b, introduced without sense; and the verse *vi.* 12, which was thrown out there as quite foreign to the context, is here absolutely necessary, and with Graetz's emendation gives the best imaginable sense. Very curiously, three other lines which could not be tolerated in a description of the Shulammitte's peaceful charms, seem actually made for this place, where she appears in a new character, as

powerful and terrible to her lover, vi. 4c, 5ab: "Terrible as towers," etc. The transposition restores the two-line rhythm which subsists in this scene from vii. 7 [6] onwards: vi. 12ab; 12c and 4c; 5ab. In all this we recognize the crisis of the drama, and its justification as a picture not of trifling love-making, but of strong female virtue. Nothing can immediately follow this. A pause must be allowed before we can go on to the following verses.

The ninth scene, vii. 11-14 [10-13], viii. 4, is spoken entirely by the Shulammitte. The first verse, vii. 11 [10], is out of place, being spoken by her *of* (not *to*) her lover. It seems to be suggested by ii. 16, which was spuriously repeated in vi. 3, and to be inserted here by some one who wished to show that the lover's conduct in vii. 9 [8] did not produce any estrangement. Moreover, it is too short to form a verse by itself. It may therefore safely be condemned as spurious. In the verses vii. 12-14 [11-13], viii. 1-2 the Shulammitte's words show that she forgives her lover's dastardly conduct, of which he has expressed himself ashamed, and she cannot show this more sweetly than by remembering his request in ii. 10-13, that she would go out into the country with him and enjoy its delights of flowers and fruit, which she then declined but now accepts. This speech is peculiarly grateful after the portraiture of her austere virtue. Here we see how warmly she can love:

vii. 13 [12] e. There will I give thee my caresses—
14 [13] d. my caresses which I have preserved for thee,

and at the same time how dignified her behavior is; she wishes he were her brother, so that she could kiss him freely without scandal, viii. 1, 2. It will be observed from the above quotation that the single line vii. 13 [12] e must be removed from the end of v. 13 [12] and placed before the last of v. 14 [13], to which it clearly belongs; which has the advantage of bringing together two other lines that should not be separated—

13 [12] d. the pomegranates are flowering,
14 [13] a. the mandrakes have given forth fragrance.

Verse viii. 3 is a repetition of ii. 6, and appears to be inserted because it was believed proper to introduce the words of viii. 4, as it stood before the closely similar words of ii. 7. Here it is unquestionably spurious. There seems, however, to be no reason for condemning v. 4 addressed to the ladies, on account of its

close similarity with ii. 7; it may be used to close both scenes. At the same time the words have no obvious appropriateness here, where no weariness is mentioned, and I should prefer to see them expunged.

Now we come to the tenth and last scene, comprising vi. 10, viii. 5-14. Here the action seems to be removed, as was indicated in the previous one, from Jerusalem to the country-place where the Shulammite's mother lives. Some onlookers notice the Shulammite and her lover coming up from the desert (viii. 5). If the scene be at Jerusalem, this must doubtless be the desert of Judea; if far away in the north, probably the plain of Esdraelon, unless the reading is wrong; which is very possible, especially as the Septuagint has something different. This verse, announcing the approach of persons interrogatively by the words "Who is this?" (as also in iii. 6), enables us to insert the only verse of vi. 10-12 that has not yet been placed. The verse vi. 10 begins with "Who is this?" and clearly refers to the Shulammite, so that different onlookers may quite naturally utter vi. 10 and viii. 5ab, the latter coming second because it mentions the lover and thus leads on to viii. 5cde. But the description in vi. 10 of a person beaming with brightness and beauty like the sun or moon, is spoiled by the line, "terrible as towers"; which may be cancelled as an unintelligent repetition of vi. 4c (which with vi. 12 I inserted after vii. 10 [9]). As they enter, the lover says, "Beneath this apple-tree I waked thee up" to the power of love; "there thy mother travailed with thee, there she travailed and brought thee forth"—a poetical conception; here thou wast born, and here thou wast *born again* to the new life of love. The punctuation of viii. 5cde must be emended so as to make the pronouns feminine, and put the speech into the lover's mouth. This does not affect the text. Otherwise the mother would be the lover's mother, who is never mentioned, and the Shulammite, having witnessed the birth of her lover, would be considerably older than he. Then the Shulammite winds up the whole, as is fitting, by an eloquent declaration of the power of love, for which she has suffered much. She asks her lover now to take her to his heart and seal her to him, for love is stronger than death, or outlives life itself; it dashes into the heart like a missile, and burns, itself unquenchable; and true love is not to be had for money; those who try to gain it in this way are only laughed at for their pains. Next come the two verses viii. 8, 9, obviously spoken of the Shulammite and therefore by

her brothers (who were mentioned in i. 6), but spoken many years before, since she is treated as a child. Hence the brothers are not actors in the drama, speaking these words where they stand. The words must have been overheard by the Shulammite, and be now quoted by her from memory, for the purpose of giving a suitable answer to them in v. 10. This would be clear if the writer had prefixed to them some such words as "I heard my brothers saying." She then contrasts the helplessness of Solomon with his immense vineyard, which he could secure from plundering only by paying enormous sums, with her own modest possession, which was within her grasp and did not depend on mercenary servants. This is the moral lesson of the piece—the worth of strong and virtuous character, that relies on itself alone and is not dependant on others who may be capricious or faithless. This would be a noble conclusion; and I believe it is the end: for verses 13 and 14 represent the lover as suddenly asking her (in the name of himself and his friends) for a song, which merely repeats a similar request in ii. 14. There, ii. 15, she accedes to the request for a song, but sends him away; here she refuses, and sends him away, with essentially the same words. Thus it is mainly a repetition of what had some sense and beauty in the former place, but here has none; for if she is to be always sending him away, when can the end come? and how can he appear to care much for her when he makes himself the mouthpiece of his companions?

The above exposition has given reasons for the chief emendations and new interpretations of the text which appear to be imperatively required. On one point, however, it is necessary to add something. The title "Solomon's Song" suggests a connexion with that king. The words "which is by Solomon," appended to the real title "The Song of Songs," no more belong to the original text than similar formulas in the titles of the Psalms, and are therefore absolutely without authority. The obvious contempt with which Solomon is treated in the Song must effectually debar us from supposing that he could be the writer, or even that it was written in his lifetime. But while giving up the authorship by Solomon, most commentators have nevertheless admitted Solomon as a person in the drama. His function there could only be as lover (either in the character of a king, or in disguise) of the Shulammite. If she has also the shepherd-lover whom we have assumed, there seems to be no room for another; for how are the two to be distinguished? If the king is the only

lover, and woos her in the disguise of a shepherd, what are we to make of the bitter satire expressed in the end (viii. 11, 12) by the Shulammitte against her accepted lover? The idea that the king is required as an actor rests on misapprehensions. First, it is said that the words in i. 9 A. V., I have compared thee, O my love, to a company of horses in Pharaoh's chariots, R. V. to a steed in Pharaoh's chariots—Or, to my steed, must be spoken by the king, because no one else would be likely to have horses and chariots given him by the king of Egypt. But this conclusion depends entirely on the alternative reading "*my* steed," which is probably incorrect (Ew. Gram. p. 532); without the pronoun the words may be spoken by any one. If Solomon held this dialogue with the Shulammitte, we should have with Ewald to suppose that he addresses to her i. 9, 10, 15, ii. 2, and that she says not a word to him, but turns aside and says to herself or to her absent lover i. 12-14, 16, 17, ii. 1, 3, which is really tantamount to an avowal that the *lover* is the person present with her; the so-called Solomon's words suit the shepherd equally well. Then again we are told by several commentators (Ewald, Ginsburg, Stickel) to assign vi. 4-9 to Solomon, and by Renan to give vi. 4-7 to him, and vi. 8, 9 to the lover; the latter avoiding the most obvious absurdity, by giving to the lover the sentence contrasting the countless women belonging to the king with the one whom the speaker loves, while the others pronounce their own condemnation by giving it to the king, the only person who could not utter it except as a lie. Here again I ask, if Renan is right in breaking off from his leaders and assigning vi. 8, 9 to the lover, is there any reason to give vi. 4-7 (the expression of a lover's admiration) to any one else? There is none, and the king disappears here also. Again, the king is supposed to be implicated (though not as speaker) in the verse vi. 12: A. V. "Or ever I was aware, my soul made me [like] the chariots of Amminadib"; R. V. "— set me [among] the chariots of my princely people"; Ginsburg, "Unwittingly had my longing soul brought me to the chariots of the companions of the prince"; Ewald, "Ich weiss nicht meine lust hat mich gebracht—zu den wagen meines Edelvölkcs"; Renan, "Imprudente! voilà que mon caprice m'a jetée parmi les chars d'une suite de prince." How can they persist in repeating this nonsense? The text is clearly corrupt, and there is really neither prince nor chariots, but only the verse "I knew not my own self: thou didst make me timid, daughter of Amminadab," for which we have found a suitable place after vii. 10, 9 [9, 8]. Thus the king disappears here again.

He comes up again, however, in vii. 6 [5]: A. V. "the hair of thine head [is] like purple: the king [is] held in the galleries"; R. V. "— the king is held captive in the tresses thereof"; Ginsburg, "— the king is captivated by the ringlets"; Ewald, "— ein könig gefesselt in flechten"; Renan, "— un roi est enchaîné à leurs boucles." Here Ewald and Renan alone recognize the elementary truth that not one definite king but only *a* king is mentioned; but all agree in putting this clause out of all grammatical connexion, although the Vulgate showed the obvious syntax, "sicut purpura regis vincta canalibus," which demands a disjunctive accent after, not before, *king*. Here again the king disappears from the stage.

We are now in a position to consider the age of the Song. Our predecessors, who have generally had Solomon before their eyes, have commonly assigned it to a very early period, which it is difficult to justify by the evidence of the language. The mention of Tirzah and Jerusalem, the capitals of the two kingdoms (the former only from B. C. 952–923 till Samaria was built) in vi. 4 is plausibly enough held by some to prove that the Song was written when Tirzah was capital of Israel; though any probability which such a statement seems to have loses all its weight if any facts of language, customs, etc., are incompatible with that age; moreover, Tirzah is not here stated to be a capital at all, but only a beautiful place.

We must, then, look for internal evidence of the age and conditions of the origin of the Song; and first consider the peculiarities of its language. Its vocabulary contains a remarkable number of curious words. Of course many are legitimate forms from known or probable Hebrew roots, and only remarkable because they happen not to occur elsewhere. But there are some which tell a very different tale. The relative *שֶׁ* for *אֲשֶׁר* is generally a clear mark of the post-Exilic language, and occurs mainly in some late Psalms, Lamentations, Jonah, Chronicles, and especially Ecclesiastes. The theory that it specially characterizes the dialect of Northern Palestine rests chiefly on the belief that it is a Phœnician form (but the Phœnician inscriptions have *שֶׁא*), which is not tenable for an ancient time, as we have no specimens of Phœnician till after the Exile. We only know that it supersedes the older relative and *כִּי* (because) in the latest Biblical books, the Mishnah, and in Syriac. In the Song it is used to the exclusion of *אֲשֶׁר*, and in New Hebrew forms like *שֶׁלִי meus*, *שֶׁלָּמָה ne*, *שֶׁרָּשָׁנָה antequam*. In ii. 9 the lover is *רֹאשׁוֹנָה looking in* (at the window), a New Hebrew

word used in the Talmud in this sense, but not in Hebrew, Syriac or Arabic. There are several truly Aramaic forms which cannot possibly be Hebrew; so especially בָּרוֹשׁ for בָּרוֹשׁ *cypress*, with the Syriac change of שׁ into ת; see others in Graetz, p. 45. So חֶבְצֵלֶת *crocus* (ii. 1) cannot be Hebrew, and Graetz must be right in identifying it with the Syriac חֶבְצֵלֶת, with an interchange of the labials ב and מ. But there are also words which overstep the Semitic area, and are clearly of Greek origin. The word פָּרְדֵּס *park* or *orchard* (iv. 13) is found also in Neh. and Eccl., and therefore almost certainly belongs to the time after the Captivity; it is the *παράδεισος* which Xenophon uses of the parks or preserves of the kings of Persia (B. C. 401). The word is of course not Greek but Persian; but I am not aware that the Persian original has been found, and the attempts made by orientalists to discover an Indian (Sanskrit) original must be pronounced absurd. It is much more likely that the Hebrews obtained the word from the Greek form, which it accurately transcribes. More unquestionably Greek is אֶפְרָיִם *litter* or *palanquin* (iii. 9) = *φορεῖον*, apparently used first by the orator Dinarchus about B. C. 312. Again, כֶּנֶן vii. 3 [2], LXX *κράμα* must be *mixed wine*, but it is a ἀπ. λεγ. and has no Hebrew root; we are, I think, safe in deriving it from Gr. *μίσγειν*, even in the absence of an identical Greek substantive. Again, כָּפָר i. 14, iv. 13, LXX *κύπρος*, is the shrub with sweet-smelling flowers, the Arabic *henna*, used to paint the nails; it has no satisfactory etymology in Hebrew, and is probably Greek, called from Cyprus where it grows. A puzzling word is contained in the sentence "Thy neck is like David's tower, built for תִּלְפִּית" iv. 4. Graetz explains it from *τηλωπός* seeing (or seen) to a distance. It is an epithet of the tower (not of the neck), according to the prevailing style of this book. This seems more suitable in sense than anything else we might invent. And the form is correct: *τηλωπός* would produce a subst. *τηλωπία*, Heb. in תִּלְפִּית, pl. תִּלְפִּית "a tower built for *lookings-out*." If the Greek word is at all correctly retained, the correct punctuation would be תִּלְפִּית, but if either η or ω were treated as movable vowels, might be תִּלְפִּית or תִּלְפִּית. Graetz notices that עַם is used in a very un-Hebrew manner, like Gr. *ἀμα*, for *together with*, where we should expect *and*; see iv. 13, 14, v. 1.

But if Greek words could be so freely used, we must expect to find also Greek habits of life, arts and customs. And there are several very remarkable things described in the Song which can scarcely be referred to any other than a Greek source. Marble (v. 15, where the lover's legs are compared to pillars of marble)

occurs nowhere else in the Old Testament except in 1 Chr. xxix. 2 and Esther i. 6, two of the latest books. The city police strike an intelligent reader as singularly modern, and certainly quite un-biblical. This impression is confirmed and corroborated by further investigation. Such patrols were unknown not only in Hebrew history to a late date, but even in the Greek history, with slight exceptions. The watchmen "who make their rounds in the city" are clearly the *περίπολοι*, who in fortified places with sentinels (*φύλακες*) went round with a bell to see that the sentinels were at their places and not asleep. But this evidence is no earlier than a scholiast on the Birds of Aristophanes; and a passage is quoted by Athenaeus from the comic poet Epicharmus of Syracuse, about B. C. 500, which shows the *περίπολοι* *arresting and beating* persons whom they suspected (Becker, Charicles, scene 9, note 2). Still, this seems to have occurred in the Greek world only in time of war or under a tyranny, like that of Syracuse when Epicharmus wrote. But during the Macedonian period there was constant use of force, with garrisons in all the towns; so that the *περίπολοι* became a regular institution, as they are in the Song. Even the slight mention of the king at his dinner (i. 12) yields some important evidence. The old Hebrew custom was to *sit* at table (1 Sam. xx. 24, 25; 1 Kings xiii. 20; in 1 Sam. xvi. 11 the meaning is "we will not *turn to go away* till —"). But here (i. 12) we have *סבב* (from the verb *סבב* *to be or to go round*), the technical term for lying on sofas round the dining-table, three to each table, *τρίκλινος* = triclinium, which is distinctly a Greek custom, adopted from the Greeks by the Hebrews in the Macedonian period. Solomon's gorgeous palanquin (iii. 6-10), made or decorated with cedar, gold, silver, purple and ebony, is unique in the Old Testament.¹ But such luxurious chairs were common among both Greeks and Romans. Graetz quotes from Athenaeus a description of one with silver feet like this in the time of Mithridates (about B. C. 250), and from Polybius an account of some with feet of gold or silver under Antiochus Epiphanes (about B. C. 170). It is probable that some such sight, seen in Antioch or Alexandria during the Macedonian age, suggested the picture in the Song.

¹Or is only equalled by the priestly writer on the Temple in Ex. xxv.-xxvii., and the historian who describes the same in 1 Kings; with which may be classed Ps. xlv., which is in many points very similar to this Song. Ezekiel xxvii. is very instructive on the merchandise with which various nations traded with Tyre. Purple was the produce of Syria.

The nature of the poetry itself yields a stronger argument against its native Hebrew origin. No other book or poem can be called purely bucolic. Bucolic poetry appears first in the writings of Theocritus. He was a Greek of Sicily, where there was much sheep-farming; and he naturally preserved the local coloring of his native country by adopting its Sicilian Doric dialect, making his lovers discourse on their rustic life as shepherds and shepherdesses, and sing to the shepherd's pipe. In his age (about B. C. 270) and country all this had the charm of recurrence to nature, and yet of the foundation of a new style of literature. He soon found imitators, both in Greece and Rome; from Vergil, the noblest of his Latin followers, springs the whole school of French bucolic poets. What wonder that Theocritus, the most recent Greek poet since the commencement of the literary eminence of Alexandria, should be studied and imitated by an Alexandrian Hebrew? It is difficult to see whence the bucolic character of the Song could be borrowed, if not from Theocritus. The similitude in words and phrases is sometimes so close that it is difficult to believe in accidental coincidence. Some instances must be given; the original being in unfamiliar Doric Greek, I give it in Andrew Lang's version: i. 5 (Black am I . . . because the sun hath *browned* me). Theoc. x. 27, They all call thee a gipsy, and lean, and *sunburnt*. ii. 14 (Thy voice is *sweet*). Theo. x. 37, Thy voice is *drowsy sweet*. ii. 5 (*Foxes* . . . that *ruin vineyards*, while our vineyards are in bloom). Theoc. v. 112, I hate the *foxes* with their bushy brushes, that ever come at evening, and *eat the grapes* of Micon. ii. 16 (who pastureth in the lilies). Theoc. v. 128, 9, My goats eat cytissus, and goats-wort, and tread the lentisk-shoots, and lie at ease among the arbutus. iii. 9 (King Solomon made himself a *palanquin* from the trees of Lebanon). Theoc. xxvi. 43, his sword that he kept always hanging on its pin above his *bed of cedar*. vii. 2 [1] (How beautiful are thy feet in shoes). And I in fair attire, and new shoon on both my feet. Theoc. x. 35 (But one meaning of *σχημα* is the figure of a dance, or a dance. Perhaps he (like the Shulammitte), is going to dance, and therefore has shoes on? Wordsworth very unreasonably scouts this as unpoetical, but the coincidence is striking). viii. 6 (Its [love's] darts are *darts of fire*). Theoc. xi. 16, With the direst hurt beneath his breast of mighty Cypris' sending—the *wound of her arrow* in his heart! and Theoc. xxiii. 4, 5, She knows not Love, how mighty a god is he, and what a bow his hands do wield, and what *bitter arrows* he dealeth at the young. viii. 7 (Its [love's] *flames great waters*

cannot quench). Theoc. xxiii. 16-26, He could no more endure so fierce a *flame* of the Cytherean . . . I am going . . . where . . . is . . . the common remedy of lovers, the River of Forgetfulness. Nay, but were I to take and drain with my lips *all the waters thereof*, not even so shall I *quench my yearning desire*. And with viii. 6 (*harsh* as the grave is *jealousy* [or love]) may be compared Bion, Frag. 12, Mild goddess, in Cyprus born, . . . why wert thou thus bitterly wroth . . . as to bring forth Love, so mighty a bane to all, *cruel and heartless Love*. The more these passages are studied, the closer will appear the similarity. Especially is the personification of Love, and the comparison of its vehemence with the power of fire and of arrows inconceivable except as a loan from the Greek lyrics.

If these be so, we have little doubt about the place and age of the Song of Songs. It must have been written at Alexandria; for where else was there a literary capital with a Greek school of its own in arts and letters, and also a resident Jewish colony formed of the wealthiest and most enlightened Jews of the age, ready to receive this new Song into their literature; which they had only shortly before made known to the whole world by the translation of their scriptures into Greek?

And the joyous tone of the Song makes it impossible to conceive it to have been produced in an age of tyranny, oppression and despair. Hence the time before B. C. 247 and that after B. C. 220 are equally out of the question, leaving the peaceful and prosperous reign of Ptolemy Euergetes (B. C. 247-221) as a probable one. It may be added that during this period Joseph, a Jew, was the farmer of the taxes of Judea, Samaria, Phenicia and part of Syria, and managed the finances so skilfully as to restore prosperity and wealth to these previously oppressed countries, while he gained and maintained great influence with Ptolemy (see Josephus, Ant. xii. 4, 10, and Graetz, pp. 78-83). This age of opulence was one of notorious and wide-spreading immorality, which from the example of Joseph himself invaded the Jewish community at Alexandria. This period (say from 230 to 218) thus seems to give, as no other does, the conditions requisite for the composition of the Song of Songs. As Graetz says, "the writer knew the Greek language, the Greek literature and art, the Greek's manners and vices, and desired to neutralize at its source the poison of the corruption of morals in Judea by the antidote of a seemingly erotic poem."

RUSSELL MARTINEAU.

III.—VERBALS IN -ΤΟΣ IN SOPHOCLES.

II.

ON THE NEUTER FORCE OF THE VERBAL.

That the neuter force of the verb very often lies close to the passive is an established fact (cf. e. g. Delbrück, *Syntaktische Forschungen*, IV, p. 79). This is most clearly seen in cases in which the two forces of the verb exchange constructions; e. g. *πάσχειν τι ὑπό τινος*; *vapulare ab aliquo*. But it is especially in the participles of the Indo-European languages that these two forces approach one another. It is well known that the Sanskrit 'perfect passive participles' in *-ta* and *-na* are very frequently not passive at all, but neuter (cf. Whitney, *Sanskrit Grammar*, §952 a). So in Latin: the participles in *-tus* are regularly neuter, when derived from deponent verbs, and not infrequently so when derived from other verbs; e. g. *concretus*, *cenatus*. In Greek this neuter force is seen, not alone in verbals derived from deponent verbs, but also in those derived from *middle* (or *passive-middle*) verbs: thus it comes that certain verbals in *-τος* correspond to the *present middle participle* of their verb. The neuter verbals in Greek have been very much neglected by philologists: our chief authority on them is Frederick Mehlhorn, in an excursus on pp. 239-43 of his edition of the 'Anacreontea' (Glogaviae, 1825). One chief cause of the ignorance and confusion which have prevailed concerning these verbals lies in the fact that—apart from the prejudice against adjectives in *-τος* being considered as being anything other than passive—the *active*, *neuter* and *passive* forces of the adjectives have not been accurately distinguished. On the other extreme we must avoid considering an adjective like *δυνατός* passive in e. g. the sentence *δυνατός ἐστι πάσχειν τι*, but active in *δυνατός ἐστι ποιεῖν τι*. Surely the *neuterness* of the verbal is not made passive by the passiveness of the dependent infinitive (cf. Schmidt, *Synonymik der griechischen Sprache*, III, p. 694).

After discussing the simplicia, in which discussion Mehlhorn brings us nothing of material value, the composita are taken up (pp. 241-42) and discussed according as they are compounded

"cum nomine, aut cum adverbio, aut cum *praepositione*." "Cum nominibus denique," he observes, "haec adiectiva ita componuntur, ut nomen praepositum aut subiectum, aut obiectum sit. Prius si est, significatio fit passiva, posterius activa." In both of Sophocles' compounds with nouns, χρυσόρρυτος and ἀλίπλαγκτος, the noun stands in the relation of a casus obliquus to the rest of the adjective. Of the compounds with adverbs by far the majority—some 20 out of 30—are compounds with *a* priv. "Longe plurima autem," he observes, "praebent cum adverbio aut cum nomine composita. Quid autem valeat compositio ad activam vim efficiendam, apparet maxime si adiect. verbb. cum *a* priv. composita percenseas, quorum simplicia *nunquam* active usurpantur. Sic nusquam βρωτός et γευστός eum denotat qui gustavit, sed ἀγευστον et ἄβρωτον, ita ut ἄπαστον usurpari notissimum est," etc. The composita with prepositions show much less frequently the neuter force; in fact Mehlhorn cites only four cases: we have thus explained περίφαντος, ἀπώματος, ἐπώματος, περιβόητος, ἀναμπλάκτης, διώματος, ἐπίφαντος, and probably ξυνετοί. Mehlhorn's summa summarum is expressed thus: "His igitur demonstratum esse arbitror primo hoc: verbalia in τος exeuntia quae a deponentibus deriventur, posse activam vim accipere, quae a mediis mediam, quae a neutralibus neutralem, sive composita sive simplicia illa: deinde vero quaecunque verbalia a meris activis deriventur, nonnisi composita active usurpari." Cf. Kvičala, Beiträge. I, p. 32: "Kein einziges Verbaladjektiv auf τος hat active Bedeutung, wenn das demselben zu Grunde liegende Verbum entschieden transitive Geltung und nur diese hat: Verbaladjektiva auf τός (*sic*) ohne passive Geltung sind nur bei solchen Verben möglich, die intransitive Geltung haben oder die, wenn sie auch häufig bereits als echte Transitiva behandelt werden, doch auch daneben einen an und für sich abgeschlossenen Sinn haben können, so dass sie der Hinzufügung eines Objects nicht bedürfen." Of Sophocles' simplicia all are derived from deponent verbs, except the doubtful σπανιστός. Moisisstzig thus introduces a chapter on this subject (I, p. 68): "Significatio participii praesentis activi, quae non solum in simplicibus et parasynthetis, sed etiam in synthetis inest, nisi tam saepe legeretur, formis latinis Participii Perf. Pass. speciem exhibentibus, vim autem eiusdem modi activi sortientibus, sicuti: pransus, osus, pertaesus et similibus, quae Zumpt §663 [should this not be §633, of the 8th edition?] affert, comparari posset. Horum similia autem pauca modo inveniuntur

exempla . . . Utrum numerus adiectivorum in τος terminatorum, quibus Part. Praes. Act. subiectus est intellectus, intra firmos ac stabiles coercitus sit terminos, sicuti formarum latinarum, quas modo commemoravimus, an certis potestas adnexa sit verborum generibus, an denique ea uti ex lubricitate pependit hodie non iam constitui posse videtur. Discrimina enim in exemplis, quae sunt in promptu, inveniri nequeunt quare, si iudicium ferendum est, in sententiam ultimo loco positam pedibus est eundum. Magnopere quidem rationibus quibusdam investigandis sum discruciat, sed frustra, nam omnes, quae animum subibant, opiniones, usus pertinacia infringebantur." We think the distinction of *time* in these neuter verbals should be insisted on more rigidly than has generally been done. So far has the tense-force of the participle as such been weakened in the adjective as such that it has quite escaped the notice of not a few writers. Mehlhorn makes no mention of the time-force at all. With the exception of some eight verbals, to which he ascribes the signification of the pf. act. part., Moisisstzig (I, p. 73) ascribes timelessness to nearly all neuter verbals. So far is this from being correct that these verbalia can refer to *past* time (cf. Kopetsch, p. 27; "Iam eo deductus est sermo, ut etiam *participii perfecti activi* significationem nomina in τος formata nonnunquam sibi vindicasse dicamus. Verum hic usus apud Platonem paucitate exemplorum continetur . . . Neque ab Homero hunc usum seiunctum fuisse, his exemplis comprobatur . . ."), as well as to *present* (cf. Kopetsch, pp. 24-26) and *future* act, just as the passive adjectives do.

The great majority of such adjectives refers to an act contemporaneous with that of the verb of the context on which they depend. The futures are, as usual, to be explained either modally (c. g. βροτός, ἄβροτος, etc.) or by prolepsis. Sophocles seems to have used these neuter verbals, referring to contemporaneous act, some forty-odd times, as against nineteen other cases. Distinguishing between *specific* and *general* contemporaneousness, we see that in about half of the cases in Sophocles this contemporaneousness has grown to be general, indefinite, timeless: here the participial nature has quite died out, and the action or *condition* expressed by the verbal is considered a *characteristic* of the subject. Not a few of these verbs express a *condition* rather than an act. Now, where there is action there is motion, and hence limits are generally involved, hence time also. Where, however, there is no action, but a mere *condition* or *state*, the limits are

indefinitely extended, and hence there is, in effect, no time in the verbal. This timelessness is most clearly seen in those cases in which the verbal has been crystallized to a noun, as e. g. in *ἀνότητος*.

We find it generally stated that neuter verbals are 'often' or 'generally' associated with a negative, and Mehlhorn says (p. 239) that Ruhnken hesitated to explain *ὑβριστός* as a neuter in Xen. Mem. II 6, 21, "quia grammaticorum in compositis cum *a* priv. tantum id fieri docentium auctoritatem verebatur"! Of Sophocles' sixty-odd neuter verbals, not quite the half are compounds of *a* priv.; nor do the others show that tendency—which was observed in the modal passives—to associate themselves with negatives. Schambach's statement (I, p. 26) that the number of adjectives "praeter vulgarem usum active a Sophocle usurpatorum permagnus sit" is certainly not to be emphasized too strongly for the forms in *τος*; Sophocles shows fewer examples of this use than e. g. Aischylos does.

The examples now to be cited have been divided into two general classes—I, those in which the adjective is joined to the name of a *thing*; II, those with *persons*. Each class is further subdivided according as the verbal is derived from a A) *neuter* or B) *middle-passive* verb. The last subdivision is that of *time*, according as the act of the verbal is a) *prior*, β) *contemporaneous* (1. special, 2. general), or γ) *subsequent* (by 1. modality or 2. prolepsis).

I. Associated with *things*. A. Derived from *neuter* verbs.

a) *Prior act.*—Trach. 743 ἀγένητον ποεῖν (τὸ φανθὲν). Schol. τὸ ἀπαξ πραχθὲν . . . πῶς ἂν τις μὴ γενέσθαι ποιήσειεν;

β) *Contemporaneous act.* 1. *Real, definite act.*—Trach. 985 ἀλλήκτοις ὀδύνας. We derive the adjective (which stands for *ἀσληκτος) from the more common neuter force of the verb. Ai. 197 ἀτάρβητος (ὑβρις). V. LL. ἀτάρβητα, ἀταρβήτα, ἀταρβήτα, ἀτάρβητος. Whether the verbal be specific or general in time depends on the time of ὀρμᾶται, which *may* be a universal present. Ai. 1006 δυνάτον (μολεῖν). El. 894 νεορρύτους πηγὰς. Suidas' νεωστὶ ρέουσι fits nicely here, as the milk was still freshly dripping. Ant. 1006 παμφλέκτοισιν (βωμοῖσι). We hesitatingly derive the verbal from the neuter sense of φλέγω (= fulgere), which Sophocles not infrequently uses, thus preferring Stephanus' omni ex parte *ardens* to his omni ex parte *incensus*.

2. *Timeless, good for all time.* 1) 'Geographically' present, and the like.—O. C. 469 ἀειρύτου . . . κρήνης. Ai. 884 ῥυτῶν . . . ποταμῶν. O. C. 1598 ῥυτῶν ὑδάτων.

2) Other examples.—O. C. 1662 ἀλάμπετον βάθρον. With the Scholiast (γρ. ἀλάμπετον) and many recent editors (e. g. Reisig, Musgrave, Brunck, Wunder), we depart from the tradition of the Laurentianus, ἀλύπητον. 'Αλάμπετος occurs in Hymn. Hom. XXXII 5. Fg. 856 ἀφθίτος βίος. Ai. 162 δυνατὸν . . . προδιδάσκειν. El. 1139 παμφλέκτου πυρὸς. Again it is difficult to decide if the verbal refer to definite or indefinite act. Fg. 856 πλωτῷ γίνει. O. C. 4 σπανιστοῖς . . . δωρήμασιν. We derive the adjective from the middle, σπανίζομαι. Or is it merely a -τος formation from the noun σπάνις? O. C. 1081 ταχύρρωστος πελειᾶς.

3. *Subsequent act*; these adjectives exhibit either prolepsis or modality.—O. R. 157 ἄμβροτε φάμα. O. R. 159 ἄμβροτ' Ἀθήνα. Ant. 1134 ἀμβρότων ἐπέων. Ant. 338 ἀφθίτον (Γᾶν). Fg. 258 ἀφθίτου (γέννας). Reading uncertain. El. 1420 παλίρρυτον . . . αἶμ'. παλίρρυτον, Bothe; πολλύρρυτον, L; πολύρρυτον, Γ.

B. Derived from *middle* and *neuter-passive* verbs. α) *Prior act*.—Phil. 297 ἄφαντον φῶς. Schol. ἀπροσδόκητον, ἄλλως: καλῶς εἶπεν ἄφαντον· οὐ φαίνεται γὰρ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει αὐτὸ ἔχει. The verbal means 'which as yet had not appeared,' 'Versteckte Funken' (Hartung). Campbell's explanations are humorous. O. C. 1507 νέορτον (τί).

β) *Contemporaneous act*.—Ai. 758 κἀνόνητα σώματα. κἀνόνητα, Suidas. The verbal is here a general present. Ai. 1186 ἄπανστον . . . ἄταν. The verbal seems to refer to those very evils which they were just then suffering. Ai. 599 περίφαντος (Σαλαμῖς). Phil. 716 στατὸν εἰς ὕδωρ. Certainly the passage is not to be rejected as spurious, because elsewhere in the play there is mention of *running* water on the isle!

γ) *Subsequent act* (modal).—O. C. 495 ὁδωτά (ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐχ ὁδ.). Schol. οὐκ ἐν ὁδῷ, οὐδὲ ἀνυστὰ οἶον οὐ βαδιστέα μοι οὐδὲ πρακτέον ταῦτα. Some critics take it to mean 'I cannot do these things,' referring to the preceding context, others 'I cannot go.' This latter explanation we adopt; cf. Hesychius' statement that ὁδῶω in the middle = πορεύομαι.

II. Associated with *persons*. A. Derived from *neuter verbs*.

α) *Prior act*.—Ant. 394 ἀπώμοτος (ὦν). Schol. καίπερ ὁμωμοκῶς μὴ ἐλθεῖν. Phil. 593 διώμοτοι πλείουσιν. Trach. 427 ἐπώμοτος . . . ἔφασκες. Ant. 950 χρυσορύτους (γονὰς).

β) *Contemporaneous act.* 1. *Specific present.*—El. 912 ἀκλαύτῳ (ῆ). Trach. 968 ἀναύδατος (ὅδε) φέρεται. ἀναύδατος, Erfurdt; ἀναυδοσ, L. El. 1065 ἀπόνητοι. Trach. 1074 ἀστένακτος . . . εἰπόμην. Trach. 1200 ἀστένακτος κἀδάκρυτος . . . ἔρξον. Ai. 321 ἀψόφητος . . . ὑπεστέναξε. O. R. 12 δυσάλητος . . . εἶην. Trach. 652 πάγκλαυτος . . . ὦλλυτο. O. C. 1663 στενακτὸς (ἀνήρ). With M. (I, p. 67), Hartung, Wecklein, Wolf-Bellermann and others, we oppose those who explain the verbal as a passive.

2. *Timeless; general present.*—Ai. 946 ἀναλγήτων δισσῶν. Thus the perplexed Schol. ἀσυμπαθῶν εἰ τοῦτο πράξειαν· ἡ τῶν μηδὲως ἀλγούντων ἐπὶ ταῖς συμφοραῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἢ πολυαλγήτων, τῶν εἰς πολλὰ ἄχῃ ἡμᾶς ἐμβεβληκότων. The alpha is privative. O. R. 472 ἀναπλάκητοι (κῆρες). ἀναπλάκητοι, L.; ἀναμπλάκητοι, codices recentiores; but cf. Gustav Meyer, Griech. Gram.², §295. Schol. αἱ εἰς μηδὲν ἀμαρτάνουσαι ἀλλὰ πάντων κρατοῦσαι . . . ἢ οὕτως, ἄφνκτοι, ἀπλάνητοι, ἀπροσπελαστοί, ἀφανείς, ἃς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποφυγεῖν. O. R. 336 κατελεύτητος φανεί; Ritter, Ribbeck, Nauck and others resort to conjectures to get sense out of a passage rendered almost senseless by the verbal ἀτελεύτητος, which they consider passive; cf. Kvičala, Beiträge, III, p. 85. We retain the verbal, rendering it as a neuter—'who accomplishes nothing'; cf. Eustathius, p. 441, 28: αὐτὸ δὲ (= ἀτελεύτητον) παρὰ Σοφοκλεῖ καὶ τὸν μὴ τελευτὴν ἐπάγοντα τοῖς ζητουμένοις δηλοῖ ἐν τῷ, ἄτεγκτος κατελεύτητος φανεί. Ai. 365 ἄτρεστον (τὸν). O. R. 586 ἄτρεστον εὐδοντ' κ. τ. λ. O. C. 1283 ἀφωνήτοις (τοῖς). Cf. Schmidt, Synonymik der griechischen Sprache, I, p. 106. El. 219 δυνατοῖς (sc. τοῖς). Fg. 867 δυσάλητος φρένας. O. R. 498 ξυνετοί (of Jupiter and Apollo). El. 1077 πάνδυρτος ἀηδών. πάνδυρτος, Erfurdt and Porson; πανόδυρτος, L. O. R. 191 περιβόητος (of Ares). Punctuation and reading disputed; περιβόατον, Dindorf. Many commentators accept the first explanation of the Scholiast—περὶ ὃν ἕκαστος βοᾷ. We have hesitatingly followed the other—<ἡ> μετὰ βοῆς καὶ οἰμωγῆς ἐπιών; cf. Tessing, de compositis nominibus Aeschyleis et Pindaricis, p. 47. Jebb (ad loc.), in excluding from prose the neuter sense of the verbal, has overlooked Plato, Philebus, p. 45 E. Or is the adjective intentionally ambiguous?

γ) *Subsequent act.*—Trach. 120 ἀναμπλάκητον Ἴδαι σφε. ἀναμπλάκητον, Schol. r.; ἀμπλάκητον, L. The verbal is used proleptically.

B. Derived from *middle* verbs. α) *Prior act.*—El. 165 ἀνύμφευτος αἰὲν οἰχῶ. Trach. 894 νέορτος ἄδε νύμφα. The Scholiast's first explanation is wrong, because based on a false reading. Fg. 787 νέορτον (τὰν). νέορτον, Valck; νεοργόν, MSS.

β) *Contemporaneous act*.—Ai. 695 ἀλίπλαγκτε (Πάν). The Scholiast gives *five* (attempts at) explanations why Pan receives this epithet. "Tu, qui maria pervagari soles" is Lobeck's happy translation. Trach. 1095 ἄμικτον . . . στρατόν. Suidas' ὁ μὴ μινύμενος is nearer the meaning of the verbal here than the Scholiast's ὃ οὐκ ἦν συμμῖξαι καὶ συμβαλεῖν. The verbal is purely neuter. Ant. 841 ἐπίφαντον (με). Ai. 229 περίφαντος ἀνὴρ.

γ) *Subsequent act* (proleptic).—O. R. 560 ἄφαντος ἔρρει. O. R. 832 ἄφαντος (βαῖν).

ON THE INSTRUMENTAL USE OF THE VERBALIA.

We now approach a number of verbals which have been variously explained, some seeing in them personification, some traiection epitheti and remarkable cases of enallage, while others pass over the difficulties in silence. The trouble in these cases seems to arise, not from the meaning of the verbal itself, but from the manner in which the different words of the sentence are construed. Grammarians observed the strangely free manner in which the poets not infrequently joined the words of a given sentence, but failed to distinguish carefully between *grammatical* and *logical* subject; and it is just by holding fast to this distinction that we hope to make our position clear.

The verbal is construed 'instrumentally' when it is joined, grammatically, with that word which designates the thing (or person) that serves as an instrument, in the wider sense of the word (translate 'with,' 'by,' 'in,' 'as to,' etc.), in the hands of the logical subject of the phrase; e. g. Aischylos, Cho. 253 βουθύτοις ἐν ἡμασιν. Surely the days here are by no means the logical subject of the verb in -θυτος: the days are merely the instruments—as much so as the sacrificial knife—by which the oxen are sacrificed. Similarly in Sophocles' φόνον . . . δημόλευστον (Ant. 36), the φόνος is not that which kills—much less that which is killed—but it is that act through, by means of which the sufferer is killed by the people. It is plain that herein no new meaning inheres in the verbal itself: passive, neuter and modal verbals can be thus instrumentally construed: the great majority of the cases seems to be passive. On looking over the examples one is struck with the predominance of relatively present (especially general-present) verbals; in fact they all, with few exceptions, are thus used. In the matter of verbals derived from neuter verbs, the case in

question is not unnaturally an *accusative of the inner object*, e. g. ἀσάλπιγκτον ὦραν corresponds to the possible construction σαλπίζειν ὦραν, after analogy of Lucian's ἡμέραν ἐσάλπισεν (Luc. Ocyp. 114): so ἀχόρευτα . . . ὀνειδῆ, after analogy of ἀγῶνας χορεύειν, etc.

It is to be observed that the instrumental use of the verbals in Sophocles—as in Aischylos—is confined (with one exception, the doubtful ἐπώμοτος) to *things*.

I. With Abstract Things.

a) The case of the resolved construction is an acc. of the inner object.—Fg. 86 τᾶβατα. The reading is uncertain. The adjective is here—as always?—potential; cf. An. Bekk., p. 323, 1 = 22, 26. Fg. 356 ἀσάλπιγκτον ὦραν. El. 1069 ἀχόρευτα . . . ὀνειδῆ. Schol. ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἂν τις χορεύσειε. The verbal may be modal. Trach. 1262 ἐπίχαρτον . . . ἔργον. "Agreeable" (Donaldson, New Cratylus², p. 473) = *as to which* one rejoices. El. 1457 χαρτὰ . . . τᾶδε. Whether in such cases the adjective be modal or generally present it is impossible to decide. Trach. 228 χαρτὸν . . . τι. Trach. 1188 ἐπώμοτον (Ζῆν'). Says Suidas, quoting this passage, τοῦτέστι τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγγυητήν. If it means 'having Zeus as the one *by whom* I swear,' this is the one case of an instrumentally used verbal being construed with the name of a *person*.

β) The resolved construction exhibits some other case.—Trach. 168 ἀλυνπῆτφ βίφ. Verses 166–68 are rejected by Dobree as spurious. Trach. 520 ἀμφίπλεκτοι κλίμακες. To this annoying passage the Schol. observes: κλίμακες αἱ ἐπαναβάσεις παρὰ τὸ ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω αὐτοὺς στρέφεισθαι ἐν τῇ μάχῃ· ἔστι δὲ εἶδος παλαίσματος ἢ κλίμαξ. Hermann, attempting to explain it, writes thus: "Positum erat, nisi fallor, in eo, ut quis averteret adversarium, atque a tergo complexus, quasi per scalam, dorsum eius conscenderet": he compares Ovid, Metam. IX 51. If anything is certain, where there is so much uncertainty, it is that the verbal is used instrumentally. Trach. 126 ἀνάληγτα. El. 186 ἀνέλπιστος (βίος). Trach. 770 ἀντίσπαστος (ἀδαγμός). Schol. ἀντίσπαστος δὲ ἴσος σπασμῷ ἢ μετὰ σπασμοῦ. "Quo ossa veluti divulsa sint," Wunder. O. R. 890 ἀσέπτων (τῶν). But we can consider the verbal merely *passive*. Ai. 833 ἀσφαδάστφ . . . πηδήματι. The verbal is proleptic. Ant. 864 αὐτογέννητ' (κοιμήματα). "Quae audaci epitheti traiectione," says Schindler, p. 44, "dicta sunt pro: κοιμήματα αὐτογεννήτφ ἐμῷ πατρὶ δυσμόρου ματρὸς, concubitus miserae matris cum patre meo,

quem ipsa pepererat": similarly Slameczka, p. 6, Stephanus, Passow, Wolf-Bellermann. And yet it is barely possible that, in this, as occasionally in other cases of compounds with αὐτο-, the commentators have failed to see to whom this αὐτο- referred. In the passage before us Antigone herself is speaking, and the αὐτο- can be taken to refer to the heroine herself. Ant. 875 αὐτόγνωτος . . . ὀργά. We derive the adjective from γινώσκω, not from γνώμη. Schambach (I, p. 24) says of the verbal: "quod verbum a Sophocle fictum non, ut exspectamus, significat: 'quod a se ipso cognoscitur, sponte intelligitur,' sed 'suam ipsius sentiam (sic!) secutus'": more cautious is Schindler's translation (p. 44): "arrogantia ab ipsa (Antigona) adscita, h. e. ultro suscepta, αὐθαίρετος, nisi activa praeferenda est interpretatio illa, quam in maiore editione Erfurditius dedit: <<αὐτόγνωτος est qui ex sua tantum animi sententia (γνώμη) unum quidque agit>>." As, however, the passive explanation sounds indisputably insipid and weak, we hesitatingly accept the other, interpreting it 'an ὀργά in, through which she was self-willed and showed herself to be so.' "Nach eigenem Willen oder Urtheil handelnd: eigenwillig" (Passow); "eigenwillig" (Hartung); "die selbst, d. h. frei, ohne äusseren Zwang sich entschliesst (γινώσκω sehr oft sich entschliessen)" (Wolff-Bellermann). Ant. 36 δημόλευστον (φόνον). "In all such passages," says Blaydes, "the verbal is still passive, being only transferred from the person to the act." But not all instrumentally-used verbalia are passive. Ant. 1211 δυσθρήνητον (ἔπος). O. C. 1614 δυσπρόνητον . . . τροφήν. O. C. 1220 ἰσοτέλεστος . . . μοῖρα. The reading of several words of the passage is disputed; cf. Schütz, pp. 176-77. Schindler has rightly insisted (p. 35) that the adjective be joined either with μοῖρα or with θάνατος, of verse 1223. The Scholiast is all in confusion, e. g. τὸ ἐξῆς δὲ ἰσοτέλεστος θάνατος . . . τούτου ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξῆς, οἷον οὐδὲ ἔπεισιν αὐτοῖς κόρος ἰσοτέλεστος τοῦ "Αἰδου" τότε γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος κόρος λαμβάνει τέλος ὅτε ἂν ὁ "Αἰδης ἐπέλθῃ. We join the adjective with μοῖρα; but the moving power is not the μοῖρα—nor the θάνατος itself—but the god or divinity who works through this μοῖρα. Ai. 253 λιθόλευστον Ἄρη. Phil. 607 λωβήτ' ἔπη. "Id quod λωβᾶται," Mehlhorn, Anac., p. 240; rather id per quod is λωβᾶται, qui eo utitur. Phil. 690 πανδάκρυτον . . . βιοτάν. Trach. 50 πανδάκρυτ' ὀδύρματα. O. R. 192 παλίσσυτον δράμημα. With Brunck, we join the verbal with δράμημα, not with the subject of the infinitive; cf. Wunder: "Ex vulgari tragicorum consuetudine παλ. δράμ. νοτίσαι dictum est pro παλίσσυτον δράμημα ποιῆσαι, ita

ut sensus sit παλινδρομήσαι καὶ ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος ἀπελθεῖν." The verbal is proleptic and neuter. Ai. 712 πάνθ' ὅσα θεοί. El. 851 πανσύρτῳ . . . αἰῶνι. Schol. πανσύρτῳ δὲ πάντα σύροντι τὰ κακὰ ἢ πανσύρτῳ τῷ μετὰ πάσης ὁρμῆς τῶν κακῶν ὁρμημένῳ. Certainly it means a life *in* which (*by* which) all evils are swept together. Trach. 756 πολυθύτους . . . σφαγὰς. Ai. 1185 πολυπλάγκτων ἐτέων. We derive the verbal from πλάζομαι; the expression means 'years *in* which we wander,' from which the translation 'years causing much wandering' easily arose. Schol. τῶν ἐτέων ἐμοὶ πόνοὺς παρασκευάζων. καθ' ὃ πολλὰ πλανώμεθα ἐν ἀλλοδαπῇ. The verbal is *neuter*, and with Schmidt (Synonymik d. g. S. I, p. 557) we protest against those who would explain the adjective here *actively*. Ant. 615 πολυπλάγκτος ἐλπίς. Trach. 357 ῥιπτός . . . μόρος. Ai. 631 χερόπλακτοι . . . δοῦποι.

II. With Concrete Things.

a) Representing the *acc. of the inner object* of the resolved construction.—O. R. 719 ἄβατον εἰς ὄρος. O. C. 167 ἄβάτων ἀποβάς. O. C. 675 ἄβατον . . . φυλλάδα. Trach. 505 πᾶμπληκτα παγκόνιτα . . . ἄεθλ'. Commentators are gladly following Kvičala and explaining the verbal as a passive. In his Beiträge, I, p. 33, Kvičala explains the expression πλήττειν ἄεθλα after the analogy of πλήττειν πληγὰς: similarly he would have us explain πανδάκρυτ' ὀδύρματα. Only he thus compares two very different accusatives, πληγὰς and ὀδύρματα, the former being the accusative of the object *effected*, the latter not being such. We do not accept his explanation of the passage, although his circumlocution, ἄεθλα, ἐν οἷς πᾶσαι πληγαὶ πλήττονται, is correct. The logical subjects of the two expressions have also suffered, the subject of πλήττειν being πληγαί, while that of -πληκτα and -κόνιτα is not ἄεθλα at all, but those who contend. We therefore explain the term as meaning the contests in which the contestants are much struck and much covered with dust. Fig. 15 φορμικτά. If μέλη is to be supplied as the subject of the verbal, it may be thus instrumentally interpreted.

β) Remaining examples.—Trach. 106 ἀδακρύτων βλεφάρων. The conflicting notes of the Scholiast explain the α both as a privativum and as an intensivum! into which latter error Blomfield has also fallen (Gloss. in Aischyl. Prom. 905); cf. Clemm, de alpha intensivo, p. 72, 12). The verbal is proleptic. O. C. 1200 ἀδέρκτων ὀμμάτων. Fig. 418 ἀθηρόβρωτον ὄργανον. It seems that a winnowing-fan is here referred to. Ai. 176 ἀκάρωτον

χάριν. ἀκάρπων, L.; ἀκάρπος, Nauck, whom many follow. The adjective has been variously joined with χάριν, νίκας, Artemis herself. It should have been joined with νίκας, but was construed with χάριν. Trach. 527 ἀμφινείκητον ὄμμα. But we know of no verb ἀμφινείκω. Or is the word, then, a compositum possessivum? Bergk rejects the lines as spurious, Wecklein defends them, and Schütz, by conjecturing, retains them. Ai. 1272 κἀνόνητ' ἔπη. O. C. 156 ἀφθέγκτω . . . νάπει. O. C. 1495 βούθυτον ἐστίαν. O. R. 1315 δυσούριστον (νέφος). The Scholiast thus defends the adjective—a *π. λογ.*—: ὄρον μὴ ἔχον ἀλλ' αἰὲ παραμένον. We derive the adjective neither from ὄρος nor from οὔρος (with Ellendt). After a long discussion of the passage Schindler (pp. 19–20) concludes that the adjective must be corrupt, and of course Blaydes is more than ready to furnish conjectures. We think the tradition can be defended. οὐρίζω means, according to Pape², “unter günstigen Wind bringen, gew. übertr., zu Glück verhelfen, in eine günstige Lage bringen, beglücken.” Now, if we interpret the adjective instrumentally, its logical subject being the speaker, not νέφος, the expression means ‘a cloud of blindness, *by means of which* I am brought into misfortune.’ O. R. 1266 κρεμαστήν ἀρτάνην. Trach. 538 λωβητὸν ἐμπόλημα. Ant. 832 παγκλαύτοις (ὀφρύσι).

ON THE TRANSITIVE FORCE OF THE VERBALS.

We saw in the dissertation on the verbals in Aischylos (pp. 71–72) that the verbals are in that author never *transitive*, in the sense of governing a case, all passages thus formerly explained either being corrupt or exhibiting the neuter force of the verbal. This can hardly be said to be true of Sophocles. There is a very small number of verbals in our author which seem plainly to govern a case—either the genitive or the dative: of these cases a few are certain, the rest doubtful. Certain of these are compounds of a priv.: in these cases some would explain the dependent genitive as depending on the notion of *separation* implied in the *negative adjective*; but the temptation to let the genitive in e. g. ἄγευστος κακῶν depend on the verb in the verbal is very strong; cf. Madvig, Syntax der griechischen Sprache, §63 c. Apart from this, however, there are compounds *without this negative prefix* which ‘govern’ a genitive, e. g. εὔμαστον: here the ‘separation-explanation’ evidently does not apply. Moreover, there seem to be cases in which—contrary to Mehlhorn’s law (pp. 242–43,

"deinde vero quaecunque verbalia a meris activis deriventur, nonnisi composita active usurpari")—simplicia are found governing cases: such instances are, however, all more or less suspicious. The situation is a very tantalizing one. Sophocles seems to have hesitatingly introduced this new construction, whose beginnings are as yet so gradual and cautious that it is extremely difficult to determine at all certainly the nature of the dependent case in question.

Ant. 582 ἄγευστος αἰών (κακῶν). The verbal is here used instrumentally; the sense is 'an age in which those living in it taste of no ills.' Ant. 500 ἀρεστὸν οὐδὲν (ἐμοί). Bekker, Anecd. Graec., p. 80, 20: ἀρεστός: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀρέσκων. Πλάτων Φαῖδρῳ. Undoubtedly the adjective means 'agreeable,' whether this meaning of the verbal arose from the simpler neuter sense of the verb or through the passive from the rarer *active* sense ('gefällig machen'). But the dative, ἐμοί, may depend on the complex, or be a dative of interest. Similarly in the following passage: O. R. 1097 ἀρέστ' (σοι . . . ταῦτ'). O. R. 969 ἄψανστος ἐγκλούς (ἐγὼ). It is generally conceded that the verbal is here active; cf. Schol. ἐγὼ ὁ ἐνταῦθα ὢν οὐκ ἔλαβον δόρυ ἵνα αὐτὸν ἀποκτείνω εἰ μὴ τις εἴποι ὅτι τάχα διὰ τὸν ἐμὸν πόθον ἀπέθανεν. Bekker, Anecd. Graec., p. 18, 4: "Ἀψανστος: ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ θιγόντος μηδὲ ἀψαμένον. Σοφοκλῆς. Wex, Antig. 392: "ἄψανστος O. R. 969, ubi glossator apud Fäbse, p. 224 ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι τὸ ἄψανστος καὶ ὁ ψανόμενος καὶ ὁ ψαύων." Cf. Passow, Stephanus, Pape, Ellendt, Hermann, Nauck, Brunck, Schambach (II, p. 3) (I, p. 25), Campbell, Wolff-Bellermann, Wecklein, Schmit, Synonymik d. g. S. I, p. 230 f.; Mehlhorn, p. 242; Holtze, p. 6. Trach. 108 εὐμναστον ἀνδρὸς δεῖμα τρέφουσιν ὁδοῦ. The difficulty of the passage lies in the explanation of the genitives, ἀνδρὸς and ὁδοῦ, and in the question whether the verbal is to be joined with δεῖμα or with (αὐτήν) the subject of τρέφουσιν and the following infinitive. In either case it is plainly active, meaning either 'she, being ever mindful' or 'she, nourishing a fear through which she is ever mindful.' Schol. ἀλλὰ τὸ δεῖμα τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς αἰὲ μνημονεύουσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀνάνδροις κοίταις τρέχεσθαι κατὰ ψυχὴν. Nauck, however (and similarly Wunder), joins thus: δεῖμα ὁδοῦ ἀνδρὸς τρέφουσιν εὐμναστον. Evidently the genitives are so placed as to allow of either construction of them. Campbell joins ἀνδρὸς with εὐμναστον. We think the verbal belongs to the subject of the sentence, and that ἀνδρὸς—or ὁδοῦ—depends directly on the verbal. Trach. 446 μεμπτός εἰμι (τῷ μὲν τ' ἀνδρὶ τῇδε τῇ νόσφ' ληφθέντι). Schol. μεμπτή εἰμι τουτέστιν αἰ

μέμφομαι· ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίμεμπτος, ἐπιπληκτική. Evidently the verbal is active; cf. Kvičala, I, p. 61; Hermann, Wex, Antig. 392; Schambach, I, p. 24; Wunder; Curtius, Das Verbum, II, p. 388; Porson, Eur. Hec. 117; Campbell, Essay on the Language of Sophocles, p. 98, §53 a. O. C. 1031 πιστὸς (ὅτῳ) ἔδρας τάδε. Schol. ἀντὶ πιστεύων, καταστρέφει δὲ εἰς τὸ πεποιθώς. Many commentators construe the verbal actively. But the dative may depend on ἔδρας τάδε.

Intermediate between those verbals which are used in a neuter sense and those which show the active force stand the following adjectives, which are derived from *active transitive* verbs, but are used almost as neuters, the object which they govern—or *would* govern—being easily inferred from the context, or else contained in the a priv. of the adjective itself, as e. g. ἀνόητος = οὐδὲν γινώσκων.

Phil. 689 ἀμφιπλάκτων ῥοθίων. Schol. ἐκατέρωθεν πληγτόντων· τὰ γὰρ κύματα κλύζονται κατ' ἀμφοτέρων ὄχθην τῆς θαλάσσης. Surely the verbal is not (with M., I, p. 48) passive if we read ῥοθίων. It is interpreted as an active verbal by Porson (Hec. 1117), Hermann (O. R. 962), Jebb (O. C. 1031; O. R. 969), Passow and others. "Undarum (insulam) undique pulsantium, circumsonantium" is Schindler's not unhappy translation (p. 25). Ai. 162 ἀνοήτους τούτων γνώμας. Ant. 645 ἀνώφελῆτα . . . τέκνα. El. 1144 ἀνωφελήτου (τροφῆς). O. R. 884 ἀφόβητος (δίκας). The verbal is active; cf. Tessing, p. 47; Hermann, O. R. 962; Porson, Eur. Phön. 216; Wex, Antig. 392; Jebb, O. C. 1283; M., I, p. 72; Stephanus, Passow. Schol. τὴν δίκην μὴ δεδοικώς. Δίκας is a "genetivus relationis, qui significat, quatenus et cuius rei ratione habita, qualitas, quae adiectivo expressa est, locum habeat"; cf. Caesar, Bell. Civ. I 69 *fugiens laboris*. O. R. 882 ὑπέροπτα χερσὶν ἢ λόγῳ πορεύεται. The verbal seems to be an instrumentally construed active, with indefinite (unexpressed) object.

FRAGMENTS WHICH CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED.

879 ἄβρωτος: Pollux (6, 39) defines it ὁ νῆστις.

881 ἀγάμητος, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄγαμος, Anecd. Bekk., p. 336, 7. Ἀγάμητος, Brunck; ἀγάμετος, Anec. Bekk.

205 ἀδόξαστον, ἀνέλπιστον, Hesych. I, p. 97, and Anecd. Bekk., p. 344, 28.

43 αἰχμόδετος, αἰχμάλωτος, Hesych. I, p. 178. V. L. αἰχμόλετος.

241 ἀκήρυκτον, ἄγνωστον, Hesych. I, p. 191.

623 ἄκλεπτοι, οὐ παραλογιζόμενοι, ἀληθεῖς, Hesych. I, p. 194.

674 ἀκόλαστον σῶμα.

298 ἄλυτον, ἀκατάλυτον, ἀκατάπαυστον, Hesych. I, p. 252.

228 ἀμόρφωτον, ἀδιατύπωτον, Hesych. I, p. 282.

27 ἀναρκτον, ἀνυπότακτον, [οὐ] οὐδεὶς ἤρξε (ἤρξει, codex): Hesych. I, p. 339.

911 ἀνόσητον: τὸν δὲ ἄνοσον καὶ ἀνόσητον Σοφοκλῆς, Pollux 3, 107.

299 ἀξέστους, τραχείας, Hesych. I, p. 412.

283 ἀπαρθέεντος (ἀπαρθίνεντος, cod.), ἀκέραιος, καθαρὰ, Hesych. I, p. 426.

564 ἄπιστος, ἀπαράπιστος, ἀπειθής, Hesych. I, p. 453. Nauck conjectures ἄπειστος, ἀπαράπειστος.

229 ἀποπλήκτω ποδί, μανιώδει, Hesych. I, p. 477.

48 ἄσεπτον, ἀσεβές, Hesych. I, p. 568.

121 ἄτμητον, ἀμέριστον, ἀτραυμάτιστον, Hesych. I, p. 603, adopting Salmasius' suggestion: ἀτραυμάτιστον. Σοφοκλῆς Ἀμφιτρύωνι. ἄτμητον, ἀμέριστον, codex.

498 ἄρρητον, ἄφραστον, ἀνιστόρητον, ἀπόρρητον, ἄφωνον, αἰσχρὸν, Hesych. I, p. 551.

231 αὐτόφορτοι, αὐτοδιάκονοι, κυρίως δὲ οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις πλοίοις, Hesych. I, p. 630.

512 αὐτόσσυτον, αὐτοκέλευστον, Hesych. I, p. 629.

354 ἀπέλαστον ἀξύμβλητον ἐξεθρεψάμην. Ἀξύμβλητον ὥστε μηδενὶ ἀπαντῆσαι, Anecd. Bekk., p. 413, 14, and Etym. M., p. 327 C. Ἀξύμβλητον (ἀξύβλητον, cod.), ὁ μηδενὶ ἀπαντᾶν (ἀπαντᾶ ἡ, cod.) δυνατόν, ἢ ἀσυνάντητον, Hesych. I, p. 414. Ἀπέλαστον is Meineke's, ἄπλαστον Bergk's conjecture for the MS reading ἄπλαστον.

505 οὐκ ἀψάλακτος, ἀκίνητος, ἀψηλάφητος, ἀκράτητος, Hesych. I, p. 665.

202 γνωστός, ἀντὶ τοῦ γνώριμος, Antiatt., p. 87, 25.

934 διωκτός, ὁ ἀνὴρ φυγὰς, ἐξόριστος: Pollux 9, 158.

392 ἐπίκοτα, ἐπίμομφα (ἐπίμορφα, cod.), ἢ πᾶς ἂν τις (ἀπασαν τίς, cod.) μέμψαιτο, Hesych. I, p. 1360.

499 ἐνθρίακτος, ἐνθουσιῶν καὶ ἐνθέακτος, Hesych. I, p. 1240.

424 θρεκτοῖσι νόμοις, ἀντὶ τοῦ τροχαίοις (τροχαῖος, cod.), Hesych. I, p. 1730. Nauck prefers the V. L. κρεκτοῖσι.

132 σαλητόν, ἀντὶ πατρός (σαράπιδος, Valesius et al.). ἡ βαρβαρικὸν χιτῶνα, Hesych. II, p. 1143; σάρητον ὁ σάραπισ, καὶ εἶδος χιτῶνος, Hesych. II, p. 1154.

CHARLES EDWARD BISHOP.

IV.—OVIDIANA.

A. A. II 305-8.

Bracchia saltantis, uocem mirare canentis,
Et quod desierit, uerba querentis habe.
Ipsos concubitus, ipsum uenerere licebit
Quod iuuat et †quaedam gaudia noctis habe.†

Of the emendations as yet known of 308 the least unsatisfactory is Merkel's *et praedam gaudia noctis habe*, though such a sense of *praedam habere* 'to turn into an occasion of gain' is very forced. Perhaps we have here another case of the frequent confusion of *d* and *cl*: *quaedam* is a corruption of *quae clam*: then *habe* will become either *habes* or *habet*, a point which can only be determined when we possess an adequate collation of the MSS. *clam habere* = to conceal or keep unmentioned in Ter. Hec. IV 1. 4 id qua causa clam me habuisse Dicam, non edepol scio. The two vv. will then become

Ipsos concubitus, ipsum uenerere licebit
Quod iuuat et quae clam gaudia noctis habet,
habes.

i. e. licebit uenerere ipsos concubitus ipsamque uoluptatem coitus et gaudia ueneris, quae taces (tacet). If *habet* is read, the nominative will be *amica*. Heinsius supports *gaudia noctis* from Her. XVIII 107.

Rem. Am. 699, 700.

Non ego Dulichio furiali more sagittas
Nec raptas ausim tinguere in amne faces.

So *R* as reported by Ehwald.

If *Dulichio* is genuine, *furiali* can hardly be right; but Ehwald's conjecture, *frustrari*, is rather wide of the word. To judge the passage adequately we should first understand the allusion. Hitherto I have seen no commentator who explains it, as I believe it should be, by a reference to *poisoned* arrows. In Od. I 259-64 Ulysses is said to have gone to Ephyre to procure poison in which to steep his arrows, from Ilus, son of Mermerus. Ilus, however, refused to give him the poison, and he obtained it from the Taphian prince Anchialus, father of Mentès.

If this is the allusion, then *furialis* is probably right; for the word is specially used in connexion with *poisons*. Met. IV 506 uergit *furiale* uenenum Corpus in amborum. Cic. Tusc. Disp. II 8. 20 Haec me inretiuu ueste *furiali* in scium. Val. Fl. VI 670 Quaque dedit teneros aurum *furiale* per artus Deficit (of a necklace producing poisonous or noxious effects). VII 254 *furialia* figit Oscula.

Supposing, I say, the allusion in Rem. 699 to be to Ulysses' use of poisoned arrows, *furialis* would be quite in keeping with such a sense. Heinsius, therefore, may be substantially right in reading Non ego Dulichio furiales more sagittas.

Except that for *furiales*, the form in *-is* would be a nearer approach to *furiali* of R. *Tinguere* is constructed with both verses; and the meaning will be 'I am not one that would venture like Ulysses to steep poisonous arrows, or seize and plunge lighted torches in a river.' In other words, 'I am not one to advocate violent measures in love: there should be no poisoning, no sudden quenching of love's torch: a gentler mode of operation is best.'

furialis tinguere would thus = *furiali ueneno tinguere*.

Epist. Sapph. 51-56 de Vries (Leyden, 1885).

Nunc tibi Sicelides ueniunt noua praeda puellae.
Quid mihi cum Lesbo? Sicelis esse uolo,
O uos erronem tellure remittite nostrum,
Nisiades matres Nisiadesque nurus.
Nec uos decipiant blandae mendacia linguae.
Quae dicit uobis, dixerat ante mihi.

Prof. E. A. Freeman, Hist. of Sicily, II 149, asks "why does Sappho call on the

Nisiades matres Nisiadesque nurus

to send back the runaway? Surely Nisa (see vol. I, p. 122), if it existed at all, was the most obscure of Sikan or other towns."

To this very reasonable question Heinsius' words may be quoted in reply: "Per *Nisiadas* autem *matres* Megarenses littorales intelligi non est dubium. Megara enim Siciliae portus a Megaris Atticis, quae et Nisea dicta antiquitus, a Niso rege."

That is to say, because the Megara in Greece was called Nisaea, therefore the women of Megara in Sicily could be called *Nisiades*!

Such an explanation, accepted though it is by de Vries, who quotes Lennep as accepting it before him, would have seemed as impossible to Freeman as it does to me.

It may, however, be put in a less violent shape. Statius, Theb. II 382 Hinc praeteruectus Nisum et te, mitis Eleusin, seems to use Nisus as = Megara. Lutatius thus comments on this passage: Megaram dixit, in qua Nisus regnauit. Quidam Nisum montem Megarensium dicunt, in quo Nisus est sepultus, quem ferunt crinem habuisse purpureum.

If, then, Statius could use *Nisus* = Megara in Greece, might not Ovid call *Nisiades* the women of Megara in Sicily? To this I should give an equally negative reply. But again, may not *Nisiades* = the female descendants of Nisus (de Vit in the Onomasticon to Forcellini)? Megara in Sicily being a colony of Megara in Greece, and an ultimate connexion with Nisus, the legendary founder of Nisaea and king of the Greek Megara, being thus traceable, it would be a pardonable licence in Ovid or whoever was the author of the Epistula Sapphus to transfer from the mother-city to the colony the mythical name with which the former was traditionally associated.

To this it might be replied (1) that such a connexion is at best *very* remote, (2) that it is much *more* remote in the absence of any tradition connecting Sappho or Phaon with the Sicilian Megara.

Freeman cites the Parian chronicle as stating that Sappho fled from Mitylene with the banished γαμόροι to Sicily, Σαπφὼ ἐγ Μιτυλήνης εἰς Σικελίαν ἔπλευσε φυγοῦσα σὺν ἄλλοις ὀλιγαρχικοῖς. This testimony is valuable as proving that the author of the Epistula Sapphus was following an existing and accredited legend in making Sappho wish to be with Phaon in *Sicily*.

A MS in the Corsini Library at Rome, the same which contains the *Culex* (see Journal of Philology for 1887, pp. 153-56; Classical Review for 1892, pp. 203-5), has also the Epistula Sapphus. vv. 53, 54 are thus given by this MS:

caronem

At uos erronem tellure remittite nostrum,
Nasiades matres Nasiadesque nurus.

Sedlmayer (whose commentary on the Heroides I have not been able to find in the Bodleian) does not mention *Nasiades* among the variants which he has recorded in this passage: neither does de Vries. The latter editor, however, gives *Nesiades* as the reading of a MS which he calls *m*¹, and as a superscribed alternative for *Nisiades* in another which he calls *g*⁷, both of the XVth cent. *Nesiades*, *Nasiades* are, I imagine, identical: both

refer to the *island* of Syracuse, but the more correct name of this island is the Doric form *Nasos* (Freeman, I, p. 350), not the Hellenic *Nesos*. In the *a* form the name is found several times in Liv. XXV 30, where the excellent VIIIth cent. codex Puteaneus seems to give a double *s*: *nasso, nassum*. If the Corsini MS is right in giving the *a* form, it is not impossible that in some of the copies not yet examined, *Nassiades* may be found. This I leave to future explorers.

From Mr. H. Wharton's interesting volume on Sappho I learn that the Elizabethan writer Lilley makes his Sappho a princess of *Syracuse*.

The same Corsini MS *incidentally* supports a conjecture of Oudendorp's in another much disputed v. of the Epistula Sapphus. 63-66, de Vries:

Arsit †inops frater meretricis captus amore
Mixtaque cum turpi damna dolore tulit.
Factus inops agili peragit freta caerulea remo,
Quasque male amisit, nunc male quaerit opes.

For *inops* in 63 Oudendorp conjectured *iners*. The two words are interchanged in Calpurn. Ecl. III 60:

Vox et carmen *iners* et acerbae stridor auenae

where the Corsini MS gives *inops*, with many others of the later MSS, as attested by H. Schenkl ad loc. I believe that this emendation of Oudendorp's will commend itself to an attentive reader of the poem more than any of those mentioned by de Vries or Sedlmayer.

I will not leave the poem without adding one more reading of the Corsini. It has *furialis en io al. hericto* in Ep. Sapph. 139. De Vries in his commentary seems to accept *Enyo*, which is found in the best source for the poem, the Frankfort codex (f), as right; and it certainly may be, though *feralis* for *furialis* (de Vries) does not recommend itself to my judgment. I observe, however, that Palmer (preface to Heroides, p. vii) seems to endorse *Erichtho* and to place the author of the Epistula after Juvenal. It was certainly known to the writer of an epigram ascribed to Ausonius (XCV 13, Schenkl):

Quod sibi suaserunt Phaedra et Elissa dabunt,
Quod Canace Phyllisque et fastidita Phaoni:

a passage from which it would seem to have been then included in the rest of the Ovidian Heroides.

Amor. III 8. 65, 66.

Nec te decipiant ueteres quinquatria cerae.
Tolle tuos tecum pauper amator auos.

So, as reported, the Codex Puteaneus: other MSS have *ueteris*.

Naugerius and Marcilius both thought that *quinque atria* was to be read here. "Fortasse," wrote the former, "ut in quibusdam, *quinque atria* legendum, ut maxime nobilis significetur is, cuius maiorum imagines uel quinque compleant atria." Caspar Barth (Aduersar. X 27) cites a marginal scholion from a MS of the Amores which gives a color to this view: Explodit nobiliorem qui totis atriis imagines habebat dispositas, et se hominem nobilem magni faciebat. Ad talem dicit Iuuenalis cum tota Carthagine migra. I see no ground for doubting Barth's truthfulness as to this excerpt: doubtless similar or identical scholia may be found on the passage in some of the innumerable MSS of the poem.

Barth, however, while agreeing with the interpretation above given as a whole, maintained that *quinquatria* should be written as one word. He quotes a gloss, *Quinquatria porticus est quinque ambulacrorum*, which is repeated by Papias in this form, *Quinquatria quinque porticorum ambitus*. Many years before my attention was called to the difficulty in Ovid, I had found this gloss in the XIVth cent. Balliol Glossary, with *porticum* for *porticorum*. It can be traced back as far as the XIth century. A Vatican codex of this date (Mai, Auct. Class. VII) gives it thus: *Quinquatria, quinque porticorum ambitus puto*. It is also in the so-called Glossae Isidori, *Quinquatria ambitus quinque porticorum*; but I am aware that Löwe has discredited the value and antiquity of this collection. Yet Arevalo seems right in tracing a connexion between the gloss and the scholion on totis quinquatribus optat, Juv. X 115 diebus festis quibus Minerua colitur, aut quod intra quinque atria fit, aut atria abundat, nam dies quinque in uno (*continui* Schurzfleisch) festi; and this carries back the gloss to a comparatively early period.

Barth's belief that *quinquatria* was a singular noun (in accordance with which he changed *decipiant* into *decipiat*) in no way follows from the gloss. It may quite as well be a neuter plural with a collective meaning; and at least as regards the MSS of Ovid there seems to be no support for the singular.

But was Barth right in accusing Naugerius and Marcilius of 'great and dangerous error' for preferring to write *quinque atria*

in two words rather than *quinquatria* in one? Surely not, on the evidence of the gloss. For if the Juvenal scholion is the source of it, it is a mere etymology, in its original form; a tentative explanation of a word, not an ascertained or really existing meaning. If, on the other hand, it has nothing to do with the Juvenal scholion, it may be, as Heinsius suggested, a gloss on this actual passage of Ovid, but written after *quinquatria* had occupied the MSS, ousting the more genuine *quinque atria*.

It is, I think, highly improbable that in the Augustan age a poet of Ovid's eminence should have written *quinquatria* (which, so far as our extant authorities go, is invariably applied to the festival of Minerva in the third week of March) in the sense of *quinque atria* 'five halls' or 'hallfuls.' But I see no strong objection to his writing *quinque atria* with this meaning. Vergil, speaking of the wealthy Galaesus, Aen. VII 538, describes him as lord of *five* flocks of sheep, *five* herds: *Quinque greges illi balantum, quina redibant Armenta*, and the recurrence of this number in familiar combinations such as *quinque zonae, planetae, sensus*, etc., to say nothing of the *πένταθλον*, might be enough to account for its being used by Ovid in the vague and large way more usually associated with *tres, ter*. At any rate, the numerical difficulty which Burmann finds in *quinque*, as if five *atria* were an impossibility, is not a very insurmountable one. It would not, I suppose, arrest any scholar who found it so written in a MS otherwise authoritative. The real difficulty is that *quinquatria* should here, and here alone, have a meaning quite distinct from its ordinary sense. But this might well have its origin in palaeography. How little separates QVINQ. ATRIA from QVIN-QVATRIA! Let the point which followed the Q once fall out, how likely that it would continue to be omitted, that the MSS which preserved it would become fewer and rare!

I need not dwell on the natural connexion between the waxen images of ancestors and the *atrium*. Juvenal's well-known line, VIII 19 *Tota licet ueteres exornent atria cerae*, is copiously illustrated by Mayor in loc. One parallel I may be permitted here to cite. Mart. II 90. 5, 6 *Differat hoc patrios optat qui uincere census Atriaque inmodicis artat imaginibus*. The plural here is like the *quinque atria* of Ovid. It is vague and meant to give an idea of profusion—he crowds his 'halls' with busts, just as Ovid's lover fills 'five' whole 'halls' with them.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

The Dialogues of Plato. Translated into English, with Analyses and Introductions, by B. JOWETT. Third edition. Revised and corrected throughout. New York, Macmillan & Co., 1892.

The appearance of the third and definitive edition of Jowett's Plato, with introductions, analyses, résumés of analyses, head-lines, marginal analysis and 175 pages of index, recalls to mind Mr. Bright's saying of the first edition that it was a more marvellous achievement of the human intellect than the original composition of the dialogues. This is not quite so. But it would not be easy to name any original book of the last twenty years that has exerted a wider or more salutary influence on the thought of the age. In its new and improved form, its manifold contents made accessible to the most hurried reader by every device of the printer's art, the work will remain an ever open source of idealistic inspirations, a rich storehouse of suggestion to literary workers of every description.

The translation now, after two careful revisions and the pains bestowed upon it by the band of scholars whose aid is cordially acknowledged in the preface, is substantially correct—correct, that is, within the limits set by the translator's aims and methods. There still remain, as I shall note hereafter, a certain number of what seem to me positive errors of interpretation. But it would be grossly unfair for the critic to swell this list by including in it all the minor 'betrayals' of his original into which the translator is inevitably led by his method of "reducing the two languages to terms of each other" and allowing the precise order of the Greek words to fade from his mind. It is no part of Professor Jowett's design to reveal to us how he construes the Greek, and it would be mere pedantry on the part of the critic to assume the rod of the schoolmaster. There remain, then, for consideration, Professor Jowett's theory of translation and its application to the problem of translating Plato; the interpretations of the Platonic philosophy suggested rather than set forth in the introductions, and lastly the enumeration of some positive errors of detail that have escaped the eyes of the translator and his coadjutors. But before attempting to play the critic one would gladly pay his little tribute of admiration to this noble literary monument of a long and noble life. *Μωμήσεται τις μάλλον ἢ μωμήσεται.* The critic may carp at details, and versions of single dialogues may be published that will better please particular classes of readers, scholars, 'aesthetes,' students of philosophy; but the work as a whole will remain a permanent contribution to English literature that will not easily be superseded. It is not given to every man to compose (in original or in translation) five volumes of English prose of unflinching propriety, lucidity and charm, never deviating into vulgarity or rhetoric, but always preserving as by Hellenic instinct the just mean and the exquisite urbanity of the best literary society.

If we except the English Bible, it is probably safe to say that no modern literature possesses any translation of like extent and literary excellence.

Professor Jowett is especially successful in reproducing the little pictures of Greek life that serve as a stage for the unfolding of the argument, or the dramatic by-play of high comedy or uproarious farce that accompanies and relieves the severity of the dialectic. What can be more admirable than the opening scene of the Charmides—the press of Greek youths thronging about the reigning beauty and Socrates just returned from the camp at Potidaea?—or the Palaestra of the Lysis and Lysis himself “standing with the other boys and youths, having a crown upon his head like a fair vision” (pity ‘fair vision’ is not in the Greek); or the Homeric review of the gathering of the Sophists in the Protagoras; or the kindly old age of Cephalus—a portrait of the just man ending his days in peace, with honor, love, obedience, troops of friends, set in the forefront of the Republic, a practical confirmation of the conclusion to which the argument will bring us ‘after it has gone a long and weary way.’ Very admirable, too, are Professor Jowett’s reproductions of the lofty strain of Socratic irony in the Gorgias—the idealist against the world; the roaring farce of the Euthydemus; the amusing description of what befell the ‘notable device of the scythe-spear’ in the Laches; the Aristophanic account of the original man-woman in the Symposium; the humors of democracy in the Republic; the friendly banter of Socrates and Phaedrus by the Ilissus, and the solemn jests of the Sophist and Statesman. And in a loftier, more serious vein, where shall we look for anything finer than the beautiful description of the Ilissus or the allegory of the Chariot and two Steeds in the Phaedrus, or the death of Socrates, or the myth at the close of the Gorgias?

There are also countless single felicities of diction and clever paraphrases to delight the lovers of neat translations and edify students of the ingenious art of Greek prose composition. E. g. Phaedr. 245 C *ἡ δὲ δὴ ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ δεινοῖς μὲν ἀπιστος σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή* “the proof shall be one which the wise will receive and the witling disbelieve”; 250 D *ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μνήμη κεχαρίσθω*, etc., “let me linger over the memory of scenes that have passed away”; 256 E “will send you bowling round the earth during a period of nine thousand years and leave you a fool in the world below.” Symp. 191 *σύμβολον* “the indenture of a man”; 221 B *βρενθόμενος* “stalking like a pelican.” Euthyphron 3 B *ὡς οὖν καινοτομοῦντός σου*, etc., “he thinks you a neologian.” Protag. 337–38 (speech of Hippias) “worthy of this height of dignity” (*ἀξιώματος*); *ibid.* “go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land into an ocean of words.” Euthyd. 303 C *τῶν σεμνῶν δὴ*, etc., “grave and reverend seigniors”; *ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος* “the old, old song.” Meno 76 E *τραγικὴ γὰρ ἡ ἀπόκρισις* “in the orthodox, solemn vein.” Phaedr. 236 *ξύνες ὃ τοι λέγω* “wherefore perpend,” but in Meno 76 D “read my meaning.” Republic 519 A “But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth?” etc. Rep. 516 C “Wisdom of the den.” *ἔθελοδόλοις* “who hug their chains.”

The periphrases are sometimes really too fine, reminding one of nothing so much as of the comparative tables of idiom in the introductions to manuals of Greek prose composition. E. g. Symp. 129 “In the magnificent oration which you have just uttered” (*τοῦ λόγου*). Protag. 320 “at this unearthly hour” (*τηνικάδε*). Protag. 347 D “even though they are very liberal in their potations”

(κὰν πάνυ πολλὸν οἶνον πίωσιν). Lysis 209 "as much as he can take up between his fingers" (οὐδ' ἂν σμικρὸν). Rep. 466 A "But that as at present advised" (νῦν δέ); 531 A "'Tis as good as a play" (γελοῖως γε); 533 C "such a fabric of convention" (τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν); 517 C "Those who attain to this beatific vision" (οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐλθόντες); 551 D "another discreditable feature" (οὐδὲ τόδε καλόν); 539 B "Taste the dear delight" (αὐτῶν γενέσθαι).

Professor Jowett affects these elegant periphrases with the avowed purpose of avoiding tautology, of which modern languages are less tolerant than the Greek. In the introduction to the Cratylus, speaking of the fear of tautology as one of the forces operative in language-growth, he says that "it seems to be a kind of impertinence to the reader, and strikes unpleasantly both on the mind and ear, that the same sounds should be used twice over when another word or turn of expression would have given a new shade of meaning to the thought, and would have added a pleasing variety to the sound." In illustration of this cf. Meno 73 E εἶποιμ' ἂν . . . οὕτως ἂν εἶποιμι "I might say . . . and I should adopt this mode of speaking." 86 C περὶ τούτου "this is a theme upon which." 91 D καὶ τούτων "and in return for this disservice." Gorgias 465 E ἐα με χρῆσθαι "let me have the benefit of your brevity," where the paraphrase has certainly "given a new shade of meaning to the thought." Phaedo 101 "For there is the same liability to error in all these cases" (ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ πον φάσας). Gorgias 512 B "or from any other devourer" (ἄλλοθεν ὀποθενοῦν). Rep. 376 A "The trait of which I am speaking" (καὶ τοῦτο).

Apt turns of expression are occasionally borrowed from the storehouse of Shakespere or the Bible, though Professor Jowett holds that this is a resource of which the judicious translator should avail himself sparingly. Nothing could be happier than "she receives the *sensible warm motion* of particles that flow towards her," etc., for the δεχομένη τὸν ἱμερον . . . θερμαίνεται, etc., of Phaedr. 251 C. "And do they n share" is for those who catch the allusion an exquisite rendering of the οὐκοῦν μεταλαμβάνει of Rep. 565 A. The translator is less successful with his Falstaff in 566 C, where he attempts to reproduce the effect of the Homeric κείται μέγας μεγαλωστί by "larding the plain with his bulk." We catch the echoes of familiar quotations also in "continue of the same opinion still" (II 381); "flowers that bloom in the spring" (Rep. 475 A), which we fear is intentional, as it has been introduced since the second edition; "the sorrows of a poor old man" (I 476); "necessity, who is the mother of our invention" (III 49); "have everything handsome about them" (III 106); "refuse to speak of their pleasant vices" (Gorgias 502 B); "rehabilitate hippocentaurs and chimeras dire" (Phaedr. 229 E); "to the manner born of our muse" (I 559).

Yet despite Professor Jowett's brilliant success with it in practice, one is loth to accept his theory of translation. All that he says in his preface about slavish conformity to the original being the petty ambition of a schoolboy sounds plausible enough and might convince us, did not Munro's Lucretius exist to prove that the most scrupulous conformity to the original and a certain inevitableness in the rendering of each and every word are quite compatible with an English of the purest and noblest type. Ingenious, fluent, easy are the epithets we apply to Professor Jowett's renderings; we should never, I think, call them inevitable. He himself admits that to reproduce the movement and feeling of the original is the translator's ideal. But every scholar

must feel that he has sacrificed this to the fetich of an equable and conventional English style. Anxious to avoid the usual failing of translations—contamination with foreign idiom—he has, in his attempt to “form a general idea of the two languages and reduce one to terms of the other” chosen as his type of English that form of the literary language which bears least resemblance to the Greek language generally and to the style of Plato in particular. It is perfectly true that “good” modern English tends to throw off the adversative and inferential form; that it avoids elaborate periods and pronounced rhythms, and is intolerant of anacoluthon and tautology; and that archaisms, quotations and a consciously Saxon vocabulary impair the equability of a style. But English literature affords many models of style, from the prose of Milton and Hooker to that of De Quincey, Carlyle, Ruskin and Walter Pater, that in some or all of these respects are much better adapted to reproduce the effect of the Greek of Plato. The English reader of culture enjoys and appreciates these styles quite as much as his Addison, Swift or Macaulay. Why should he be compelled to read his Plato in a style that Lysias would have employed, had Lysias been a Saturday Reviewer? The translator’s statement that “in some respects it may be maintained that ordinary English writing, such as the newspaper article, is superior to Plato: at any rate, it is couched in language which is rarely obscure”—this portentous dictum, I say, makes one ask whether Professor Jowett is aware how much of the force and feeling of the original is lost in his fluent rewriting. A portion of Plato’s meaning may sometimes sleep in the ear of a careless reader or imperfect Grecian, but a chief charm of Plato’s style for the scholar is that it defines every nuance of feeling and thought with a precision of which the English language is incapable. This is accomplished by skilful arrangement and distribution of emphasis, the balanced or inferential opposition or parallelism of phrase and clause, and a consciously careful discrimination of synonyms. Hence, as Mr. Pater somewhere says, the best way to translate Plato is often to make sure of the right vocabulary and then to follow the windings of Plato’s thought in the order of the original words, careless of the formal coherence of the syntax. The translator who breaks up Plato’s periods into neat, crisp English sentences, and refuses to himself the license of anacoluthon, will inevitably misplace the emphasis and lose the rhythm of his original. If he does away with the inferential and adversative form and ignores the force of the particles, he sacrifices the logical evolution of the thought, which for Plato was often no less important than its substance. And by employing elegant periphrasis to avoid tautology he often wantonly alters emotional connotations and suggestions to which Plato attached the greatest significance.

This work, however, is much more than a translation. In the elaborate introductions to the dialogues, extending in some instances to more than two hundred pages, Professor Jowett undertakes not only to resume and interpret Plato’s thought, but to apply, I had almost said to ‘improve’ it (“Plato,” as he says, “admits of endless applications”), in relation to the entire life and culture of our day. These introductory essays, a notable feature of the first edition, received many additions in the second, and in the third, besides many alterations and improvements of detail, are enriched with supplementary discussions on *The New Science of Language*; *The Ideas of Plato* and

Modern Philosophy; The Decline of Greek Literature; The Scope of Psychology, etc., etc. To many readers the modernity, the breadth of view, the gentle wisdom, the playful urbanity, the veiled and evasive dogmatism in the treatment of great themes that mark these essays will seem hardly less attractive than the dialectic discussions they serve to introduce (*τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν*). What could be more exquisite than the little essay on Friendship prefixed to the *Lysis* (I 45); or the half-serious debate as to the relative advantages of a marriage of love and a marriage of convenience in the introduction to the *Phaedrus*; or the hints for the Platonic education of after-life (III ccxi); or, in a somewhat higher vein, the meditations on immortality in the introduction to the *Phaedo*; the portrait of the ideal philosopher of modern times (III lxxxviii); the reflections on the symbolism of the Platonic mythus (II 316-24); the picture of the world as it reflected itself in the conjectures of early Greek science (III 380 sqq.)? Who can read unmoved the lovely passage (unfortunately too long to quote, V ccxxxvii) in which the translator takes leave of his laborious task and reluctantly severs his lifelong communion with the spirit of the greatest teacher who has ever appealed to the reason of man? This beautiful page will remain classic: it marks the supreme perfection of nineteenth-century English prose.

Simple and unemphatic in style, these essays are yet thickly strewn with wise, pregnant or pretty sayings which the appreciative reader will note and of which a few may not unprofitably be collected here: "The moral and intellectual are always dividing, yet they must be re-united, and in the highest conception of them are inseparable" (I 127). "For he sees the marks of design in the world, but he no longer sees, or fancies that he sees, God walking in the garden or haunting stream or mountain" (III 427). "Governing for the people cannot easily be combined with governing by the people" (II 312). "In all things there is an element of convention; but the admission of this does not help us to understand the rational ground or basis in human nature on which the convention proceeds" (I 256). "The Symposium is Greek, having a beauty as of a statue . . . while the *Phaedrus* is marked by a sort of Gothic irregularity" (I 515). "It was easier to think of a former than of a future life, because such a life has really existed for the race, though not for the individual" (II 15). "'Piety is doing as I do' is the idea of religion which first occurs to him and to many others who do not say what they think with equal frankness" (II 71). "Good men are too honest to go out of the world professing more than they know" (II 180). "Nor need anything be excluded from the plan of a great work to which the mind is naturally led by the association of ideas and which does not interfere with the general purpose" (III iii). "No such inspired creation is at unity with itself, any more than the clouds of heaven when the sun pierces through them" (III viii). "Looking into the orb of light he sees nothing, but he is warmed and elevated" (III cxvii). "Habit is to the mind what the bones are to the body" (IV 178). "Astronomy and medicine were naturally connected in the minds of early thinkers because there was little or nothing in the space between them" (IV 432). "Evil is supposed to continue . . . a sort of mephitic vapor exhaling from some ancient chaos" (IV 434).

These essays, however, claim to be much more than a series of miscellaneous

reflections and happy sayings about Plato and Platonism. They offer a complete, if designedly unsystematic, interpretation of the Platonic philosophy, and a critical examination of the entire scientific and philosophic effort of our time, touching lightly but with confident affirmation on every topic from prehistoric marriage to the future of science and the transmission of acquired qualities by heredity. With the synoptic gaze of the dialectician, Professor Jowett, from the vantage-ground of two generations of Oxford culture and the summits of the Platonic philosophy, surveys the labors of the present generation of scholars and thinkers with playful indulgence and finds them by no means all very good. The conclusion of the suggestive but somewhat rambling and inconclusive essay on the new science of language is that "Like some other branches of knowledge, it may be approaching a point at which it can no longer be profitably studied" (I 320). The essay on the nature and limits of psychology begins by saying that during the past twenty years "the subject has gained in breadth and extent; whether it has had any true growth is doubtful," and, after a clever summary of the obstacles to a scientific investigation of mind, either by self-scrutiny or study of the machinery of the body, concludes by offering to "rehabilitate psychology to some extent not as a branch of science, but as a collection of facts bearing on human life." And the essay on Hegelianism, while assigning Hegel an exalted place above other philosophers, assumes that "we know his method to be erroneous," and blasphemously says that "whatever came into his mind seemed to him to be a necessary truth." The young grammarians, the adherents of the new psychology and the Neo-Hegelians can be safely relied upon to defend themselves against the fleers of any Platonic littérateur. But Professor Jowett's easy-going belletristic treatment of the history of philosophy, and more especially of the Platonic philosophy, may fitly be animadverted upon here. His own attitude towards philosophy may be defined as a mild literary positivism tempered by an Hegelianism akin to that of Renan. "Most of the ancient puzzles," he says, "have been settled on the basis of usage and common sense, and there is no need to re-open them" (I 192). And again: "To continue dead or imaginary sciences which make no signs of progress and have no definite sphere tends to interfere with the prosecution of living ones." Like Hegel, he holds that self-contradiction is the logic of a higher order of truth, and he finds in the master "an emancipation nearly complete from the influences of the scholastic logic." Accordingly he denies the truth of the law of contradiction and avers that "the silliness of the so-called laws of thought has been well exposed by Hegel himself." For "unless we are willing to admit that two contradictories may be true, many questions which lie at the threshold of mathematics and morals will be insoluble puzzles to us." Plato, he thinks, may have dimly anticipated this great truth in his hint of a "longer way" (Rep. 435 D and 504), which is perhaps an intimation "of some metaphysic of the future which will not be satisfied with arguing from the principle of contradiction." But Plato, alas! does not attempt, like Hegel, to carry the ordinary mechanism of language and logic "into another region in which all oppositions are absorbed and all contradictions affirmed only that they may be done away with" (IV 316). For Plato "in the Symposium denies the possibility of reconciliation until the opposition has passed away," and in working

out his doctrine of not-being as a form of otherness he has "lost sight altogether of the other sense of not-being as the negative of being." The best answer to this rigmarole is supplied by two or three sentences from Plato himself. The first sentence, as regards the neglected sense of not-being, shall be the challenge of the Eleatic stranger in the *Sophist* 239 C: "Come, now, make a bold and manful attempt, bending every intellectual power to the feat, to deliver yourself of any true utterance about not-being without (implicitly) predicating of it essence or unity or number in any degree!" And for the law of contradiction and its abrogation by Hegel we may take *Republic* 436 D E, or, better yet, *Sophist* 259 C D (in Jowett's version): "Letting alone these puzzles as involving no difficulty, he should be able to follow and criticise in detail every argument, and when a man says that the same is in a manner other, or that other is the same, to understand and refute him from his own point of view, and in the same respect in which he asserts either of these affections. But to show that somehow and in some sense the same is other, or the other same, or the great small, or the like unlike; and to delight in always bringing forward such contradictions, is no real refutation, but is clearly the new-born babe of some one who is only beginning to approach the problem of being." If Professor Jowett had devoted to Schopenhauer some of the days and nights which he has consecrated to Hegel he would have remembered that the so-called laws of thought are merely the primary conventions of mutually intelligible speech; that their most general expression is: "At a given time and place and for the purposes of a given discourse every predicate either may or may not be affirmed of any subject"; and that it is as futile to speak of the silliness of these laws, or try to transcend them in quest of a higher logic, as it is to dwell upon them and magnify their significance with foolish wonder. But Professor Jowett is in reality only coquetting with Hegelianism for its literary effectiveness. An age of intellectual transition is necessarily an age of inconsistency, he tells us, and inconsistency, as we know from the example of Renan, lends an incomparable breadth of effect and piquancy to the treatment of great religious and philosophical themes. Professor Jowett has not formally adopted Renan's principle that "to contradict oneself frequently gives the best chance of being occasionally in the right," but he doubtless is faintly conscious of a certain artistic pleasure in the contrast between the positivistic reasoning in detail and the spiritualistic summing up of his essays on Immortality and on the Scope of Psychology, or in that between his demonstration that there is after all nothing in Hegelianism and his prodigal encomiums upon Hegel. And to take minor illustrations, there is a noble disdain of the pedant's ideal of consistency in affirming on one page (III cc) that Plato does not "assert in the *Republic* the involuntariness of vice" and telling us on the next page that "In the *Republic* he is evidently impressed with the conviction that vice arises chiefly from ignorance and may be cured by education." Or in saying in one place (I 17) that no mention occurs of the doctrine of ideas in the *Timaeus*, in another (I 13) that the ideas are transformed into demons, and in a third (III 346) that "the ideas remain, but that they have become types in nature."

But we are not here concerned with Professor Jowett's philosophic consistency, nor do we care to defend ontology and metaphysics against his scepticism.

ticism. We cordially concur with him in the belief that we want only enough metaphysics to dispel the illusions of metaphysics, though we think he does not realize the full force of his admission that it requires a good deal of metaphysics to get rid of metaphysics, and can hardly be aware how much metaphysics would be needed to reconcile with what seems to be his own final faith his assertion that "it is probable, or indeed certain, that of many mental phenomena there are no mental antecedents, but only bodily ones" (IV 183). But because metaphysics is an unreal science we must not infer that truth and error are meaningless terms as applied to statements about the history of philosophy. The life and growth of metaphysical systems, whatever their objective validity, like that of other products of the human spirit, is a subject for scientific investigation. They are to be studied partly by the historic method, and partly by an *a priori* analysis of the limited number of possible combinations of the main facts of human experience external and internal. That is to say, any given philosophical system is to be explained partly by reference to the science and religion of the age that gave it birth and the experience and reading of its author, and partly by analyzing it into its elements and finding in them some one of the few eternal problems of thought (or verbal puzzles, if you will, τῶν λόγων . . . ἀγῶρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν) that are no nearer solution to-day than they were in the time of Plato.

The historian of philosophy cannot escape the necessity of this analysis by asserting that these ancient puzzles have only an historic significance for us now; nor by calling them epigrammatically "surds of metaphysics"; nor by "relegating some of them to the sphere of mystery and some of them to the book of riddles," or by saying that "these and similar double notions, instead of being anomalies, are among the higher and more potent instruments of human thought." Nor is it of any avail to protest against the pedantry of forcing into the Procrustean bed of a system the unsystematic *aperçus* of primitive thinkers. In the case of the Pre-Socratics, where we possess only fragments, such warnings may be needful. In the case of Plato they are a mere evasion. It is not necessary to re-open the tiresome debate as to whether Plato did or did not have a system. His mind and writings were dominated by certain leading thoughts and feelings which his style everywhere implicitly suggests, even where they are not distinctly formulated. The growth and connection of these ideas in his mind was not the result of accident. It is the part of the historian to detect these predominating thoughts, to analyze Plato's attempted solutions of the problems of metaphysics and morals into their elements and compare them with the nearest modern analogues. But Professor Jowett, while perhaps over-quick to note and express picturesque resemblances in matters of feeling and the play of social life, has apparently no eye for those deeper analogies that are revealed by analysis. Thus he tells us that we no longer debate the problem of the one and the many—the co-existence of unity and plurality. But a glance at the last chapter of Professor James's smaller psychology or a little reflection on the interminable debates respecting Kant's synthetic unity would show that we have merely transferred the puzzle to psychology. It would be an interesting study to show definitely the relation of the Platonic problem of the metaphysical unity of the idea in its multiform manifestations to the modern psychologist's difficulty in assigning the postu-

lated unity of cognitive functions to a soul that can manifest itself only through infinitely divisible nervous tissue. Instead of attempting such a study, Professor Jowett puts us off with the ingenious fancy (it is nothing more) that the co-existence of unity and plurality in the idea was to Plato a mystery like that of the co-existence of unity and trinity in the Deity to a trinitarian.

Again, "to appreciate fully the drift of the Euthydemus," he says, "... we should imagine a mental state . . . in which the ideas of space, time, matter, motion were proved to be contradictory and imaginary, in which the nature of qualitative change was a puzzle." But to find this state of mind we need go no further than Herbert Spencer's chapters on the Unknowable, or the strange debate between Spencer and Mill on the meaning of 'same,' or the modern problem of problems: Can evolution evolve qualitative differences out of quantitative? Once more he tells us (II 24) that "the question which Plato has raised respecting the origin and nature of ideas belongs to the infancy of philosophy; in modern times it would no longer be asked." With what questions, then, are Max Müller's *Science of Thought* and Romanes' mental evolution concerned? The origin and nature of our ideas is surely the central question of recent philosophy. We approach the problem from the psychological side and ask, Can we establish a distinction of kind between our ideas and the images and sensations of brutes? But those who would escape materialism and the 'flowing philosophers' will also in the end be forced to investigate the relation of 'ideas' to objective reality, and so to face the problems of the Parmenides.

As a result of this lack of definiteness and precision in the conception and statement of philosophic questions, we find intermingled with the fine sayings that adorn these pages an equal number of errors, misleading suggestions, fantastic analogies, misconceived criticisms of Plato, epigrammatic evasions of serious problems, and Hegelian passages of what Ruskin calls "pure, definite and highly finished nonsense."

For example, it is fanciful to find in Phaedrus 247 D "the assertion of the essentially moral nature of God"; as it is to cite Phaedrus 246 C to illustrate first the Cartesian union of mind and body, and second the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz; or to see a "reminiscence of the *δημιουργία* and the world-soul of the Timaeus in the monads of Leibnitz which really came from the Platonic idea (Phileb. 15 B *μονάδας*), and the Lucretian atoms by way of Giordano Bruno. Plato's disparagement of geometry as a science that, unlike dialectic, is forced to employ sensuous representatives of ideal truths is not a conception of a geometry in which figures are to be dispensed with, nor even in a dim and distant way an anticipation of modern analytic geometry. Socrates' words in Phaedo 97 B are not "a mysterious reference to another science (mathematics?) of generation and destruction for which he is vainly feeling" (II 189). They refer simply to the doctrine of causation by 'presence' of the idea which he is about to expound. It is not true that the distinction drawn by Protagoras (Protag. 351 B) between the courageous and the confident is futile. It blocks the argument of Socrates on that line, and forces him to turn in another direction. It is inaccurate to say (I 413, II 16) "that the soul which had seen truths in the form of the universal (Phaedr. 248 C, 249 C) cannot again return to the nature of an animal." Plato does not oppose good

and knowledge in the Charmides in contrast to his identification of them elsewhere (I 7), but merely affirms as often that no knowledge except knowledge of the good is always and necessarily a good. The definition 'doing one's own business' of temperance (tentatively) in the Charmides, and of justice in the Republic, does not show the "shifting character of the Platonic philosophy" (I 5), if we bear in mind the context and Laws 696 C [ἀλλὰ μὲν τό γε δίκαιον οὐ φέται χωρὶς τοῦ σωφρονεῖν].

It is no disparagement of Plato's philosophy of language to say that "he had no idea that language is a natural organism (I 281)"; for his idea that language is an instrument (*ὄργανον*) is far truer. It is a misconception to treat the "assertion that an agent and a patient may be described by similar predicates" as a mistake which "Aristotle (Eth. Nic. V 1. 4, XI 11) partly shares and partly corrects" and as an example of robust sophistry in Plato (II 294). For owing to the greater regularity of the Greek language, what is sometimes called the fallacy of paronymous terms in English was generally a legitimate locus for inferences in Greek, and Plato, while aware of the difficulty, thinks it conducive to edification to keep the same associations with both active and passive. Gorgias 476 B must be interpreted by Laws 860 A *ἐὰν δέ γε δίκαιον μὲν ὁμολογῶμεν, αἰσχρὸν δὲ εἶναι πάθος, διαφωνήσει τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ καλόν*, etc. There is no real inconsistency between the doctrine of punishment set forth in the Gorgias and Republic 380 A B (II 298), and the seeming inconsistency may be explained by Laws 728 B C. The criticism on the doctrine of the quadripartite line (III xcv), that the relation of shadows to objects does not correspond to the relation of numbers to ideas, ignores the fact that Plato's division is based not on differences in the objects but in the methods or processes of cognition (cf. Rep. 534 A and *infra*, p. 365).

The remarks on the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* (III 385 and IV 16) are plausible but beside the point. The argument is that if the likeness of particulars necessitates the assumption of a common type (the idea), then by parity of reasoning the resemblance of the particular and the idea involves another type from which this likeness is derived. The logic of this argument is untouched by Jowett's remark that "the mind, after having obtained a general idea, does not really go on to form another which includes that and all the individuals contained under it." There is nothing in the Timaeus to confirm the statement (III 391) "that the pattern (by which the world was created) though eternal is a creation." Republic 511 does not say that "objects of sense only receive their true meaning when they are incorporated in a principle which is above them" (IV 315), but that the non-sensuous conceptions of the mathematics and the arts belong to the domain of the 'understanding' as usually studied, but are objects of the higher reason if taken in connection with first principles. The criticism of the Philebus that "if we adopt the test of definiteness the pleasures of the body are more capable of being defined than other pleasures" (IV 531) betrays a failure to grasp the essential meaning of *ἀπειρος* as applied to *ἡδονή*. It is not true that Aristotle is in advance of Plato in affirming that pleasure is not in the body at all (IV 532), for this is the Platonic doctrine (cf. Timaeus 69 D, Philebus 43; Phaedo 66 C does not really assert the contrary). This appears even from the passage of Aristotle (Eth. Nic. X 3. 6) cited by Professor Jowett, for the words *οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ* express not Aristotle's opinion, but

as often the universally accepted view or the view of the very opponents against whom he is arguing. I will not pause to criticise or attempt to fathom the meaning of "the Kantian conception of an *a priori* synthetical proposition 'one is'" (IV 32) or "the individual is the synthesis of the universal and the particular" (III clxi), or of the statement that "the philosophy of Berkeley could never have had any meaning even to himself, if he had first analyzed from every point of view the conception of matter," or of the criticism "that the being and not-being of Plato never merge in each other, though he is aware that determination is only negation" (IV 18).

Professor Jowett writes very prettily round and about the larger questions of the Platonic philosophy, but instead of a precise investigation of Plato's meaning, he too often contents himself with an evasive flourish about the 'shifting character of Plato's thought,' or the tentative nature of all early speculative efforts. The introductions to the *Charmides*, *Lysis* and *Laches*, for example, practically ignore the fundamental question of the relation of these 'Socratic' dialogues to the doctrine of the *Republic* and the *Laws*. In the *Laws* Plato repeatedly affirms his intention of eschewing verbal eristic, such as he implies that he has permitted himself elsewhere, and he expressly admits that the identification of knowledge in the ordinary sense, and virtue is a way of speaking conducive to edification. In view of this shall we regard the treatment of *φιλία*, *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία* in the *Lysis*, *Charmides* and *Laches*, as embodying Plato's best thought at the time, or are they merely dramatic dialectical exertions? The question must at least be asked. At any rate, it is not permissible to affirm generally (I 3) "that in the philosophy of Plato *σωφροσύνη* still retains an intellectual element . . . and is not yet relegated to the sphere of moral virtue, as in the *Nichomachean ethics* of Aristotle" (cf. *Laws* 696 sqq.).

Similarly the treatment of the teachableness of virtue in the introductions to the *Protagoras* and *Meno* is vague and uncertain. It is quite true that "Plato is desirous of deepening the notion of education, and therefore asserts the paradox that there are no teachers" (II 7). But it is only half true that "Plato means to say that virtue is not brought to a man, but must be drawn out of him and cannot be taught by rhetorical discourses or citations from the poets" (I 116), and it is utterly misleading to say that in the *Meno* the answer to the question whether virtue can be taught is supplied out of the doctrine of ideas. Plato, who, like all reformers, relied chiefly on education, never doubted but that for all practical purposes 'virtue' can be taught. This appears sufficiently from the allegory of the ship in the *Republic*. It is the mutinous sailors who affirm that the art of navigation cannot be taught (cf. *Laws* 644 A οἱ γὰρ ὁρθῶς πεπαιδευμένοι σχεδὸν ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται). The ethical virtues are taught by the development of instinctive right feeling and convictions, through discipline maintained from early youth. These virtues can be brought to a man and instilled into him, in part through citations from the poets (under censorship) and rhetorical discourses (*Laws* passim). Intellectual virtue, on the contrary, is an innate faculty of the soul which teaching cannot produce, but only direct from unworthy to worthy objects (*Rep.* 518). Plato admits the effectiveness of the education of public opinion (*Protag.* 325; *Rep.* 492) and the more systematic instruction of the Sophists. But these

agencies are often misdirected and lack unity of purpose. He would employ the forces of both for the education of his ideal city, in which ordinary ethical virtue would be a normal product of the state machinery (Rep. 500 D), while the higher intellectual virtue would be preserved and converted to noble ends whenever it appeared. Under the present régime of chance nothing less than a special providence can save from corruption a soul endowed with the higher faculties. Hence the virtue of such men may be truly said to come *θεία μοίρα* by grace divine (Meno 99, interpreted by Rep. 493 A).

Once more, we are not much advanced in knowledge of the doctrine of ideas by being told that "they are the ever-varying expression of Plato's idealism," or that they are a "great theory of knowledge which Plato in various ways and under various forms of expression is seeking to unfold," or that their various forms "are not to be regarded seriously as having any meaning," but that their "great diversity shows the tentative character of early endeavors to think." A truly philosophic treatment of the subject would show us definitely how the theory of ideas seemed to Plato the only alternative to an impracticable nominalism in logic, a sensationalist psychology, a philosophy of relativity and a materialistic view of the world. *ἡ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ ἔργον.*

A philosopher is required to translate a philosopher, and Professor Jowett's belletristic attitude towards philosophy impairs the value of his translation for serious students. One who reads for pleasure, inspiration and the general effect is charmed by the ease, grace and perfect propriety of the English, and accepts the translator's dictum that nothing would be gained by a pedantic and punctilious conformity to the structure of the Greek sentence. But suppose a reader wishes to catch the exact nuance of Plato's thought in some matter where thought and feeling surpass the subtlety of language many times at the best. He will desire either a facsimile of the original, by patient study of which he may puzzle out the meaning for himself, or a 'compensating' version made with an unerring instinct born of a profound insight into the author's thought. Jowett's pretty periphrases, elegant 'compensations' and ingenious abbreviations are a constant delight to a reader who seeks only the charm, the wit and the dramatic life of the dialogues. They will, even in this substantially correct third edition, frequently mislead the reader who wishes to follow the argument. The translator's habit of allowing the Greek to fade from his mind while he writes out its purport in idiomatic English, would be safe only if he had a sure grasp of the Platonic philosophy as a whole. And this he has not. As it is, he abbreviates a seemingly superfluous expression and omits a qualification which cannot be spared; he substitutes a convenient synonym and alters the associations of an entire paragraph; he introduces a compensating embellishment which implicitly contradicts the whole tenor of the argument. And the case is not bettered by the fact that in a majority of instances a popular jury would pronounce the difference insignificant. One of the best lessons that the student learns from Plato is not to be content with an *à peu près*. Moreover, while this translation is stylistically very easy reading, it is in respect of the evolution of the thought often far more difficult than the original. Especially in the *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, *Sophist* and *Statesman* does one come upon passages which upon reconsideration he admits to be correct and marvels of ingenious yet idiomatic translation, but

which require two or three readings in order to be understood; when a closer version expressed in a less Latinized vocabulary would have been apprehended at once. It is true that modern English does not emphasize and make explicit the connecting links of thought like Platonic Greek, but what do readers of the Parmenides or the Sophist care for conventional English? There is much plausibility in Professor Jowett's claim that "it is a mistaken attempt at precision always to translate the same Greek word by the same English word." But it is an inaccuracy for which the careful reader can learn to make allowance. By study of the context he can gradually build up in his mind a true conception for the fixed conventional representative of an ambiguous or technical term, just as the student of the Greek does for the corresponding Greek word. And he will prefer the method of translation that makes this possible, to the confusion introduced by Professor Jowett's somewhat capricious substitution of synonyms for such words as λόγος, δόξα, φρόνησις, σοφία, σωφροσύνη, for example. It would be far better to render λόγος everywhere by 'speech' or 'discourse' than to translate it now by 'ideas' (II 166), now by 'thought' (Phaedo 100 A, Philebus 15), and again by 'reason' (IV 527), or 'understanding' contrasted with imagination (IV 537), or 'understanding' opposed to reason (Phileb. 62 A). And it is safer to translate δόξα everywhere by 'opinion' than to paraphrase ὁρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη by 'truth and appearance' (II 16) or render ἀληθίνης δόξης ἑταῖρος 'companion of true glory' (Phaedr. 253 D). The word σωφροσύνη presents a good test-case. It is best rendered 'sobriety,' though it has no single equivalent in English. In the Charmides, where an attempt is made to define the term, Jowett translates it now by 'temperance,' now by 'wisdom' and by 'temperance or wisdom' at the point of transition from one meaning to the other. Its primary meaning seems to be 'soundness' or 'safeness' of mind, sense and sobriety, as appears e. g. in Protag. 333 C ἀρά τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἀδικῶν ἀνθρώπος σωφρονεῖν; The two chief derived meanings are (1) self-restraint in the matter of the appetites, continence, and (2) self-restraint as shown in submission to lawful authority, 'minding one's own business.' It is only from this idea of 'knowing one's place' that it gets the connotation of 'self-knowledge,' and hence should not be translated simply by 'wisdom' when the intellectual aspect is to be emphasized, but by some paronym of knowledge. The synonyms employed by Professor Jowett not only make it difficult for the English reader to follow the argument of the Charmides, which becomes, like many of Plato's arguments in a loose translation, too grossly fallacious, but they seem to have confused the translator himself. For, surely, the virtue that Charmides has already learned is not self-knowledge, but common, every-day temperance (I 7), and in submitting himself to the instruction of Socrates he is giving proof not of his 'temperance,' but of his soundness of mind or good sense (I 76). The relation of temperance and wisdom in Plato's mind is best shown by a passage (Laws 710 A) which is thus translated by Jowett: "Yes, Cleinias, temperance in the vulgar sense; *not that which in the forced and exaggerated language of some philosophers is called prudence*, but that which is the natural gift of children and animals, some of which live continently and others incontinently, but, when isolated, was, as we said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods." A more correct version of this passage would run as follows: "Yes, Cleinias, temperance, in the

popular sense; not that temperance which a man might magnify in his discourse constraining us to identify it with wisdom, but that quality which is, so to speak, the bloom on the peach, in some young boys and animals that are naturally continent in pleasure, while others are incontinent—the quality, I mean, which, when isolated from the generally recognized goods (of the soul), was hardly worth consideration.” In this version, the retention of the metaphor in *ἐπανθεῖ* and the detailed rendering of the last clause are matters of taste, but Jowett’s translation of the italicized words is positively misleading. The *σεμνύνειν*, or rhetorical magnifying for the sake of edification is not the “forced and exaggerated language of certain philosophers”: it is a constant feature of Plato’s own style in treating ethical subjects. He employs it in relation to these very ideas a few pages back (Laws 689, 696 C), where he distinguishes *σοφός* in the sense of ‘clever,’ from *σοφός* as ‘wise’ in the only true wisdom, which is the harmony of desire and will and ‘fear of the Lord.’ Again, *φρόνησις* must not be translated ‘prudence’ here; it is a synonym of *σοφία* in the sense of the higher wisdom. Professor Jowett’s remarks on these words in the index s. v. Wisdom (V 537) misrepresent their true relation. *σοφία*, he says, means wisdom “in the higher sense, the highest combination of virtue and intelligence,” while *φρόνησις* has “the narrower significance of prudence or forethought and contains less of the moral element.” Now, the two words, as we have just seen, are sometimes used interchangeably by Plato as synonyms of the ‘higher wisdom.’ But *σοφός* and *σοφία* throughout Greek literature have properly nothing to do with morality; they denote cleverness, intellectual ability and the skill of the specialist. The dramatists and Plato sometimes employ *σοφία* for the wisdom which is virtue, but Plato always with the consciousness that he is wresting a good word from the service of the wicked (Theaet. 176 C D). *φρόνησις* and *φρονεῖν*, on the contrary, from the beginning belong to the world of conduct which in its higher aspect is the world of morality. Primitive morality was almost wholly prudential, and this fact, and the English associations of ‘prudence,’ have misled Professor Jowett. But to Plato *σοφία* was more contaminated with the associations of unscrupulous cleverness than *φρόνησις* with those of selfish prudence. The translator, indeed, not infrequently fails to appreciate the Platonic nicety of language in ethical matters. E. g. Rep. 389 D *σωφροσύνης δὲ ὡς πλεῖσθαι οὐ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέγιστα*, etc., is rendered “are not the chief elements of temperance *speaking generally*,” etc. But *ὡς πλεῖσθαι* means ‘for the multitude’ and is half contemptuous. So in 442 E *τὰ φορτικὰ αὐτῷ προσφέροντες* is more than a ‘few commonplace instances.’ Emerson somewhere, speaking of an antinomian higher rule of life, says “Does any man think this rule too easy—let him keep its commandments one day.” Plato’s meaning is that the higher philosophic virtue will stand all the vulgar tests of ordinary morality which it is almost an insult to apply; cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. X 8 (*ἡ φορτικὸς ὁ ἐπαινος*); for, as Leslie Stephens says: “the moral law can be stated unconditionally when it is stated in the form ‘be this,’ but not when stated in the form ‘do this.’” Again, in Republic 430 C *ἀποδέχομαι τοίνυν τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πολιτικὴν γε*—the rendering “and if you add the words ‘of a citizen’ you will not be far wrong” fails to bring out the force of the limitation. Socrates wishes to restrict his definition to that demotic virtue (intermediate between

the mere virtue of temperament and that of philosophy), ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυίαν ἀνεὺ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ, which he so disparages in the *Phaedo* (82 B) and of which in its higher form the Platonic statesman who plays providence with the vulgar sort is in a sense the creator—δημιουργός (*Rep.* 500 D). Jowett renders τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν (*Phaedo* 82 B) "the civil and social virtues," etc., and we accordingly find temperance duly entered in the index as "a social virtue," a statement which would sadly bewilder any modern student of ethics who should attempt to "hold the eel of science by the tail" by index-learning.

This index, covering 175 pages, is a piece of work for which all who use these volumes should be grateful to Mr. Knight. Even scholars familiar with the Platonic text will find their account in such articles as those under Athens, Education, Etymology, Homer, Greek Life, Model City, Music, Personification, Proverbs, Socrates. And in the brief, pregnant résumés of leading points of Platonic doctrine contributed by the translator (under the entries Courage, Education, God, Ideas, Justice, Music, Dialectic, Soul, the State, Temperance, Virtue, Wisdom) the English reader will find as good a primer of Platonism as he could desire, expressed in Professor Jowett's happiest style. Nevertheless, an index made from an English translation, and a translation as 'free' as this one, inevitably contains much that is misleading. It is constantly associating things whose sole bond of connection is the translator's caprice in his choice of English synonyms, and it thus serves as a most effective demonstrator of the misconceptions to which seemingly innocent infidelities may give rise. Suppose, to take the first example that comes to hand, that the Professor of Psychology consults the article 'Attention.' He will be referred to *Euthyphron* 13 for the "various meanings of the word" and to *Theaetetus* 153 B for the doctrine that attention "is a motion of the soul." And if he is a rash man he may credit Plato with a vague anticipation of the theories of Ribot. But if he is prudent he will consult his colleague the Greek Professor, who will tell him that in *Euthyphron* 13 it has pleased Professor Jowett to translate by attention a word (θεραπεία) which means service, service of the gods, while in *Theaetetus* 153 B the Greek for attention is μελέτη 'study-practice.' We have already seen that the Professor of Ethics would be sent to *Phaedo* 82 B for the doctrine that "temperance is a social virtue." Many similar erroneous suggestions and arbitrary associations of Platonic loci could be pointed out, the greater part of them due to the same cause. Thus the association (under "Art and the Conditions of Art") of *Phaedrus* 268-9 and *Laws* 4, 709 C is a mere equivocation on the word 'condition'; the loci collected under "argument, courtesy required in" were surely never brought into juxtaposition before; *Theaetetus* 201 E and *Timaeus* 51 C are not both statements of the doctrine that the "elements are names only"; the community of feeling ironically attributed to himself and Callicles by Socrates in *Gorgias* 481 D has nothing to do with that postulated as a social ideal, *Rep.* 5, 463; *Euthydemus* 296 cannot be cited for 'innate ideas'; that 'Induction is the source of knowledge' cannot be legitimately inferred from *Laws* 12, 965; *Phaedrus* 242 does not say that 'love is a mighty God,' for if it did it would contradict the *Symposium*, and Plato, except in translation, does not contradict himself—the statement is "love is either a god or something divine"; *Philebus* 31 B, 41 E, 49 A do not assign

pain to the mixed class, in contradiction of 28 A, etc., which assign it to the infinite; nor does Laws 3, 693 contradict Theaetetus 172 A in respect of the affirmation that 'expediency' (say rather 'utility') is the aim of the legislator.

I will conclude with a partial list of errors detected in the course of a hasty perusal of the principal dialogues. The list probably includes at least half of all the mistakes that a careful scrutiny would discover. I have not examined the Laws further than to note that many errors have been corrected and some still remain.

Republic.

341 οὐδὲν ὢν καὶ ταῦτα of course does not mean "and you failed."

344 E. This is now nearly right; but why is ἤτοι translated "rather" instead of "or else"?

404 B ἀπλῆ πον καὶ ἐπιεικὲς γυμναστικὴ means "not over-precise and rigid in its prescriptions," not merely "simple and good."

437 D ἐπιθυμιῶν τι φήσομεν εἶναι εἶδος κ. τ. λ.—not "admitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular class of desires, and out of them we will select hunger and thirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious of them"; but "In view of this, then, shall we say that desires are a (distinct) class (in the soul) and that the most clearly marked of them are those which we term thirst and hunger?" This, the only rendering that the Greek will bear, is confirmed by 439 E ταῦτα . . . δύο ἡμῖν ὀρίσθω εἶδη ἐν ψυχῇ ἐνόντα, which, by the way, is somewhat incorrectly translated: "Then let us *finally* determine that there are two principles existing in the soul."

464 E ἀνάγκην σωμάτων ἐπιμελεία τιθέντες—not "we shall make the protection of the person a matter of necessity," but "compelling them [by the indirect effect of our legislation, cf. 556 A ἀναγκάζων ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς πολίτας] to develop their muscle"; cf. 407 B ἡ περιττὴ αὐτῇ ἐπιμέλεια τοῦ σώματος.

473 A "I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? Does not the word express more than the fact, and must not the actual, whatever a man may think, always, in the nature of things, fall short of the truth?" This is completely "upset." The correct version would run: "Can anything be accomplished in deed exactly as it is expressed in word, or is there a natural necessity that action should less lay hold of truth and reality than diction, whatever some people may assert?" Plato is inverting the familiar Greek antithesis of word and deed and challenging the Democritean Λόγος ἔργον σκιά. "Words," the ὄργανον of the dialectician, embody more of the truth of the idea than the "deeds" of the practical man. Cf. Phaedo 100 A οὐ γὰρ πάννυ ξυγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις, where the thought is wholly misrepresented by Jowett's rendering: "For I am very far from admitting that he who contemplates existences through the medium of thought sees them only 'through a glass darkly' any more than he who considers them in action and operation." And as a result of this translation he tells us, with a reference to Phaedo 100 A (Intr. to Meno, vol. II, p. 13), that the ideas "are not more certain than facts, but they are equally certain," whatever that may mean.

488 E. The text here will always be doubtful. Sidgwick's οἰομένῳ (J. of P. X 275) is perhaps the best reading. Whatever the text, it is certain that it is the true pilot, not the mob, who doubts the possibility of uniting the pilot's art

with the politician's skill in getting control of the helm, "whether other people like it or not." The translator here takes a flying shot at the general meaning and misses it: "and that he must and will be the steerer, whether other people like it or not—the possibility of this union of authority with the steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts," etc.

490 D ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὠρισάμεθα; cf. 486 E μὴ δοκοῦμεν . . . οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα. The translation "which question of necessity brought us," etc., misses the point.

493 C. Not "except that the just and noble are the necessary," but "should apply the terms just and noble to (mere) necessities." There is a difference. So in 493 D read not "And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their own notions about the honorable and good," but "and yet as proof that these things [necessary accommodations to popular estimates] are really honorable and good, did you ever hear from one of them an argument that was not absurd?"

498 A πλησιάσαντες, κτέ. Not "when they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, take themselves off," but "after devoting themselves (for a time) to the hardest part of it," etc. The point is not that they are frightened away, but that they wrongly begin with the hardest part of the subject; cf. *infra*, 498 B.

523 C. Not "gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its opposite," but "no more affirms (shows) any one (quality or predicate) than its opposite."

525 B ἢ μηδέποτε λογιστικῶ γενέσθαι. The translation "and therefore he must be an arithmetician" is incomprehensibly wrong. Read: "or else [i. e. if he does not rise out of the sea of change by study of the abstract verities of mathematics] he can never become a true reckoner" (sc. in the 'calculations' of the philosophic reason).

526 E εἰάν τις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ἐπιχειρῇ τῷ λόγῳ τέμνειν. The translator makes an unnecessary mystery of this. His note is: "meaning either (1) that they integrate the number because they deny the possibility of fractions; or (2) that division is regarded by them as a process of multiplication, for the fractions of one continue to be units." The meaning is simply that in any mathematical calculation you must keep your adopted units consistently the same, although from another point of view they may not be units. Some power of abstraction is required to do this, for there is no object of sense that cannot be divided into parts; cf. James's *Psychology*, II 655. This imaginary mystery seems to haunt Professor Jowett. He alludes to it again, *Introduction to Timaeus*, III 386–87.

526 B C. Not "you will not easily find a more difficult study *and not many as difficult*," but "you will not find many studies more difficult, nor find them easily."

534 A. Not "let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of opinion and of intellect," but "let us pass over their objective correlates, the opinable that is and the intelligible, and their respective subdivisions."

540 B. Instead of "not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty," read "regarding it (however) as a necessary rather than as an honorable and desirable task." There is no suggestion of "heroism" and "duty" in the Greek.

553 D. Not "of all changes . . . there is none so speedy and sure as the conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one," but simply "this (the above described) is the quickest and surest conversion of," etc.

575 C. "a small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them are few in number." "Even" is not in the Greek and reverses the meaning.

576 D. Not "we must not allow ourselves to be panic-stricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is only a unit and may perhaps have a few retainers about him," but "let us not be dazzled by the aspect of the tyrant, who is only one man [so that, even if adopting for the moment the vulgar estimate, we deem him and his few retainers happy, this happiness cannot outweigh the misery of the majority], nor by (the seeming happiness of) his few familiars about his person." The translator has missed the connection of thought and the force of the Greek idiom here.

579 C. Commentators have, strangely, failed to note that τοῖς τοιοῦτοις κακοῖς is the measure of the excess of the unhappiness of the tyrant soul that attains its desire, compared with the tyrant soul that is confined to the life of a private citizen. "Amid evils such as these" is accordingly wrong.

581 C λέγωμεν τὰ πρῶτα, etc. Not "we may *begin* by assuming," etc., but "that the three primary classes," etc.

581 D E. Both text and translation here exhibit defective feeling for Greek idiom. Hermann's text, or something like it, is the only idiomatic one, and τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πᾶν πόρρω cannot possibly mean that the philosopher "is not so far indeed from the heaven of pleasure," but must express the philosopher's opinion of the pleasurable-ness of the lower pleasures compared with the higher.

607 A. Instead of "For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, *which by common consent have ever been deemed best*, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our state," read "pleasure and pain shall be the lords of your city, instead of law and the rule that the common reason shall from time to time have pronounced to be the best."

611 B οὐ βρόδιον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αἰδίων εἶναι σύνθετόν τε ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ κεχωρμένον συνθέσει, ὥς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἡ ψυχὴ. Instead of "The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements," read "It is not easy (possible) for a thing to be immortal that is compounded of many elements and not compounded in the fairest way, as now seemed to us to be the case with the soul." ὥς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη refers back to 603 D μυρίων τοιοῦτων ἐναντιωμάτων ἅμα γιγνομένων ἡ ψυχὴ γέμει ἡμῶν or to the repetition of the language of 603 D in 611 B, just above: ὥστε πολλῆς ποικιλίας . . . γέμειν, etc. This passage is generally misinterpreted.

Meno.

74 D E. Carelessness in the rendering of one sentence leads to positive error in its successor: "What is that lower nature which you designate as figure—which contains straight as well as round and is no more one than the other—that would be your mode of speaking!? Men. Yes, Soc., and in speaking thus you do not mean to say that the round is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round." The correct translation is: "which contains straight as well as round, so that round is no more (truly) figure than

is straight . . . and in speaking thus you do not mean that round is no more truly round than it is straight, nor that straight is no more truly straight than it is round."

75 C. *εἰεν* is wrongly transferred from Meno to Socrates.

92 A. "no, Socrates: the young men who gave their money to them [sc. the Sophists] were out of their minds, and their relations and guardians who entrusted the youth to the care of these men were still more out of their minds." The words *τούτων δ' ἐτι μᾶλλον οἱ τούτους ἐπιτρέποντες οἱ προσήκοντες* are misconstrued. They mean "and still more (mad) than these (the youths) their relatives, who permitted them (to resort to the Sophists)."

93 D E. Instead of "here was a teacher of virtue who you admit to be among the best men of the past," translate "This is the kind of teacher of virtue he was, and yet you admit that he was among," etc.

95 C. Instead of "I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to teach virtue," etc., read "This is just what I admire (approve) most in Gorgias, that he is never heard," etc. *ἀγαμαι* does not mean 'wonder.'

Protagoras.

310 D. "courageous madness" is very infelicitous for *τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν πτοίησιν*.

320 D *τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μίξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῇ κεράννυνται*. The last words do not mean "and various mixtures of both elements"; they are a periphrasis for the other two elements, air and water; cf. Timaeus 31-32, Phileb. 29 A B.

327 E. "and you, Socrates, are discontented" is infelicitous for *νῦν δὲ τρυφᾷς*.

336 E. The words "and this led Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the other side" are merely a plausible variation on the Platonic text, which simply says "and Alcibiades carries the pertinacity of the partisan into everything that he undertakes." Alcibiades does not take Socrates' part out of pure love of opposition.

346 B *καὶ ἐχθρας ἐκονοίους πρὸς ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις προστίθεσθαι* cannot possibly mean "in order that the odium which is necessarily incurred by them (the parents) may be increased." It is rather "and thus they (the sons) incur ill-will of their own accord, in addition to that which is unavoidable (through their parents' unhappy temper)."

346 E. The words *ὥστε τούτου γε ἔνεκα οὐδένα ἐπαινέσομαι* must, I think, mean "so that, so far as this goes (in respect of this), I shall have to praise no man." The words are the counterpart of *ὥστε μὴ ψέγειν* above. Simonides is willing not to censure the moderately good, and he will not waste his time seeking for a flawless man, and so, in the meantime, avoid the necessity of praising any. This shade of meaning escapes in Jowett's "In this sense I praise no man," which also fails to account for the future *ἐπαινέσομαι*.

356 E-357 C. The loose translation here does not bring out clearly the dialectical evolution of Socrates' thought, and in two instances falls into positive error. The translator ignores the difference between *ἡ μετρητική* (which, strictly speaking, deals with *μήκη*) and *μετρητική* or *μ. τις* any measuring of *ὑπερβολῆς* and *ἐνδείας*. To the middle of 353 E we are concerned with *ἡ μετρητική*. Then, on the hypothesis that salvation depended on the desire for more or less in relation to odd and even, Socrates shows that salvation would

then depend on (1) knowledge, (2) *μετρητική τις*, (3) to wit, *ἀριθμητική*. The translation does not bring this out, and in 357 A is erroneous. Instead of "what would be the saving principle of our lives? Would not knowledge? a knowledge of measuring when the question is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number when the question is of odd and even," read "would it not be knowledge (of some kind), and would it not be (further) a knowledge of measurement (*μετρητική τις*), inasmuch as (*ἐπειδὴ περ*) the art postulated (*ἡ τέχνη*) is an art concerned with excess and defect; and since, further (*ἐπειδὴ δὲ*), it is to be an art dealing with odd and even, can it be other than arithmetic?" (The specification is now complete.) These errors are repeated in the analogous passage, 357 A B. The third and actual hypothesis, Socrates continues, is that salvation depends on choice of more or less in pleasure and pain. The art of salvation is a *μετρητική*, because it deals with excess and defect (*ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὖσα*). *Being μετρητική*, it is necessarily *τέχνη* and *ἐπιστήμη*—what particular *ἐπιστήμη* we need not enquire. Jowett mistakes the force of the participle *οὖσα* here as he did that of its parallel *ἐπειδὴ περ* above, and renders: "Seeing that the salvation of human life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and pains—in the choice of the more and the fewer—must not this measuring be a consideration of excess and defect and equality in relation to each other?"

Phaedrus.

235 A. "And I was doubting whether this [sc. the rhetorical manner] could have been defended by Lysias himself." *τοῦτο* is here wrongly referred to τῆς ῥητορικῆς. It refers back to τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος, etc., as the context would show, were it not for the loose translation of τὰ δέοντα by "sentiments."

242 E. "For if Love be, as he surely is, a divinity." Plato would not thus contradict the doctrine of the Symposium. Socrates says: "A god, or *something divine!*"

244 C. "rational investigation of futurity" is misleading for "investigation of futurity by men in their senses." The contemptuous tone of *ἀνθρωπίνῃ οἰήσει* is lost in the reading "to human thought." Hence the reader of the translation not being informed that *οἰήσεις* is a term of disparagement will not understand the statement that follows: that prophecy is more august than augury, both in *name* and fact.

253 A καὶ τούτων δὲ τὸν ἐρώμενον αἰτιώμενοι does not mean "the qualities of their god they attribute to the beloved," but "they regard the beloved as the cause of this (experience)."

253 D ἀληθίνης δόξης ἑταῖρος is not "the follower of true glory," but "the associate of right opinion." The charioteer has knowledge like the *νοῦς* or the guardians, the good steed right opinion like the disciplined *θυμός* or the auxiliaries. The translation obscures an important Platonic doctrine.

269 E. Not "I conceive Pericles to have been the most accomplished of rhetoricians. Phaedr. What of that?", but "I conceive that there was a reason for Pericles having been the most accomplished of rhetoricians. Phaedr. Why so?"

270 D ὅπερ ἐφ' ἐνός, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἐφ' ἐκάστων is not "see first in the case of one and then in the case of all of them," but "see, as in the case (supposed) of a

simple unit, so in the case of each part of a compound." The following words: *τῷ τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν*, etc., cannot be construed "What is the power of acting or being acted upon which makes each and all of them to be what they are," but "wherein each of them is naturally adapted to act or be acted upon (by anything)." Cf. 271 A *ὅτῳ τι ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν*.

Lysis 217 E καὶ τὸ μήτε κακὸν ἄρα μήτ' ἀγαθὸν ἐνίστε κακοῦ παρόντος οὕτω κακὸν ἔστιν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον γέγονεν. The last clause does not mean "and that has happened before now," but "and sometimes it has become so (sc. evil)." *ἔστι δ' ὅτε* is correlative with *ἐνίστε*.

Laches 189 A. Not "Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil," but "Let him (Solon) concede me this, that the teacher himself be a good man, or I shall appear a dullard, because I shall take no pleasure in his teaching."

Euthydemus 295 A. "You are incredulous, Socrates. Yes, I said, and I might well be incredulous, if I did not know you to be wise men"; render rather "Yes, I said, of all save your exceeding cleverness."

Cratylus 425 B. "and we must see whether the primary and also whether the secondary elements are rightly given or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction." This is either erroneous or so 'free' as to be nearly meaningless. Socrates is not speaking of 'elements,' but of words, and he says that it is a sorry business to string together etymologies without distinguishing primitive and secondary formations, and analyzing the primitive words into their phonetic elements.

436 C ἢ οὐκ ἐνεθέεις αὐτὸς λέγων ὡς πάντα κατὰ ταῦτόν καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτόν ἐγίγνετο τὰ ὀνόματα. Not "did you ever observe, in speaking, that all the words which you utter have a common character and purpose?", but "or did not you yourself observe, while you were speaking [sc. the preceding etymologies], that all the words appeared (were turning out) to be made on the same plan and to the same result?"

437 D E. Not "and when he has duly sifted them, all the rest will follow," but "and when that has been duly tested, then it must appear that the rest is in accord with it."

439 D 'Αρ' οὐν οἶόν τε προσεῖπεν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ αἰὲ ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκείνὸ ἐστίν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, etc. Not "and can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing away, and is first this and then that; must not the same thing be born and retire and vanish while the word is in our mouths?", but "Is it then possible to predicate of it rightly, if it is ever vanishing, first that it is 'that,' and next that it is of such or such a nature, or must it not ever, while the words are in our mouths, straightway become other, and slip away and no longer be the same?"

The translation of the *Timaeus* has been greatly improved in accuracy, harmony and simplicity with the aid of Mr. Archer-Hind's edition and the criticisms it called forth. Corrections suggested in these pages seem to have been adopted at 22 E, 24 B, 40 B, 52 B C, 55 A, and elsewhere. The sentence about the unmeaning employment of particles is silently dropped from the Introduction, but the exact force of the particles is still frequently ignored. Cf. *οὖν*, 48 A; *δεῖ δὲ* . . . *τόδε* (*τότε* is wrong) *γάρ* . . . *τιθέμεθα δ' οὖν*, 53 E-54 A; *τόδε γε μὴν*, etc., 63 E; *οὖν*, 65 C.

77 B C πάσχον γὰρ διατελεῖ πάντα, στραφέντι δ' αὐτῷ, etc. These words are still wrongly rendered: "For this nature is always in a passive state, revolving in and about itself, repelling the motion from without and using its own," etc. I gave the correct translation after Zeller (A. J. P. X 74) some time ago, and showed why the force of the negative must be extended to the participle στραφέντι. There is really no doubt about the matter, and I have nothing to add except a reference to 64 B πάσχει μόνον.

50 A. Does not the parallelism μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο αὐ—μόνον ἐκεῖνο αὐ indicate that ἐκεῖνο in both cases refers to the πανδεχέας? In that case μηδὲν τούτων is resumptive of τὸ δὲ ὁποιοῦν τι, etc., not of τοῦτο and τόδε above, and the translation must run in outline: "the πανδεχέας only (μόνον ἐκεῖνο) is to receive the predicates 'this' and 'that,' but of the predicates 'hot,' 'cold' and other pairs of opposites, the πανδεχέας none (μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο) is to receive. This view is supported by the language of 51 A *in fine*.

Professor Jowett repeats his assertion that "the principle of the other, which is the principle of plurality and variation in the Timaeus, has nothing in common with the other of the Sophist, which is the principle of determination," and adds in this edition a page of vague and misleading reflections on the meaning of οὐσία in the ψυχογονία. To this I reply: (1) There is nothing in the Timaeus except the unintelligible use of θάτερον for the joints to suggest an identification of θάτερον with "the principle of irregularity and dissension . . . the residuum of chaos" . . . "the source of evil seen in the errors of man," etc. The passages (47 E sqq., 33 B) in which the 'residuum' is described do not mention or in any way imply θάτερον; and so far from manifesting itself in the errors of man, the circle of the θάτερον normally produces right opinion (37 B); (2) The functions of the circles of the same and the other in the souls of the universe and of man are to predicate sameness and difference rightly (44 B, 37 B C), and this, expressed in almost identical language, is the final object of the long investigation of ταῦτον θάτερον and οὐσία in the Sophist 260 C D; (3) Nor need the doctrine of οὐσία and its intermixture with ταῦτον and θάτερον occasion any difficulty. They are intermingled as in the Sophist 254 E δύο γένη τινὲ—ξυμμιγνυμένω μὴν ἐκείνοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰεὶ (cf. 259 A). There are three or four οὐσῖαι, the οὐσῖαι of ἕτερον, ταῦτον and ὅν, each taken in abstract isolation, and the compound οὐσία or relative being in which they are all combined. The text of the Timaeus, as I have already shown in these pages, leaves some doubt as to the imagined details and stages of the combining process. But there is not the slightest doubt concerning the meaning of the ψυχογονία as a whole. Like is known by like. Accordingly Plato fantastically compounds the soul of the categories which the analysis of the Sophist found to be implied in all cognition; and this inextricable and doubly compound interminglement in the soul is symbolic of their strange mutual interpenetration in the dialectical process of thought (Sophist 240). That is all there is of it, and there is no occasion for rhetoric and mysticism, nor need we enquire (p. 422) whether Plato obtained his circles of the same and the other from some earlier thinker.

The five metaphysical dialogues in the fourth volume are very correctly translated. A simpler, less conventional English would have made the connection of thought clearer in many places (e. g. Parm. 142 E, 147 C D),

but Professor Campbell's revisions seem to have left practically no errors in the Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman, and a hasty perusal detects very few renderings in the Parmenides and Philebus that can be pronounced positively wrong.

Parmen. 156 D Ἄρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἀτοπον τοῦτο, etc. Instead of "and does this strange thing really exist?" is it not possible to translate: "is this, then, the strange thing? (of which we were speaking)." The question does not seem to be of the existence of the *ἐξαίφνης*, but only whether it is the mysterious moment postulated by the argument.

Parmen. 157 B οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ περ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός ἐστιν. Not "inasmuch as there are things other than the one," but "inasmuch as they are other than the one."

162 A. The translation is improved here, but as the translator still retains the received text, he is obliged to "construe through a stone wall," in order to get any sense. I have endeavored to show (A. J. P. XII 349-53) that a transposition of one *μή* restores the sense and grammar to the passage which Aristotle found in it. But it is idle to argue the question so long as Greek scholars cannot be got to say whether it is or is not possible to construe: (*μετέχον*) *μή* οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ *μή* εἶναι *μή* ὄν, "does not partake of the not-being of not-being." I hold that this construction is on its face impossible, and that we are therefore forced to interpret the passage in some other way.

Theaetet. 165 A *μή* προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθισμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. Not, I think, "if a person does not attend to the meaning of terms as they are commonly used in argument," but "which is the (careless) way in which we are for the most part accustomed to affirm and deny (say yes or no to any question)." Cf. Euthyd. 276 A sqq., where Cleinias is tripped because Socrates fails to warn him to be on his guard, *εὐλαβηθῆναι*, and Socrates' subsequent comment, *σὲ δὲ τοῦτο . . . διαλέλθε, ταῦτ' ὄνομα ἐπ' ἀνθρώποις ἐναντίως ἔχουσι κείμενον* (278 B).

Theaetet. 177 E. Not "And as far as she has an opinion, the state imposes all laws with a view to the greatest expediency," but "to the best of her opinion and belief."

182 A. The translation is loose and the idiomatic force of *ἔτι* is missed. Instead of "and that the patient *ceases to be* a perceiving power and becomes a percipient," read "and that the patient is no longer (when we push our analysis to this point) to be regarded as (abstract) perception, but as a percipient" (accepting, as Jowett tacitly does, the reading *αἰσθανόμενον*). Below, in 182 B, the translation omits as surplusage the words *ἐν μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι*, which cannot be spared.

Politicus 266 C. "Human beings have come out in the same class with the freest and airiest of creation and have been running a race with them." The alternative interpretation, mentioned in the footnote, that pigs, not birds, are meant, is right. The English reader will conceive an exalted idea of the flexibility of the Greek language from the remark "according to this explanation we must translate the words above, 'freest and airiest of creation,' 'worthiest and laziest of creation.'" But it is not really possible to translate *γενναϊοτάτῳ* καὶ *ἁμα* *εὐχερεστάτῳ* in either of these ways, but only (with Campbell) "grandest and least fastidious." Accordingly the bird-catcher below, "who, of all mankind, is most of an adept at the airy life," must be transformed

into a swineherd whose nature has been subdued to what it works in and who is therefore not squeamish or over-nice.

Philebus 19 C ἀλλὰ καλὸν μὲν τὸ ξύμπαντα γινώσκειν τῷ σώφρονι, δεύτερος δ' εἶναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτὸν. The translation "Happy would be the wise man if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him is that he should know himself," is 'correct' in a sense, but does not convey the meaning. The passage is a subtly moralized Platonic version of the Hesiodic οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ, ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακείνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται. Render: "A fine thing is universal knowledge—to the man of sober soul [without σωφροσύνη even ἐπιστήμη is not a good], but the next best thing is not to be unaware of one's own ignorance."

Phileb. 30 D E. "That mind *is the parent* of that class of the four which we call the cause of all." Even if we adopt the reading γενοίστης, the word should not be rendered 'parent,' but 'kin(sman).' νοῦς is not the parent of αἰτία in the Platonic scheme.

33 B. "If so, the Gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have either joy or sorrow." 'If so' is misleading and not in the Greek. The sentence is an independent confirmation of the preceding argument, not an inference from it.

Phileb. 59 C ἐκείνων ὅτι μάλιστα ἐστὶ ξυγγενές. These words, I think, are wrongly related; instead of "or if not, at any rate what is most akin to them has," read "or if not, at any rate with that which is most akin to them."

66 D. "I understand; this third libation, Socrates, of which you spoke, meant a recapitulation." It does not seem to have been observed that this is the *third* recapitulation; cf. 19 C, 60 A.

Phaedo 99 A. "These muscles and bones of mine would have gone off to Megara . . . if they had been moved only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen the better and nobler part," etc. Render rather: "borne thither by (my) idea of what was best, if I had not thought it better and more honorable," etc. Socrates is explicitly denying all causal initiative to the parts of the body, and, though in other connections the 'body' and the 'flesh' might be said to have its own idea of good, it is grotesque to attribute such an idea to the bones and sinews here.

Gorgias 509 B. "and will not the worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends?" Rather: "is not this the defence, the inability to provide which for self or family or friends is the most disgraceful?"

Misprints are rare: ἐυὼν ἐπαίνῃ for ἐκὼν (I 124); Simmais for Simmias (II 256); Charimdes (I 13). The reference Laws 693, s. v. animal, should be Laws 963.

By a singular oversight, a characteristic sentence about Hebraism and Hellenism from the Preface to Matthew Arnold's Culture and Anarchy, is assigned to "Sir Wm. W. Hunter, Preface to Orissa." Sir Wm. Hunter merely quotes the passage as a motto for his book.

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PAUL SHOREY.

REPORTS.

ZEITSCHRIFT DER DEUTSCHEN MORGENLÄNDISCHEN GESELLSCHAFT.¹

Vol. XLV.

Pp. 1-35. In Nepāl there are about thirty living non-Aryan dialects, most of which have been largely influenced by the culture and language of the ruling Indian dynasties. Chief among these dialects is the Newārī, calling itself justly Nepālabhākha or 'dialect of Nepāl'; for, unlike the Dénwār, Pahi and other tongues spoken in the country of the Himālaya, it has developed into a literary language. It shows all the advantages derived from the influence of the foreign, highly-cultured language and literature of the Sanskrit nation, viz. an enlargement of its thesaurus by concrete and abstract ideas and conceptions not met with among uncivilized people, and, as a natural result, a greater facility of expression. Its main shortcoming is an over-great dependence upon the language of the representative of the higher culture. A. Conrady is working on a grammar of this language, and publishes, for the present, a short abstract of it, with specimens of the literature, based on a number of MSS written in the Newārī language and consisting mostly of commentaries on Sanskrit texts. Of words borrowed from the Sanskrit, three distinct periods can be distinguished. The Newārī belongs to the Indo-Chinese family of languages.

Pp. 36-96. Sejjid Moḥammad Bey [ibn] 'Oṭmān el Wanāl Galāl, one of the best representatives of modern Arabic poetry, was born Sept. 1829, in Kefr eṭ-Ṭammā'in. He translated the fables of LaFontaine and other French works. As a result of his Molière studies he published, in 1873 (1290 H.), an Arabic translation of Tartuffe, under the title of Eṣ-ṣeḡ Matlūf. A second, revised edition appeared in 1890, together with translations of 'les femmes savantes,' 'l'école des maris' and 'l'école des femmes.' They present one of the best specimens, philological as well as literary, of the Arabic dialect of Modern Egypt. The scene has been skilfully shifted from France to Cairo and its surroundings. K. Vollers, introducing this poet to the readers of the ZDMG, prints in Latin transcription his famous Tartuffe, together with a glossary of difficult words and phrases not found in Dozy's supplement and other dictionaries.

Pp. 97-143. The history of the seven viziers as found in Sindbādh is acknowledged to be the original of that of the ten viziers, which is found in almost all Oriental languages. It is wellnigh impossible to reconstruct the Arabic original text, owing to the comparatively recent date of the MSS. The only Persian text thus far known is that of Ousely-Kazimirski, which differs greatly from the Arabic. The language is simple and straightforward,

¹ See A. J. P. XII 101.

and proves it to be of recent date. Theodor Nöldeke calls attention to a much older Persian recension of the story, found in Codex 593 (L) of the Leyden Library, written by Jūsuf b. As'ad, and completed on Wednesday, Sept. 5, 1296. The language and style are bombastic and flowery. Nöldeke publishes part of the text with a Latin transliteration, and German translation and notes.

Pp. 144-59; LVI 54-92. Georg Bühler continues his contributions to the Interpretation of the Açoka-inscriptions, publishing the Sanskrit text of the seven pillar-edicts in the Delhi-Sivalik, Delhi-Mirat, Allahabād, Lauriya-Ararāj, Lauriya-Navandgarh and Rurpūria version, side by side. With the exception of the Delhi-Mirat and the Allahabād versions, they are all in excellent condition. His edition differs, therefore, but slightly in text from those of his predecessors, but more so in translation and the commentary.


Pp. 161-71. Irdjā, in the meaning of 'to defer, postpone,' is the verb from which is derived the name of the Mordjites, i. e. Mohammadans who prefer to postpone their judgment of a sinning Moslem until the great day of judgment, representing thereby the liberal, advanced wing of Mohammadan theology. That this is the correct definition is shown by G. van Vloten in several quotations from the poems of Thābit Qoṭna and Naṣr ibn Seijār.

Pp. 172-86. Wellhausen reviews favorably Ch. M. Doughty's *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, during 1876-78, 2 vols., pp. 623 and 690, Cambridge, 1888. Doughty's main object was a visit to the rock-tombs and the inscriptions of Madāin Ḥalīh. His work is one of the best contributions to an accurate knowledge of the history and geography, literature and philology of Arabia.—De Goeje recommends L. Abel's *Sammlung von Wörterverzeichnissen als Vorarbeiten zu einem Wörterbuch der alten arabischen Poesie*. I. Die sieben Mu'allaqāt; Text, vollständiges Wörterverzeichniss, deutscher und arabischer Commentar. (Berlin, 1891.) The review contains a number of additions to the glossary, published by Abel, and several corrections.

Pp. 187-203. F. Spiegel shows that the Avesta and the Shāhnāme, or Book of the Kings, by Firdūsi, have not only many points in common relative to the Iranian legendary history, but also no less important points of difference in chronology, sociology and other topics of interest. In the Shāhnāme the king occupies the first and most respected place, in the Avesta only a secondary position.

Pp. 204-20. F. Bollensen sends a number of critical notes on the Rigveda, with special reference to F. Max Müller's treatment of the Marut hymns in 'The Sacred Hymns of the Brahmanas, translated and explained,' vol. I; London, 1869.

Pp. 221-38. Of special interest to the student of Semitic comparative philology are Aug. Müller's notes on Lagarde's Uebersicht über die Bildung der . . . Nomina, and J. Barth's Nominalbildung.¹ He prints several additions

and corrections to Lagarde's statements concerning  (! on p. 92, 1)

¹ See A. J. P. XII 107-8.

and طَفَشَ (33, 27). Acknowledging the merits of the many reviews of these works, he shows that the reviewers have apparently overlooked some of the most important facts; above all that Lagarde and Barth both begin with the same proposition, viz. "dass eine und dieselbe Form in verschiedenen Einzelfällen auch sehr verschiedenen Ursprungs sein kann"; the same method is observed, the same general results are obtained; the difference being only in the details. The chief attraction of both is their great originality and the novelty of their methods, which Müller carefully describes, illustrates and compares. It is only in the details that we notice a difference in method as well as result. These cases are specially treated by M., who shows that Barth is a philologist, registering the facts and letting them speak for themselves, while Lagarde enters into the philosophy of language and deals with ultimate problems. Two desiderata in Semitic philology, so happily and abundantly supplied in Indogermanic linguistics, are statistics and linguistic chronology. This gap ought to be filled speedily by some of the many younger Semitic scholars. Müller closes by calling attention to the remarkable similarity in the relation between noun and verb in the Semitic languages and the Turkish.

Pp. 239-44. In his discussion of amber in the commerce of the Middle Ages, K. G. Jacob had disputed a number of statements on this subject made by O. Schneider.¹ The latter now defends his position, showing the extreme weakness of Jacob's arguments, which Jacob tries to strengthen on pp. 691-92.

Pp. 245-91. Paul Horn prints a second instalment of the Persian text of the Memoirs of the Shâh Tahmâsp I of Persia (c. 1563 A. D.), consisting of extracts from the historical work of Mohammad Mehdi Ibn Hâdi Širâzi (found in the Berlin MS, Cod. Sprenger 204).

Pp. 292-94. W. Pertsch sends a descriptive list of 32 coins given to the D. M. G. by the heirs of the late H. L. Fleischer.

Pp. 295-300. M. Schreiner points out that among the Mediaeval Chronicles and Chronological Notes (edited by Ad. Neubauer, Oxford, 1887) that of Josef b. Isak Sambari contains the largest amount of thus far unknown legendary stories concerning Jewish rabbis and grammarians. Josef's source is usually Al-Makrizi's Account of the Egyptian Synagogues.

Pp. 301-2. The same writer has a note on As-Šabtî, son of Harûn-ar-Rašîd, supplementing Nöldeke's article in vol. 43, 327.²

Pp. 303-8. Th. Aufrecht, The Prâṇdhamanoramâ of Divâkara (1627 A. D.); being a commentary to the Jâtakapaddhati of Keçava Daivajña (c. 1490 A. D.), throws light on several obscure astrological writings. Biographical and bibliographical notes on Keçava and Divâkara are added. Aufrecht also explains 1) santya = saṁantya; 2) hîḍ = hîḍas (Rigveda) 3) Bhaṭṭojî must have taught as early as 1620; 4) on Kāvya-parīkshâ; 5) Paṇini's poem Iāmbavatīvijaya.

Pp. 309-42. S. Fraenkel bestows high praise on Nöldeke's Beiträge zur Geschichte des Alexanderromans (Denkschriften der kaiserl. Akademie der

¹ Vol. 43, 353; A. J. P. XII 103.

² A. J. P. XII 103.

Wiss. in Wien, Bd. XXXVII, 5 (Wien, 1890).—H. Hirschfeld reviews A Commentary on the Book of Daniel, by Jepheth ibn Ali the Karaite, edited and translated by D. S. Margoliouth (Oxford, 1891).—Favorable mention by G. H. Schils of C. de Harlez' *Ili, cérémonial de la Chine antique* (Paris, 1890), and *L'école philosophique moderne de la Chine* (Bruxelles, 1890).—F. Hommel announces *Register und Nachträge zu der 1889 erschienenen Uebersicht über die Bildung der . . . Nomina von P. de Lagarde* (aus dem 37. Bande der Abh. der k. Ges. der Wiss. zu Göttingen, 1891, pp. 76). The index is carefully made and the addenda are of great importance.

Pp. 343-60. K. Vollers sends three contributions: 1. Additions to the articles on the Zâr, by de Goeje and Nöldeke, in ZDMG 44, 480 and 701.¹ 2. On the vocalic change in Arabic words borrowed from other languages, explaining e. g. why in Arabic loan-words an *ʔ* is often found in the place of the general Semitic *ʕ* or the Greek soft breathing. 3. *Simmâwl*, the poisoner, whose name popular etymology has connected with *sim* 'poison,' is a distortion of *simâwl*.

Pp. 361-94. A. Sprenger criticises Hamadâni's description of the Arabian peninsula and the publication of this work by D. H. Müller. It is practically a continuation of the well-known controversy against the famous traveller Eduard Glaser and a defence of Müller against the latter.

Pp. 395-402. C. Snouck-Hargrouje sends an Arabic text, with German translation and commentary, referring to slave-trade in Singapore at the present time. The document is an inquiry sent a few years ago by a pious Arabian living in Singapore to a learned countryman of his residing in Batavia. The answer of the latter is given in a German translation without the text. S. shows the impossibility of suppressing the slave-trade by decrees and laws rather than by the education and moral elevation of the masses.

Pp. 403-29. H. Vambery describes the intellectual life of Persian women, based on a MS of Mahmud Kažar (born 1799), consisting of a series of poems in eleven sections, called *Mažmas Mahmud* (= the Miscellanies of Mahmud). It is this, one of the best specimens of modern Persian literature, throwing a bright light on the inner history of the splendid reign of Feth Ali Šah. Section 5, called *Nakli Mežlir* = Society-report, i. e. a description of the person and work of Persian poetesses, was written at Nihawend in 1825 (1241 H.), and contained 3 subdivisions: 1) the royal princesses, 2) the women of the royal harem, and 3) the poetesses of the Iranian countries. Extracts in Persian, with German translation, show the superiority of the Persian women in intellect and wit over their Mohammadan sisters in Arabia, Turkey, Middle Asia and Hindustan.

Pp. 429-34. Examining M. de Clercq's catalogue of a collection of Sassanian gems (Paris, 1890), Paul Horn discovers and corrects a number of deficiencies in the text written by M. J. Menant, with the assistance of M. Ed. Drouin.

Pp. 435-38. L. von Schroeder calls attention to the peculiar accentuation of the last six leaves of the Vienna Kâthaka MS, containing the 35th Sthânaka,

¹ See A. J. P. XII 107.

treating of the *Prāyaççitti*. The *Vedāta* is marked by a vertical stroke below the syllable and the genuine *Svarita* by a small circumflex, also beneath the line.

Pp. 438-46. M. Steinschneider, quoting *Fihrist*, p. 312: "Apollonius of Tyana (or *Balinās*) was the earliest writer about talismans, and his work on this subject is famous among us," states that Apollonius is reported to have been the author of works on mysticism, magic and alchemy. On magic he is said to have written six works of which Arabic translations in MS are existing. Some of these evidently belong to Apollonius (Pergaeus) the Mathematician. Steinschneider also gives additions to his article on Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia* among the Arabians (see vol. 37, 477; A. J. P. V 529).

Pp. 454-64. Ernst Leumann expresses his thanks to Sanskrit students and public libraries for their liberality in lending him Sanskrit MSS, and offers, in return, the free use of any MS in his possession, of which he prints a complete list, in three sections.

Pp. 465-92. A. Müller and A. Socin discuss H. Thorbecke's literary remains and H. L. Fleischer's lexicographical material, both presented to the D. M. G.

Pp. 493-500. Up to the year 1677 Hebrew Bibles were very expensive in Germany and full of mistakes. In that year Balth. Christ. Wust, of Frankfurt, undertook to publish a more reliable and, at the same time, cheaper edition. He engaged for this purpose David Clodius, born 1644, and from 1671 Professor of Oriental Languages at Giessen, as chief editor. As second proof-reader and corrector he secured Leo Simon, Dr. Med. and Rabbi in Mainz, whose life and work, literary and social activity, are described by David Kaufmann.

Pp. 501-10. W. Bacher has a very interesting review of J. Fürst's *Glossarium Graeco-Hebraeum, oder der griechische Wörterschatz der jüdischen Midraschwerke. Ein Beitrag zur Kultur- und Alterthumskunde* (Strassburg, 1891).

Pp. 511-76. The *Waqf*-right from the point of view of the *Sari'at-right*, as interpreted by the *hanefite* school, is discussed by J. Kresmárik as a contribution to the study of the Islamite Law. *Waqf* or *Wakuf* means a pious foundation for religious or charitable purposes. Their great importance lies not so much in the wealth that they represent, but rather in the fact that they serve those religious and benevolent ends the want of which is felt by all classes and for which, owing to the peculiar organization of the Muhammadan commonweal, little or nothing is done by the state government or the communities. Poor-associations, mosques, schools, hospitals, aqueducts are maintained and provided for by the *Waqf*.

Pp. 577-91. Julius Weber, a missionary residing in the Northwestern *Himálaya*, publishes, with a preface by Georg Huth, the Tibetan text of the Buddhist *sūtra* of the 'Eight manifestations,' with a German translation and notes by himself and Huth.

Pp. 592-619. Julius Wellhausen, in his book *Reste arabischen Heidentums* (p. 217), maintains that there are only a few genuine Arabic names of stars,

while most of them are borrowed from the Greek. Unfortunately, he does not mention any special names. F. Hommel examines the Arabic names of stars, and especially of the moon-stations, and comes to the conclusion that their origin is Semitic and their age much greater than admitted by Wellhausen. Thus the constellation *banû Nâš* is really 'banû an 'Âš,' the 'an' (= han) being the old article before 'alif and 'âyin; 'Âš is the עשׁ of Job = Syr. ܐܝܬܐ (= Arcturus); again 'Al'ayyûq (= capella) is the Babylonian *iqû* (*iqû* being the god of the star *aškar* = capella), which originally is = 'unêqu (goat); 'al'ayyûq properly = 'the goatherd' (cf. the *ἄνιοχος* of the Greeks); *Simâk* (virgo) is also a word found in Babylonia, where we have *šumuk šamê*; *samâk* = pisces is the result of a secondary development. The name of the sixteenth moon-station, *azzubânay*, is the Babylonian *zibânitu* = *χηλαί*. Of Semitic origin is also the name of Sirius and Prokyon (= the two si'ray), corresponding to the Babylonian *Kakkab Kak-ban* (star of the weapon of the bow) and *Kakkab Kak-si-di* (= *mešri* = north). Hommel shows that long before the sixth century of our era the Bedouins had known the names of the moon-stations and the stars, and that their origin points to Assyria and Babylonia, whence they were brought to the other Semitic nations, as well as to the Greeks and Romans.

Pp. 620-28. R. von Stackelberg's *Iranica* treat of, 1. Rustam who is called a *Sagzi* = Σάκης (i. e. of *Sejestân*); 2. The Iranian *ροξόρης* legend of *Aršak*, the son of *Valaršak*. It is simply the Armenian version of the Avestan story of *Erexša*, the archer = Neo-Persian *Âriš* (*Firdûsi*); 3. Contributions to the knowledge of the Ossetan religious folklore.

Pp. 629-81 contain a part of the Sanskrit text of *Dinālāpanikācukasaptati*, with German translation by R. Schmidt, describing the parrot (*çuka*) as teacher and counsellor of man.

Pp. 682-84. P. v. Bradke denies W. Neisser's assertion (Bezz. Beitr. XVII 244) that *ōman*, *ōmanvant* and *avant* are pre-Vedic forms preserved in the present text of the *Veda*.

Pp. 685-90. Ign. Goldziher has a note on the 'jinnat' (= *δαίμόνια*) of the Arabic poets.

Pp. 693-712. Favorable reviews by Th. Nöldeke of K. Ahrens' *Das Buch der Naturgegenstände* (Kiel, 1892) and by Im. Löw of R. Payne-Smith's *Thesaurus Syriacus* (Oxonii, 1890), fasc. VII.

W. MUSS-ARNOLT.

REVUE DE PHILOGIE. Vol. XV.

No. 1.

1. Pp. 1-5. Henri Weil discusses critically a few passages in *Lysias περὶ τῆς πολιτείας*, and also in the *Lysias* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, where this speech is preserved. The remarks are characterized by the well-known penetration of the author.

2. Pp. 6-13. *Laeviana*, by Louis Havet,—a critical discussion of a dozen fragments of *Laevius*. The article contains valuable metrical observations, especially in regard to *synaphea*.

3. Pp. 14-33. Popular Latin versification in Africa (Commodianus and Verecundus), by L. Vernier. After a brief review of what has been done by others on the subject, the author institutes a careful and methodical investigation. He concludes that the peculiarities of the prosody under discussion are neither isolated facts nor aimless blunders, but are all due to three great principles or processes that afterwards changed Latin into Romance: the suppression of unaccented shorts before or after the tone-syllable, and the shortening of unaccented longs—processes which took one *tempus* from words; the recession of the accent, which led to the same result; finally, analogy, which, contrary to usual laws, sometimes caused shorts to be lengthened. With the uncertain material resulting from these processes and the consequent loss of acute perception of quantity, the poets tried to imitate the hexameters of classical Latin; but they read these with their own corrupt pronunciation. Spondees, for instance, when the *ἄρσις* was not an accented syllable, were trochees. Hence the model had been spoiled, and the material with which the mould was cast was inadequate. They were attempting to imitate the inimitable. The author cites many examples to illustrate his views, and scans a considerable number of verses. He admits that sometimes the same verse can be scanned in different ways, and that it is not possible always to see at a glance the true scansion, even when there is but one. On the whole, his treatment of the subject is the most satisfactory, perhaps, that has appeared.

4. Pp. 34-40. Continuation of O. Riemann's remarks on various questions of Latin syntax. In this article is discussed the question how the unreal imperfect subjunctive was turned into the infinitive. Admitting some weak places in the line of argument, he decides in favor of *-urum fuisse*. He cites and discusses all the examples that have been claimed for *-urum esse*, and gives a list of the certain and the doubtful examples of *-urum fuisse*.

5. Pp. 40-45. Frédéric Plessis critically discusses four passages of Propertius (iv, 1, 17-20; iv, 1, 73; ii, 1, 37-38; ii, 13, 19). His remarks merit attention.

6. Pp. 46-50. Jules Martha discusses the reasons that induced Cicero (Brutus, ch. xiv) to believe that certain men who lived before the Punic wars were eloquent. He concludes that Cicero was not influenced, as some think, by any histories in which fictitious speeches may have been ascribed to them, but inferred from the influence they wielded on critical occasions that they must have been able orators.

7. Pp. 51-55. H. d'Arbois Jubainville defends Liv. v, 34, 8 *per Taurinos saltusque Juliae Alpīs transcenderunt*, rejecting Madvig's emendation, *per Taurinos saltus vallemque Duriae Alpīs transcenderunt*. The *Alpīs Julia*, it is true, is far away from the Taurini, but the author most appositely remarks: "Un auteur, même un auteur de l'antiquité, peut quelquefois se contredire, et souvent il arrive que ses contradictions sont la partie la plus instructive de ses écrits." His theory, which seems very plausible, is that Livy drew from two contradictory sources. He shows what these sources

were and points out other instances of like confusion. The question is an interesting one, as its solution will show where the centre of gravity of the Celtic population was at that time. The earlier authority gave *per saltus Juliae Alpīs*, the later *per Taurinos*.

8. Pp. 56-58. S. Dosson, discovering that M. Hochart was really in earnest when he attempted to show that the works of Tacitus are a recent forgery and that they are mentioned by no writer before 1425, cites several instances in which authors quoted him *verbatim* or nearly so, and by name, at an earlier date.

9. Pp. 59-60. E. Audouin explains the origin of the contradiction between Caes. de Bell. Civ. i, 15 and Pompey's letters (Cic. ad Att. viii, 11 A; 12 A), and removes a difficulty in B. Civ. i, 30 and i, 37, 2.

10. Pp. 61-63. Noniana—critical discussion of six passages of Nonius, by Louis Havet.

11. P. 64. Louis Havet shows that the first syllable of *cicur* is, or may be, long in the three passages of Pacuvius where it has been considered short.

12. Pp. 65-75. Enniana—critical discussion of fifteen passages of Ennius, by Louis Havet.

13. P. 75. Louis Havet restores the two extant fragments of the *Aquae Caldae* of Atta.

14. Pp. 76-81. George Doncieux investigates the question who wrote [Tibul.] iv, 2-6. He concludes that the elegies 7-12 were composed by Sulpicia alone, el. 2, 4, 6 by Tibullus alone, and 3, 5 by both together, Sulpicia furnishing the sentiment and some expressive verses, Tibullus elaborating and completing.

15. P. 82. The *Vita Tibulli* begins: *Albius Tibullus, eques regalis*. For *regalis* has been substituted *Romanus*. Baehrens reads: *Albius Tibullus, eques R. e Gabis*. "G. D.," in the article before us, objects to the preposition, and reads *R. Gabis*. He also cites Hor. Epist. I 4 in *regione Pedana* as confirming *Gabis*, which was in the *regio Pedana*.

16. Pp. 83-84. In Plat. Rep. III 405 C, O. R. inserts 'H *oû* after *δικαστοῦ*, and cites several instances of *oûk, ἀλλά*—in reply to a double question, where the reply is adapted only to the second alternative. Cf. Gorg. 453 D.

17. Pp. 84-85. H. de la Ville de Mirmont proposes *Acmonio* for *Armonio* in Am. Marcellinus, xxii, 8, 17.

18. Pp. 86-96. Book Notices. (1). A. M. D. commends De syllabarum in trisemam longitudinem productarum usu Aeschyleo et Sophocleo scripsit Sigofredus Reiter, Leipzig and Prague, 1887. (2). A. describes the contents of Die Entstehung der griechischen Literatursprachen, by Ed. Zarncke, Leipzig, 1890, and pronounces the position taken by the author not altogether tenable. (3). Ch. Cucuel describes and favorably criticises Quaestiones scaenicae, diss. inaug. scripsit Fridericus Harzmann, Marpurgi

Cattorum, 1889. (4). Ch. Cucuel favorably criticises Denys d'Halicarnasse, Jugement sur Lysias, texte et traduction française, etc., par A. M. Desrousseaux et Max Egger, Paris, 1890, and suggests some slight improvements for the text, critical commentary and translation. (5). P. N. favorably mentions *Intorno all' opuscolo di Palefato de incredibilibus. Considerazioni di Nicolo Festa*. Florence and Rome, 1890. (6). A. briefly describes Fr. Kraner's editions of *Caes. Com. de Bel. Gal. and de Bel. Civ.*, Berlin, 1890 and 1880. (7). F. Plessis praises Schulze's *Römische Elegiker*, Berlin, 1890, and commends with some reserve Adolf Kiessling's 2d edition of *Hor. Odes and Epodes*, Berlin, 1890. (8). S. Chabert commends Lucian Müller, *De Accii fabulis disputatio*, Berlin, 1890. (9). L. D. makes rather unfavorable mention of Munro's *Lucretius* (translated into French by A. Reymond, Paris, 1890) and (10) of Schütz's *Hor. Odes and Epodes*, 3d ed., Berlin, 1889. (11). Anonymous praise of Jahn's *Eclogae, e Proclo de philosophia chaldaica*, Halle, 1891. (12). Alban Derroja makes favorable mention of Hime's *Introduction to the Latin Language*, London, 1890, but finds a few faults and errors. (13). E. C. notices *Les Scolies genevoises de l'Iliade, publiées . . . par J. Nicole*, Paris, 1891, and gives an account of the *Genevensis* 44. (14). Émile Chatelain praises highly and gives a brief analysis of *Le latin de Grégoire de Tours*, par Max Bonnet, Paris, 1890. (15). E. C. briefly notices *Sexti Pompei Festi de verborum significatu cum Pauli epitome: edidit Aemilius Thewrewk de Ponor, Pars I, Budapestini*, 1889, and (16) *Corpus glossariorum latinorum*, vol. IV: edidit G. Goetz, Leipzig, 1889, and (17) a work on the MSS of the letters of Pliny the Younger, by S. G. de Vries in the *Exercitationes palaeographicae in Bibliotheca Universitatis Lugduno-Batavae*, etc., Lugd. Batav., 1890. (18). Brief anonymous mention of *Chronologie de l'Empire romain*, publiée sous la direction de R. Cagnat, par George Goyau, Paris, 1891.

No. 2.

1. P. 97. R. Dareste calls attention to a fragment of a law of Solon (in the recently published *Scholia to Homer*) throwing light on *ἐξούλης*.

2. P. 98. Jules Nicole emends the passage referred to in (1).

3. Pp. 98-100. B. Haussoullier publishes his restoration of the mutilated column 31 of the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*, with Kenyon's comments on it.

4. Pp. 101-15. *Chemica Graeca, e codicibus MSS Monacensi 112 et Bernensi 579*, by Albert Jahn: elaborate critical discussion of numerous passages.

5. P. 116. J. Keelhoff shows that *ἐπίπλοα* should be stricken from the *Lexica*.

6. Pp. 117-30. Critical and metrical notes on *Commodianus*, by Léon Vernier.

7. Pp. 130-31. *Acciana*—critical notes on four fragments of Accius, by Louis Havet.

8. Pp. 132-38. H. Lebégue adopts the method of Alfred Jacob (see *Rev. de Phil.*, April, 1889) and corrects numerous errors in the dates of MSS contained in *Facsimilés des manuscrits grecs datés*, etc., published by H. Omont, Paris, 1890-91.

9. Pp. 139-54. Colonel Stoffel criticises *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, by Franz Fröhlich. Admitting the excellence of the work in every other respect, he finds and corrects numerous errors in the treatment of military affairs. He seems to hold the view that none but a military man can be competent to speak of the military affairs of the ancients.

10. Pp. 155-56. Jean Psichari explains *Soph. El.* 1-10, 159.

11. Pp. 156-60. Under the head of *Bulletin bibliographique*, B. Haus-soullier gives an account of the contents of Classical Texts from Papyri in the British Museum, including the newly discovered Poems of Herodas, edited by F. G. Kenyon. With autotype facsimiles of MSS British Museum. London, 1891.

No. 3.

1. P. 161. Announcement of the death of Othon Riemann, who died Aug. 16, 1892, aged *thirty-eight years*. The next volume of the Review will contain his biography.

2. Pp. 162-67. F. G. Kenyon furnishes some fragments of Herodas.

3. P. 167. F. Cumont calls attention to a letter of St. Gregory of Nyssa.

4. Pp. 168-74. Critical notes by C.-E. Ruelle on the Musical Problems ascribed to Aristotle.

5. P. 174. O. R. finds an example of *tamquam* = 'as if' in the sense of 'with the notion that' in Cicero (*Brut.* I 5).

6. Pp. 175-76. R. Cagnat shows from a recently discovered inscription that in *Plin. Hist. Nat.* V 4, 29, the true reading is *Chiniavense*.

No. 4 merely completes the *Revue des Revues*, begun in No. 1 and continued through Nos. 2 and 3.

MILTON W. HUMPHREYS.

CORRECTION.

I regret that in a footnote to my article on the verb *σκηνώ*, etc., on page 78 of this Journal, I misrepresented Professor Thayer's statement in his *Lexicon*. The passages cited in the note are complete for the New Testament only, not for 'the Scriptures.' The error was entirely mine. In the same footnote, for *Rev.* 12, 2 read 12, 12. Professor Thayer has kindly sent me another example of *κατασκηνώ*. The form is *κατασκηνοῦν*; it occurs in *Diod. Sic.* 19, 94, and should be classed with the seven cases mentioned at the bottom of page 78. The table on page 83 should be corrected to correspond.—M. H. MORGAN.

BRIEF MENTION.

1891 was a year of surprises, and among its important surprises may well be counted the Flinders Petrie papyri, which Mr. Mahaffy has edited with his wonted jauntiness. The fragments of the *Phaedo* of Plato contained in these papyri were eagerly scanned by Platonic scholars, but Platonic scholars were destined to a disappointment akin to that of Isokratean scholars in the presence of the Marseilles papyrus (A. J. P. VI 111). The Flinders Petrie fragments of the *Phaedo* are more than eleven hundred years older than our oldest MS and have the strong presumption of antiquity in their favor, and yet no sober scholar would buy back the entire papyrus text at the cost of the Bodleian. This sad state of things seems to amuse Mr. Mahaffy, whose interest in the classics is not devoid of a certain Robin Goodfellow malice, and he gravely tells us that the Flinders Petrie papyri represent a text that has not been doctored by the Alexandrians, who were all their lives in bondage to the fear of the hiatus, "and 'improved' the condition of Plato's text to an extent unsuspected by most modern scholars." And so he proceeds to edit the Flinders Petrie text and to point out here and there passages in which the Alexandrians have shifted the words in order to avoid that bugbear, the hiatus; for it seems that the avoidance of the hiatus is a superstition, fostered by Benseler's "tract," "which is too often quoted as conclusive." In short, our whole tradition is ruthlessly discredited. So long as there is enough of the Greek texts left out of which to construct parallels for Irish politics, Mr. Mahaffy will doubtless console himself, but what is to become of the feeble folk who make their houses in the rocks of the Greek text, what is to become of the minute scholars, the syntacticians, the statisticians and the whole tribe of *γωνιοβόμβυκες*? Fortunately, Mr. Mahaffy is not to have his way with these poor people, and USENER has come to their help in an essay as delightful as it is instructive—*Unser Platontext* (Göttinger Nachrichten, 1892, pp. 25-50, 181-215). In this paper Usener treats Mahaffy with perfect urbanity and shows his appreciation of what the brilliant Irishman has done, but he shows also that the Petrie text removes hiatus as well as creates it and disposes forever of the hiatus business. "Mir war es neu," he says, "dass unser bisheriger Platon irgend welche Empfindlichkeit gegen den Zusammenstoss von Vocalen verrathe. Man wird es mir nicht verargen wenn ich nicht zu verstehen vermag, wie dieser hiatenreiche Text hiatus-scheuen Grammatikern seinen Ursprung verdanken könne." To be sure, Usener might have added that Blass (*Attische Bereds.*² II 458) undertakes to show an avoidance of hiatus in some of the later dialogues of Plato, but there is no trace of any such avoidance in the *Phaedo*. After a careful investigation into the details of the various readings in the Petrie papyri,

Usener reaches the conclusion that, in spite of all the corruptions and all the interpolations introduced by ages of active use, the Bodleian is gold and the Flinders Petrie text pinchbeck. The Bodleian, like the priceless Σ of Demosthenes, goes back to a better tradition than that of the corrupt Alexandrian vulgate; for here, contrary to all experience in the run of our MSS, the later is the better and the earlier is the worse, and we are brought face to face with a riddle which Usener solves by referring these admirable MSS to their source in the great publishing house of T. Pomponius Atticus, whose Athenian texts competed with the slovenly copies of the old Alexandrian MSS. But the great Alexandrian critics still deserve our gratitude and our confidence, and Usener has done good service in vindicating their methods and their results.

With the most profound respect for the best type of English scholarship, I venture to say that England is the only country in the world in which a classical man would dare to prepare an edition of a Greek author with such an apparatus as Mr. E. C. MACKIE has set forth for our inspection in the preface to his *Menippus and Timon of Lucian* (Cambridge, At the University Press; New York, Macmillan and Co.). In that apparatus one looks in vain for Maurice Croiset, whom Mr. Mackie ignores as steadfastly as Mr. Bury in his *Nemeans* ignored Alfred Croiset, and one is not consoled by finding a conspicuous place given to Mr. Lucas Collins's slovenly book on Lucian in "Ancient Classics for English Readers," wherein Mr. Collins shows an extremely hazy knowledge of Greek. He did not know, for instance, or did not care to know, the difference between 'tongs' and 'anvil,' between 'shrewmouse' and 'weasel,' and actually wrote of the 'original Latin' of Suidas. Mr. Mackie makes no reference to Schmid's *Atticismus*, in which more than two hundred pages are devoted to the peculiarities of Lucian. But why particularize? The book reposes on the work of Hemsterhuis and Reitz, and nothing later is seriously considered.

Mr. D. H. HOLMES sends to *Brief Mention* the following list of slight errors noted in constant use of von Essen's invaluable *Index Thucydideus*:

P. 2, ἀγγέλλουσι, θ 1. 5, cited as pres. ind., should be pres. part. dat. and given below.—P. 12, αἰτία, δ 65. 19, should be cited δ 65. 9.—P. 37, ἀξιωματι also occurs at β 65. 14, not cited.—P. 39, ἀπείπον. Why is ἀπερούσιν, etc. (p. 40), not given under ἀπείπον, since ἐρῶ is given under εἶπον (p. 122)?—P. 138, ἐνεγέγραπτο, α 128. 34, should be cited on p. 112 under ἐγγράφω.—P. 141, ἐξέβαινον, ζ 65. 24, should be cited on p. 126 under ἐκβαίνω.—P. 143, ἐξώρμησε, ζ 88. 12 d, and ἐξώρμησαν, ζ 6. 14, should be cited under ἐξορμάω (same p.).—P. 154, ἐπεπονθήκει, η 38. 9, should be cited under πονέω (p. 374), instead of under ἐπιπονέω.—P. 155, ἐπισχῆσω, ζ 33. 34. Why is not this form given under ἐπέχω (p. 147), since fut. forms like it (e. g. στήσουσι) are given under ἐχω (p. 174)?—P. 157, ἐπεφύγει, δ 133. 25, should be cited under

φεύγω (p. 440) instead of under ἐπιφεύγω, which does not exist.—P. 244, μέλλωσι, α 60. 28, for η 60. 28.—P. 249, (1) μετὰ, β 62. 27, should be β 62. 28. (2) μετὰ, δ 9. 3, does not exist.—P. 316, (1) ὅμοιοι, β 45. 23, should be β 45. 33. (2) β 89. 25 should be β 89. 26.—P. 322, ὠρρώθησαν for ὠρρώδησαν.—P. 354, (1) πέμπουσιν, β 80. 18, should be β 80. 19. (2) πέμψαι, δ 27. 34, should be δ 27. 33.—P. 359, (1) περιερρή should be placed under περιρρέοντος above on same column. (2) περιεφρουροῦντο should be spaced, as being a first occurrence.—P. 362, πλείω, β 89. 29, should be β 89. 30.—P. 379, προύβη should not be spaced as being a first occurrence.—P. 381, προεροῦντα should be given under προεῖπον (p. 380); cf. p. 39, ἀπειπον, above.—P. 382, προμαθῶν should be placed before προνύμαχοντο, in alphabetical sequence.—P. 383, προειρημένον, etc., should be given under προεῖπον (p. 380); cf. p. 39, ἀπειπον, above.—P. 395, εἶρηκα and the rest ought, consistently, to be put under εἶπον.

Mr. BURY's edition of the *Isthmian Odes of Pindar* (New York, Macmillan & Co.) follows the same lines as his *Nemeans*. So far from being weaned from the doctrine of the recurrent word, he clings to it passionately, and extracts from it the last drop of the "milk of Paradise." The same cleverness and suggestiveness characterize introductions and commentary, the same diffuseness and the same fancifulness, the same fitfulness, not to say backwardness, in acknowledging obligation where acknowledgment is due. The most simple matters are stated with the air of one who sees a new planet swim into his ken, and the notes are loaded with statistics that are absolutely lacking in point. ἀπαξ εἰρημένα are sometimes significant, or can be made significant, but the mere mention of the fact that this or that word occurs only once in Pindar does not seem to be of any particular value. And even then he is not always right. The solitariness of ἔθειρα (I 4, 9) hardly counts in the presence of ταννέθειρα (O 2, 26). In several of his notes Mr. Bury calls attention to the varying quantity of vowels before mute and liquid, πᾶτρα here and πᾶτρα there, πῶτμος six times and πῆτμος eight times. But apart from a comprehensive study of quantity in Pindar, these are dead facts. Far otherwise do these facts appear in the generalization of Breyer, who in his *Analecta Pindarica* has reached the conclusion that "in the lengthening of vowels before mute and liquid the dactylo-epitrites approach very closely the Homeric usage, while the logaoedics and paeonians deviate from the standard and approach the Attic norm."

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Thanks are due to Messrs. B. Westermann & Co., New York, for material furnished.

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CORRIGENDA

TO A. J. P., VOL. XIII, No. 2, pp. 139-70.

Page 141, line 32: delete 'outward.'

Page 148, line 10: for semicolon read colon.

Page 148, line 13: for colon read semicolon.

Page 155, line 24: for 'shall' read 'should.'

Page 158, line 30: after 'issue' insert 'And how will Theseus prevent this undetected accomplice from rendering help? he may have joined the guards already, for aught that Theseus knows.'

Page 163, line 8: for 'to madness nearly are' read 'are sure to madness near.'

Page 166, line 4: insert δὲ after the first τῷ, and in the following lines delete 'in a place . . . original reading.'

Page 166, line 10: L is not 'probably' older than the main body of Suidas: possibly it is, but the probability is the other way.

Page 167, line 7 from foot: delete 'much.'

Page 167, last line: for 'then' read 'the.'

Page 168, line 4: for 'Plut.' read 'Plat.'

Page 169, line 13 from foot: λ should be uncial.

A. E. HOUSMAN.